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Preface

I began my research on Anna Ella Carroll certain I
had discovered a much-maligned, forgotten heroine of
American history, whom I would redefine and properly place

in historiography.

To try to find the truth about a woman

surrounded by so much legend has been an enlightening
experience.

Sorting out her story as best I could has made

me aware of how complex the past is and how difficult
biography as a craft is.

The late Distinguished Teaching

Professor Ralph Adams Brown, biographer of John Adams, had
taught me that my sophomore year in college.

He was right.

To him I render my thanks, as well as to Ellis Johnson and

Donald Stewart, who introduced me to history and to Anna
Ella Carroll as author of the Tennessee Campaign.

Carroll was one of the few women discussed in the
Civil War course Stewart and Johnson taught at Cortland
State.

She was a legendary figure, and like all good

legends, there was at least some sense and some truth to her
claim.

Discovering the whole story turned out to be
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difficult.

In part, the difficulties lay with source materials.
Some of Carroll's papers had been preserved, but many had

been lost during her life.
house fire in the 1940s.

Others accidentally burned in a

The collection in the Maryland

Historical Society is extensive, but consists mostly of

letters received.

Tracing letters written that still

survive was a hit-or-miss task.

A large cache discovered in

1970 by Charles McCool Snyder in Millard Fillmore's papers
in Oswego, New York, helped the most to portray a

three-dimensional figure instead of a noble legend.

So did

letters from Carroll to William Henry Seward and Thurlow
Weed at the University of Rochester.

But most inquiries to

collections of Carroll's correspondents resulted in a

disappointing reply.

important figures in Carroll's life remain shadowy.
Lemuel Evans, John Causin, and her father, Thomas King

Carroll, left behind little information.

Even tracing her

family history proved difficult as probate records for the
appropriate period have not survived.

There were, to be

sure, articles and books about Carroll's life, but virtually

all were repetitions of the story of her military claim that

she tried for so long to have the world accept and believe.
To look beyond that story has been my task.

I have

had a fascinating glimpse of a nineteenth-century anomaly:

a well-educated Southern woman, a Unionist who hated slavery
ix

but refused to support emancipation, a citizen of a state
known for religious toleration, yet a virulent

At the same time, I have been frustrated by

anti-Catholic.

research that at times raised more questions than it

answered.

Was she a swindler, a fraud, a cheat?

Did the

military maliciously destroy records that would have proven
she was a brilliant strategist?

still uncertain.

The answer to the first is

The second I hope I have answered at last.

One of the final tasks and great pleasures in
finishing work is thanking those people who helped you.

Professor Ludwell Johnson read my manuscript several times.
He questioned my generalizations, sharpened my prose, and
I thank him for his timely

repositioned many of my verbs.
efforts.

My appreciation extends as well to Professor Cam

Walker and to Editor George Hoemann.

They also read parts

of this work and gave invaluable help, criticism, and

suggestions.

Committee members Boyd Coyner and Judy Ewell

posed occasional questions that led me in new directions to

the benefit of the whole.

Part of this work will appear in

a book on American women and foreign policy, edited by

Professor Edward Crapol.

His patience, tact, and superb

editorial criticism are, I hope, reflected to some degree in
the entire work.
Del Moore, Coordinator of Reference Services, and

Carol Linton, Head of Interlibrary Loan at Sworn Library,
X

were unstintingly generous with their time and labor.

Carol

in particular accomplished miracles ferreting out obscure
source materials and convincing libraries to loan them to me

for extended periods of time.

Along with these two

particular individuals, I must render my appreciation to the

College and the History Department.

They provided two

research grants, microfilming costs, computer space and
time, and generally made the mechanics of my work much
easier.

Karen Stuart of the Maryland Historical Society was
helpful from the beginning of this project, as was Marcia

Miller.

As always, librarians and archivists went far

beyond the call of duty at the Library of Congress, the

National Archives, the Hall of Records in Annapolis, the New

York Public Library, sue Oswego, and the University of
Rochester.

Carroll's childhood house still stands in Somerset
County.

Dick and E. B. Warbasse graciously invited me into

their home and showed me the wooden shoe that was said to

have been worn by a slave at Kingston Hall during the tenure
of the Carrolls.

They provided hospitality and interest,

even in a revisionist history of their house's most famous
occupant.

My thanks to Paul Touart of the Somerset County

Historical Trust for helping me find that lovely home and
its hospitable occupants.
The love and support of my family and friends during
xi

my work has made my life a joy.

Ken and Nora Coryell

provided not only sympathetic conversation but generously
gave me a home away from home during research trips.

They

and their children supported my efforts on the East coast,
as did my parents and the rest of my family in Kansas.

My friends and colleagues became my family here in
Williamsburg.

In particular, I want to thank Holly Mayer,

Gail Terry, and Camille Wells, who asked me questions

designed to focus my work more clearly;

the Williamsburg

Presbyterian Churdh Choir, especially Jeanne Kent and Tom

Marshall, who gave me escape and sustenance through mus io
for four years;

and Ben Kellam, who drew maps, served as a

valuable resource to explain the Eastern Shore to me, and

helped me look at my work with an English major's eye.

Most

particularly, I want to thank John and Ruth Ann Coski, and

Mary and James Perry.

They not only listened, but provided

caring support far beyond any call of friendship for myself
and for Ivan.

The errors that remain, when all is said and done,
are mine.
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ABSTRACT

Born on the Eastern Shore of Maryland in 1815, Anna
Ella Carroll was the eldest daughter of Maryland Governor
Thomas King Carroll. By the early 1850s, she had become a
political pamphleteer for the American, or Know-Nothing,
Party, a nativist and anti-Catholic organization. She wrote
a number of books and election pamphlets supporting the
presidential candidacy of Millard Fillmore in 1856. In the
election of 1860, she promoted the candidacy of John Minor
Botts of Virginia, a strong Unionist.

Once the Civil War began, Carroll worked to support
Lincoln's actions, often criticized as exta-legal, and wrote
several pamphlets on his behalf. She argued, as did Lincoln
and his other supporters, that the President could wield
war-making powers to preserve the Union, even if wielding
those powers infringed on certain legal rights. A number of
politicians acknowledged the value of her arguments
supporting the President's position, and one pamphlet was
printed by the administration and laid on every desk in
Congress.
Carroll's most famous work came during the fall and
winter of 1861, when she visited the Western Theatre of the
war and devised a plan to invade the Confederacy by going up
the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, instead of do™ the
Mississippi River. Unknown to her, the Union and
Confederate forces both were well aware of the strategic
value of the rivers, and already had plans to proceed in the
manner she suggested to the War Department. Convinced she
had presented a plan that had saved the Union by providing a
successful route of invasion, Carroll spent much of the rest
of her life attempting to convince Congress that she should
be generously awarded for her work.

Carroll's cause was adopted by the suffragists about
1880. Until the turn of the century, suffragists'
organizations and periodicals supported Carroll and her
cause as prime examples of man's inhumanity to woman.
Carroll's story was revived again in the 1940s by various
writers. Although her claim to have developed the military
strategy used by the Union army in Tennessee had been
disproved, it was not until the 1970s that Carroll's other,
more substantial work as a constitutional writer and
political pamphleteer attracted attention and scholarly
examination. This work considers her life and examines the
methodology she employed that enabled her to work within the
political sphere while retaining her connection to the
"female sphere."
xiii
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Chapter 1

Politician'a Daughter

The weather is hot on the Eastern Shore of Maryland

in August.

Humidity can lie like a blanket across the flat

farms and small villages.

Late afternoon thunderstorms do

not relieve the heat but make it closer, till moving itself

becomes an effort.

A breeze from Tangier Sound or off the

Big Annemessex River might break the heat in Somerset County

for a little while, but soon that breeze would die and the

oppressive air would return, along with the hordes of
mosquitos and the whirring of cicadas.

Anna Ella Carroll was born August 29, 1815, in

Somerset County, Maryland, the eldest child of Thomas King

Carroll and Julianna Stevenson Carroll.

Well-educated,

independent and articulate, Carroll became a political
writer and lobbyist in the mid-nineteenth century.

Actively

involved in politics throughout her life, she achieved

notoriety when she claimed to have developed military

L
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strategy that led to Union victories during the Civil War.
Carroll used her intellectual gifts and her ability to

manipulate politicians and the press to developed a
methodology that enabled her to pursue a lifelong interest
in politics within the cultural strictures of the "woman's
sphere."

The Carrolls of Somerset County claimed a common

ancestry with two of the most distinguished families of

Maryland, the Catholic Carrolls and the Protestant Kings.
The Carrolls came to America in 1689.

Charles Carroll,

patriarch of the line, had been appointed receiver of Lord
Baltimore's rents from the Maryland colonists by 1691.

One

of his grandsons was Charles Carroll, "The Signer" of the

Declaration of Independence.

Another was the Most Reverend

John Carroll, the first Catholic archbishop in the United
States.^

Kinsman to Charles and John was Colonel Henry James
Carroll.% In 1792, Colonel Carroll had married Elizabeth
Barnes King, daughter of Thomas King of Somerset County, and
a descendant of Sir Robert King, a Presbyterian dissenter
whose family had left Ireland for Maryland in 1682.

One

of the richer planters on the Eastern Shore of Maryland,
King was less than pleased at his only child's choice of

husband, but he settled the young couple on an adjoining
estate, Bloomsborough, in Somerset County.

The mixed

marriage of Catholic and Protestant produced three sons.

In
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1798, at age five, the eldest boy, Thomas King Carroll, went

to live with his grandfather King on the family estate of

Kingston Hall, where he became "the object of Sir Thomas
King's devoted affection and brightest hopes."*
Thomas King Carroll was brought up in the best

English gentry tradition, with coaches driven by slaves in
livery and all the accoutrements of an English country life
transplanted to Maryland.

About 1802, Thomas King died, and

Thomas King Carroll was joined at Kingston Hall by his
parents and brothers.

In 1808, Carroll enrolled at the

University of Pennsylvania, where he earned a bachelor's

degree in 1811 and a master's degree in 1815.

He studied

law and became partner to Robert Goodloe Harper, the

son-in-law of Charles Carroll of Carrollton.

On June 23,

1814, he married Julianna Stevenson of Baltimore, the

daughter of a prominent physician, Dr. Henry Stevenson.
Dr. Stevenson had converted his home in Baltimore, Parnassus

Hill, into a charity smallpox hospital for the city in 1754
in an effort to promote smallpox innoculation.

Another

relative, Dr. John Stevenson, was said to have laid out the
plan for the city of Baltimore.

While on his honeymoon with the beautiful Julianna,
word reached Thomas King Carroll that his father had died

and Kingston Hall was now his.

He returned to the

plantation and its liveried slaves and began his career as a

planter.

But farming did not particularly interest him, and
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politics did.

After his return to Kingston Hall, and before

his daughter Anna was born, Carroll stood for election and
won a seat in the Maryland legislature, the youngest member
ever elected.

His twenty-first birthday came the day before

he took his seat.^ His political activities would
eventually lead him to the governorship of Maryland.
The state which Carroll served as legislator and

governor has been called by one historian "an American
microcosm."? Its border position straddled the

agricultural economy of the South and the growing
industrialization of the North.

Maryland was never

adequately or comfortably defined as a "northern" or

"southern" state in national matters.

By the time of the

American Revolution, grain had replaced tobacco as the

primary staple crop and Baltimore with its active harbor was

the fastest-growing city in the new nation, but black

slavery and the plantation system of agriculture still
flourished in the state.

In 1663, some thirty years after

the colony had been founded, there had been enough slaves in
Maryland to elicit statutory recognition of their existence

and legal status.

While in 1783 Maryland had banned the

slave trade, and in 1794 had strengthened laws against
importation, the large plantations in southern Maryland and

on the Eastern Shore needed slave labor to survive.

Its

abolition was unlikely, given the political power of those

areas.

8
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Even through the first part of the nineteenth

century, as the Maryland economy diversified and the cities
began to grow, state politics remained the province of the
Two-thirds of the lawmakers

slave-owning landed gentry.

from 1789 ^o 1830 were from the plantations of the Eastern

Shore and southern Maryland.

In this group were men such as

Robert Goodloe Harper, who re-organized the Maryland

Federalist party in 1808.9

Jeffersonian Republicans

were the ascendant party in the state until 1812, but the

Federalists predominated through most of the War of 1812.

A

British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay during the war halted

Baltimore's growth, severely limited Maryland's trade, and
divided the Federalists into pro-War and anti-War factions

within the state of Maryland, paralleling the party's
national split.In spite of the Federalists' national

decline after the war, however, the party retained

considerable life in Maryland until 1821, when it rather

suddenly dissolved.

The Jeffersonian Republicans became the

predominant party in state politics again, but little
partisanship characterized voting patterns.

Older, landed

interests still retained most of the political control.
Mot until the mid-18206 did partisan politics again

come to life in Maryland.

The diversity of candidates in

the 1824 presidential race reawakened political Interest

throughout the state.

William H. Crawford was nominated by

an official Republican caucus, a method that had been
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falling into disrepute, and failed to gain much support in
the state.

Candidate John C.

Calhoun, on the other hand,

enjoyed considerable notice from former Federalists such as

Robert Goodloe Harper and former state senator Virgil

Maxey.

But it was Andrew Jackson who attracted a more

substantial portion of former Federalists than did the other
candidates.

Baltimore.

Popular support for Jackson was strong in
Calhoun supporters, including former party

leaders Maxey, Harper, and Roger Brooke Taney,

Jackson's candidacy.

defected to

Former Federalists, eager to rejoin a

party with power, perceived Jackson as the only candidate

"independent of party intrigue and control."

He was a man

"'without an agreement with any party, or any combination of
any knot of . . . intriguers.'"

John Quincy Adams defeated Jaclcson in Maryland in
the 1824 election, and won the national election, which was

decided in the House of Representatives.

Adams carried

southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore, but Jackson won

strongly in Baltimore and the west.

By 1827, preparing for

the next election, parties had coalesced more firmly.

majority of the Federalists went with Adams' men;

The

the old

Republicans with Jackson's, along with many of the leaders
of the old Federalist party.

The geographical divisions

remained the same in the presidential election the following

year.

In southern counties and the Eastern Shore, even

where enthusiasm for Adams' program of federally-funded

7

internal improvements was slight, Marylanders preferred

Adams over the more "imprudent" and hot-headed Jackson.

14

But Baltimore and the western counties maintained their

support for Jackson and him motto:

"'Jackson and

Reform.'"15 go did at least one Eastern Shore politician:
Thomas King Carroll.

Carroll had been a member of the State House of

Delegates in 1816 and 1817 and had worked as a judge in the
Levy Court of Somerset County before being appointed Judge

of the Orphans' Court in February 1826.

In December 1829,

after considerable fighting between former Federalists and

former Republicans, the Jacksonians elected former

Federalist Carroll as governor of the state,ni, term as
governor lasted a little over one year, however, as the
Jacksonians lost power.

The political fallout from

Jackson's vetoes of internal improvements and, more

importantly, over his distribution of executive patronage,
gave Carroll only twelve months in office.
accomplish little.

He could

He did manage to promote education,

urging the establishment of a state-wide public school
system, an improved University of Maryland, and
congressional appropriations for copying British-owned

Revolutionary War records.

17

President Jackson's Maysville Road veto and a veto

of a proposed Washington-to-Frederick turnpike spelled

disaster for the Democrats in a state as intensely

8

interested in internal improvements as was Maryland.

18

The

Jacksonians quickly lost control of the state legislature,

and in November 1830, Carroll lost the gubernatorial
election to the anti-Jacksonian Daniel Martin.19 Upon

Carroll's retirement from the governorship in January of
1831, he was elected to the state senate but refused that

position, as well as the suggestion he run for United
States' senator.

He returned to the pressing business of

trying to make a success of his plantation in Somerset
on
County.
Carroll had his work out out for him as he returned
home to Kingston Hall.

The 1819-22 recession had badly

damaged the economy of Baltimore and Maryland, and the state
91
was only just beginning to recover by the early 1830s. -

The state's heavy and financially imprudent investments in

transportation projects, such as railroads, turnpikes, and
canals, led to substantial and unpopular tax increases to
pay off the resultant deficit.^ The farming sector of the

economy had suffered even more as those taxes strained a
collapsing agricultural base.

The tobacco crop had given

way to wheat by 1815, but that crop was decimated by an

infestation of the Hessian fly.

Land use reverted to

tobacco, which exhausted the soil, or to scrub pine, which

was not a cash crop.

Farmers' limited liquid assets meant

agricultural experimentation to increase production was

seldom possible, and the failure of most state

9

transportation projects to extend to more rural areas

further reduced the vitality of the agricultural sector,
particularly in the older and more remote counties along the
23
Eastern Shore.
Added to Carroll's problems of recession, high

taxes, soil exhaustion, transportation difficulties, and the
always cyclical and variable nature of farming, was the
growing problem of slavery.

In spite of Maryland's

increasing resemblance to northern states in other areas,
its hold to this tie with the South contributed to its

tendency toward occasional pro-Southern sectionalism and

pro-slavery political positions.

That attitude was most

prevalent on the Eastern Shore and in southern Maryland,

where most slaveholders resided.

Carroll felt differently than many of his neighbors.

Although conditions for slaves in Maryland were relatively
milder than for bondsmen further south, the institution did
not appeal to Carroll.

" Kingston Hall had a substantial

slave population at the time of his inheritance, and Carroll
spent much of his time trying to keep the plantation solvent

enough to prevent their sale.25 He did not free them,
apparently feeling, as did many Maryland slaveowners, that
freed slaves had no proper or safe place in a slave-owning

society, but he was an advocate of the African colonization
movement for free blacks.

Though there is no evidence

Carroll was a member of the Maryland State Colonization

10

Society, as were other leading Marylanders of his

acquaintance such as Harper and Charles Carroll, undoubtedly
he supported its efforts to remove freedmen and women from

their unpopular position in the state to the Maryland colony
in Liberia.26

In this environment, Carroll's favorite child, Anna
a lesser branch of a

Ella, "Miss Anne," was raised:

well-known family, a gentry background maintained by the
most precarious of finances, a border state that vacillated

between sectionalism and nationalism in its society,
economy, and politics.
childhood.

Little is known about Carroll's

She had five younger sisters:

Henrietta, who married;

Sallie, Ada, and

Julianna, who died in 1860, and

Mary, who remained single.

She had two younger brothers:

Henry James, known as Harry, who became a land speculator,
and Thomas King, who became a poor country doctor.

Another

younger brother died in infancy.

Carroll's upbringing seems to have been as mired as
the world in which she lived.

education as he would a son's.

Her father treated her
She read Coke and Blackstone

on law, Shakespearean drama, and Kantian philosophy in her
father's library, as he had done in his grandfather's.

Her

domestic education was apparently not neglected, but her
interests and enjoyment lay with books rather than with the

accepted and common accomplishments of most upper-class
young women of the period— drawing, music, needlework, and

11

household tasks.

Politics fascinated her.

By 1830, when

her father took office in Annapolis, Carroll's political

education was such that letters to her "wisest and dearest

of fathers" were sprinkled with precocious political

comments amongst the news of home.

"It is my principle, as

well as that of lycurgus," she wrote at age 14, "to avoid

'mediums'—that is to say, people who are not decidedly one
In politics they are the inveterate

thing or the other.
enemies of the state.

At fifteen, during her father's brief tenure as

governor, Carroll was sent to Kiss Margaret Mercer's
boarding school in West River, Maryland, to finish her
education.

30

Although she seems to have spent less than a

year under Mercer's tutelage, her teacher's views on

education and slavery must have served to reinforce her
father's opinions.

Mercer too was the daughter of a

governor of Maryland and had been taught by her father.

She

preferred the concrete to the metaphysical in her teachings
in science, philosophy, ethics, and religion.

Beyond

educating her female students for their "'appropriate
sphere'" wherein their "'throne is the nursery, and beside

the cradle,'" Mercer believed her girls needed an education
"'as may prepare them for the great and good measures, the

wisdom and the virtue which are requisite to the safety and
prosperity °60 of the South «

But Mercer mintax^ed, as

Carroll would in later years, that educated women must not
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despise "the refinements and delicacy which communicate an

appropriate and attractive grace to the female character.
These can never be laid aside, no matter how great the

positive acquirements without a violation of the laws of
nature."32

Like many woman in the 1820s and 1830s, Mercer was

interested in the abolition of slavery.

Her position

foreshadowed the one that Carroll would take twenty years

later.

Aware of the economic and social upheaval for both

master and slave that accompanied emancipation, Mercer

preferred gradual emancipation with compensation for owners

and voluntary colonization of freed slaves.

She bought

slaves herself and freed them, hiring some to work on her
estate, and providing passage to Liberia for those who

wished to go.

She asked her students to contribute to the

cause and corresponded with northern abolitionist leaders
such as Gerrit Smith in search of support for her programs.

The increasing impatience of abolitionists, however,
eventually prompted a break with them.

Mercer wanted

abolition, but, she wrote, "'I will temper my zeal with as
much discretion as my nature possesses. ' "

While Mercer ' s

position on education and slavery no doubt met with Thomas

Carroll's approval, his finances apparently did not allow

Anne to continue her education.

Ex-Governor Carroll

returned to Kingston Hall with his daughter in January 1831.

His wife Julianna was ill and his plantation approaching

13

financial ruin.

As difficult as farming was, by all accounts Carrol1
was a poor manager of finances as well.

His refusal to sell

unneeded slaves, while no doubt viewed as a humanitarian

gesture on his part, did not prevent him from using those
sama slaves as collateral for mortgages required to pay off

loans he had co-signed for improvident friends. 3* The
Chancery Court records of Somerset County contain several

lawsuits in which Carroll was required to pay off mortgages

for others.

Carroll had a particularly difficult time in

1835 and 1836, as he sold two slaves, a pair of horses and a

carriage, and "one black horse and one sorrel 1 [sic] horse"

to satisfy judgments against him.
By the mid-1830s, Anne Carroll took the first steps

of what would become her lifelong task of trying to help her
family, and particularly her father, stay afloat financially
as she opened a boarding school on the plantation.

Her

attempt to postpone the inevitable did not succeed.

The

school closed, and in 1837, as a financial panic swept the
country, Thomas King Carroll lost Kingston Hall.

It was

sold by the sheriff, and the family moved to Castle Haven, a
smaller estate in Church Creek, Dorchester County.

Unfortunately, little is known about Anne Carroll in

the decade between 1840 and 1850.

She seems to have left

her family's home around 1840 and gone to live in Baltimore

and Washington.

In later years she lived in boarding houses
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with a servant or two;

more than likely she established

that pattern in this decade, since no evidence suggests that

she established a separate household.

37

She apparently

worked as a promotional writer for railroad lobbyists, and

contributed letters and short articles on political matters
to local newspapers.3* Since the vast majority of her work
was penned anonymously or under a pseudonym, examples of her
39
writing are difficult to find and to document.
She
commuted often between Baltimore and Washington, always

searching for a way to make money for herself and her

family.

In one letter, written in November 1848 from

Washington, she complained that her latest financial plans
had fallen through and that arranging a mortgage on some
Maryland real estate would have to suffice to raise funds so
she could return to Maryland to care for her ailing parents.

Her father recovered;

her mother did not and died on July

31, 1849.40
Carroll's departure from the capital city had been
only temporary.

By April 1849, she had returned and

petitioned the new Whig Secretary of State, John M. Clayton,
for a job for her father as Naval Officer of Baltimore.
Thomas Carroll had become a Whig by the 1840s and had served
Maryland's Whig party as a lottery commissioner.Carroll

obtained the position and served for four years.
*

*
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With her father’s immediate financial future more

secure, Anne Carroll began to involve herself and her pen
more deeply in national politics.

At the age of 35,

unencumbered by husband or child, she took full advantage of
her intelligence, her education, and her family connections

to participate in the political life of the nation’s
capital.

Because she was a woman, Carroll’s participation was

necessarily limited.

She did not choose the paths of

woman’s rights, abolition, or reform, as did many political
women of the mid-nineteenth century.

But she was determined

to exercise influence over leading politicians.

Through her

letters and meetings, she hoped to have an effect on
political appointments.

She would suggest her father as a

candidate for office regularly, after his tenure as Naval
Officer had ended;

she would also suggest and eventually

demand, appointments for many of her friends and for persons

she thought would serve the government well.

Carroll’s

unusual education and natural inclination toward politics

had served to train her mind.

skills as writer and lobbyist.

By 1850, she had honed her
Her attempt to work her way

into the circles of national power could now begin.
From the few letters of Carroll’s that survive from

the early 1850s, it is clear that she did not believe in
wasting time or energy communicating with the lower echelons

of bureaucracy.

For her father’s appointment as Naval
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Officer of Baltimore she had written directly to the
Secretary of State, even though his appointment was from the

Department of the Treasury.

But, she wrote the Secretary,

"so high is my appreciation of yourself, so perfect is my
confidence in the efficiency of your power to serve me, that
I must trust to your own kindness" to excuse a daughter from
4P
making the effort to find a "loved Father" a job.
Carroll's flowery phrases were typical of
nineteenth-century writing and served well as part and

parcel of her method to attract the attention of political

leaders as she searched for patronage positions,

she

appealed first to the intelligence and discernment of those

to whom she wrote, then to their sentimental side.

Near the

end of President Millard Fillmore's term, she began a mostly

one-sided correspondence with him that would last for over
twenty years.

She sent him a manuscript to read, which he

returned "with thanks for the privilege of perusing it."

Disproportionately encouraged by his polite reply, she wrote

to reassure him that while the Whigs were in "disastrous"
shape for the coming election, at least "the American people

have already stamped an impress of approbation upon your
administration, which posterity will cherish for ages to

come."43 By May 1852, Carroll, who had been only

momentarily deflected by Fillmore's suggestion that she go
through channels for a position for a friend, desired an

appointment with him for "very cogent reasons" to discuss
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the job.

She reassured Fillmore that it would be "the only

case with which I shall ever presume to invite especial

Signing her letter, "your little friend,

Interposition."

A. E. Carroll," Carroll played upon Fillmore's vanity and

her own supposed frail femininity to convince Fillmore to do
a favor for her.

After all, she wrote, "no selfish

aspiration, no sordid interest, no political distinction has
actuated me."

It was just the good of the country and their

friendship at stake.**

A few days later Carroll wrote Fillmore again, this
time to pass on good news she had heard regarding his
renomination prospects, but warning him that "traitors

within your own camp" were eroding his support.

Within this

letter, Carroll made clear her awareness of the limitations

placed upon her by her sex, as well as presenting her
rationale for exceeding those limits by lobbying for
positions and discussing politics.
Honored Sir, it may look unique for an "American lady"
to be so heartily embarked in the interest of the
political condition of the country, but I am sure it
will be considered a pardonable offence, when I tell
you that by blood and name and spirit I am identified
with those who largely contributed to achieve and
perpetuate our free institutions. And that by
education and social position I have been ever led to
an intelligent apprehension of the structure and
entire organisation of our political system--And a
consequent appreciation of the wisdom and virtue of
those, who have signally upheld them—
Then it is no marvel that I should turn to you, with
an increasing admiration .... ypyr very truest and
bast little friend, A. E. Carroll.

18

Carroll attended the Whig national convention in
Baltimore in June 1852.

She was crushed by Fillmore's

defeat, telling him when she discovered "that the friends of

KT. Webster would never come over to you and that hope had

fled, I almost sunk under it in the gallery."^ Sorrow

over Fillmore's defeat did not blind her to the need for

speed for obtaining any political largesse, however.
Carroll wrote five days later renewing pressure on Fillmore

to appoint a friend of hers to a position and to do it for

her and for the sake of their friendship:

"I do entreat you

by all that is true, by all that is faithful , by all that
will contribute to my happiness . .

.

She would see him

that evening and no doubt expected the good word then.*?

When "unfriendly sources" later told her no appointment

would be made, she refused to believe Fillmore would betray
her thus, and made the rather peculiar request that he make
the appointment anyway, just "to show that the wisdom of a
certain person is not altogether impregnable.

By the end of Fillmore's term, Carroll regarded his

failure to meet her demands as a personal affront.

"If the

President had any disposition to serve me which he

professes," she wrote to Treasury Secretary Thomas Corwin,
whom Carroll had apparently known for some time, she was

"satisfied such a post might be had . .

. ."

It was time

for Corwin to act on her request instead, in the "brief
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period" of official power he had left at his disposal.

Once

again, Carroll emphasized her friendship with the official

as the justification for fulfilling her request.

"I know

you will not forget your most faithful, your most devoted

and eternal friend."^ Friendship was a recurring theme in

Carroll's demands for positions for friends, and she sought
to maintain contact with political leaders even after they
left office, in case their political power did not wane.

Even after Fillmore and Cozwin were out of office and could

do no more for her, she continued to write to them as if to
reassure herself both of their continued friendship and the

legitimacy of her continued demands for jobs.

"I could not

but feel," she wrote Fillmore, three days after his
successor's inauguration, "that the position I occupy

justified me in making it [the patronage request]—because I

am yr true & faithful and eternal friend . . .
Just what Carroll's position was, as opposed to how

she perceived it, is unclear.

She did not hesitate to write

to the highest officials in the land, such as the new
Secretary of State, William Marcy, and she also had enough

influence to see them in person.

An interview with Marcy

had "filled my eyes with tears and my heart with sorrow,"

and she followed it up with a letter written on behalf of

her father who would lose his position in Baltimore with the
incoming Democratic administration.

her request to save her father's job.

Marcy had not granted
"As a Parent, as a
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gentleman, I appeal to you," she pleaded, "to sustain the
efforts of a daughter, on behalf of a pure and exemplary
Father.Regardless of the degree of access Carroll may
have had, either due to her family's name, her sex, or her
womanly charms, she did not possess enough influence to

obtain what she requested.

Her father was removed from

office, and many of the requests she made on behalf of
others for positions were denied.

Carroll's political training served to keep her
aware of and responsive to the shifting sands of politics.

At the same time she wrote to the departing Fillmore and

Corwin with protestations of faithfulness, she began
corresponding with William Henry Seward, one of the major

powers in the Whig party, and leader of the anti-Fillmore

faction in New York.

She praised his political acumen and

his role in the nomination of Winfield Scott for the

election of 1852, for "where would have been our prospects
for success with any other name than Winfield Scott?"
Seward's support of Scott over Daniel Webster had been in
part responsible for Fillmore's inability to make any

political deal that might result in his renomination, but no

matter.

Carroll was a politician and a pragmatist.

After

commenting upon the "imbecility" of the Southern Whigs who
had split from the party over Scott's failure to make clear

his support for the compromise of 1850 and praising Seward
as "the leader" of the Whig Party, she closed her letter by
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requesting Seward to send his opinion of the party's chances
in New York to her at the Whig Committee Rooms in

Washington. 52
As she had done when corresponding with Fillmore,

Carroll was careful to express her awareness of the
limitations placed upon her by her sex as she wrote.

"I am

a lady, but by blood & name and spirit identified, with
those, who contributed greatly to establish and perpetuate

our free institutions."

Carroll was very conscious of the

singularity of her proclivity toward politics, but she told

Seward, "by education & association my interest is more than
that of ladies ordinarily.

I read, think 5 write .

. . ."

She continued to flatter Seward's abilities prior to the

election and continued to apologize for her temerity,
excusing it as coming "from the impulses of a frank and
generous nature, without any of those considerations which
the mere politician would cautiously inquire into."53

in spite of those reassurances, and in spite of the
Whig loss in November 1852, Carroll remained convinced of
Seward's importance in the party and was determined to

continue contact.

As she ceased writing to the loser

Fillmore (except for notes of condolence upon the deaths of

his wife and daughter),5^ she began to pressure Seward to
use his supposed influence to restore her father to his
position in Baltimore or to secure for him "an early and
lucrative post."

"I feel you can apreciate the exertions of
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a daughter for a dear and honored Parent," she wrote,

"especially when that effort is impelled by sacred and
imperious considerations, which may involve life
itself."55 once again, Carroll combined the presumed

political sagacity of the appointment with an emotional

appeal that placed her lobbying for a political position
within the province of the "womanly sphere."

Carroll's attempt to save her father's position or
get him a new one failed.

The resulting scramble to keep

him afloat financially resulted in "a state of mind almost
partalcing of dementation," under the influence of which she
addressed a long letter to Seward that presented a detailed

portrait of the degree to which her father's financial
gg
ineptitude affected Carroll.
While Carroll later apologized to Seward and asked
him to forget he had ever received it, her letter was

remarkably frank in its depiction of Carroll's concern and

the sacrifices required by her "to relieve my dear
Father ... in freeing himself, from an entanglement,
brought about by the noble generosity of his heart, which
prompted him for others, to sacrifice his own."

Consequently, Carroll considered it an act of "obedience to
filial devotion" to "sacrifice whatever personal comfort may

now conflict with duty" to her father, "feeling the goal is
dear enough to demand it."

She asked for Seward's advice

about a real estate investment in Maryland that would raise
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money for her father's benefit.

By this time, Carroll was

well aware of the necessity of protecting her father from

his own "generosity."
be in her name.

The purchase price and mortgage would

She could then maintain control of the

farm, "engage myself in whatever sphere of usefulness

propriety will properly permit," while "affording to my
Father, all the activity of engagement his health so

imperiously demands."

There was apparently no response

from Seward, and there is no evidence Carroll ever bought
the farm.

Carroll's constant devotion to her improvident yet
beloved father soon faced another challenge.

Thomas King

Carroll had apparently learned little from the loss of

Kingston Hall for his debts in 1837, for in 1853 his
daughter began to search for money to pay off more of his

debts.

She decided upon a unique course of action.

At first "impenetrably veiled," Carroll visited the
offices of leading abolitionists and philanthropists in New

York City to ask for contributions so she could buy some of
her father's slaves, which he had again mortgaged, to

prevent their sale.

While she continued to write letters to

men she thought would be sympathetic to her plight, she

preferred to meat individually with them, since in a
personal interview there were "many little suggestions &

explanations, often important, to a correct understanding of
the case. "58 Slavery was a curse that had tried her
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fortitude, she wrote Gerrit Smith as she applied for an
interview.

"I regard all my own misfortune—or that, in

which I am involved, on acct,

of my family, to that

inheritance of slavery, to which for so many generations my
family have been subjected."^ Smith made a contribution,
as did New York journalist and editor Gerard Halleck.

It

was Halleck who suggested she flaunt convention by removing

her veil when interviewing with people for contributions.
. I think it may rather operate against you," he wrote
as he sent her a list of additional men to "touch."

"In

other words," he suggested, "your frank, honest face will be

a passport to you where no mere name or family distinction

would be availing."60
in connection with her search for contributions to
pay her father's debts, Carroll re-established her

correspondence with Millard Fillmore.

Her father's

"generosity and nobleness of nature" had "misguided his
judgment & made him neglectful of the future," she wrote in
March of 1855.

Thus Carroll had had "to assume a position

of responsibility" which, considering "the refined

sensibility of my nature & my age [40] & inexperience in
life is surely without a paralel [sic]."6^

Characteristically, Carroll's first letter that renewed
contact with Fillmore did little beyond praising his

political astuteness and reassuring him that she would

remain "with all the affection of a daughter, your faithful
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gm
little friend .

.

. ."

But slowly and surely the demands

began creeping into the text:

first a complimentary one in

the form of a request that he review the table of contents

for a book she was to write, then a demand for an immediate

response to that request.^ A plea for a personal loan to
avoid eviction proceedings on her family followed, then a

request that he call to see her for "a purpose which you
cannot neglect & will not regret!"

All these demands were

made at a most inconvenient time, when Fillmore was absorbed

with last-minute preparations for a tour of Europe,

beginning May 16.

He apparently did not reply.

64

Carroll's concern that Fillmore reach her was not

entirely selfish.

Her interest in politics had led her to

an unusual degree of involvement with the newly-formed
American Party.

She wished to give Fillmore notice that the

Know-Nothings were considering his name for its Presidential

nominee for the 1856 campaign.

"You may smile," she wrote

Fillmore at 11:00 FM the night before he set sail, "but I

believe, I can have very much to do with yr nomination by
that party, which will as surely control the next election
for President as that you & I live."^^

Carroll told Fillmore that she had met with party

leaders in Boston shortly after he sailed and had drafted a

letter for them that requested he make his "feelings &

wishes clear" regarding the American party.

She revealed

herself to Fillmore as the author of the letter not for
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vanity's sake, but rather "that you may know the movement is
sincere & in good faith."66 Fillmore refused her request,
taking a candidate's traditional position of reluctance that

she accepted, but she enclosed the opening of a book on the
American Party platform that she had written and asked his

review of it.

Once he had received it, she demanded, "write

me a letter expressive of yr regard, for my efforts—I am so
well assured, this will give you pleasure —I cannot feel I

impose a burden."

67

Carroll spent the summer promoting the American

Party and Fillmore as its candidate over his nearest rival,

George Law.

Although she knew she was "a woman—and have no

right to interfere in politics," once again she found a way
to excuse her actions and maintain the legitimacy of her
work as she argued that "this American movement is above

party and if the efforts of woman are ever to be exerted for
God and Liberty, it is now . . . ."

Fillmore's note to her

in which he wished the "Cause" success had satisfied those

unsure of his loyalty.

Carroll was convinced of Fillmore's

suitability as "my convictions as well as my hopes induce me
to believe you will be the candidate of the American

convention.

Perhaps no one, vain tho it may seem, really

knows more of the true wishes of the leading men of the
Order . .

. than myself."@8 Because of the paucity of

papers from Carroll's early career, it remains difficult to

determine exactly how much influence she did have within the
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American Party as it pondered its selection for the
presidential campaign.

By championing Fillmore, however,

for one of the few times in her life, Anna Ella Carroll had

chosen the right man upon whom to expend her inexhaustible

supply of literary energy.
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Chapter 2

Carroll and the Election of 1856:
The Republican Mother As Savior of the Nation

Millard Fillmore was nominated in February 1856 as
the American Party's presidential candidate.

convinced that it was thanks to her;

Carroll was

after all, she had

been a supporter of Fillmore as far back as 1852.

Now at

last, her choice was legitimised by the men of the party,
and Carroll had been given a national platform from which to

write.

While she continued her private political activities

of seeking influence over patronage positions through her
letters to politicians, she now began to publish under her

own name and to participate in more public political
behavior.

The next eight months would be the most

productive of Carroll's career as she wrote and published
books, pamphlets, articles, and editorials in support of the
American Party and its candidate.

The rise of the American Party to national power
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after 1854 came about as the Whig Party declined and

paralleled the rise of the Republican Party.

Both new

organizations appealed to voters, primarily Whigs and
anti-slavery men, who were disenchanted with the compromises

inherent in a national two-party system.

Both organizations

took moralistic stands on issues with mass appeal:

and anti-Catholicism, and the control of slavery.

nativism
Many

nativists were also anti-slavery men and vice versa, and

voters supported one or the other party, or both.

But by

the election of 1856, party loyalties were more intense.

Know-Nothings were determined to win the election with a
candidate who focused interest on nativism rather than
T
slavery.

Eistorians have long argued the primacy of the

slavery issue to all parties in the campaign of 1856,
relative to other issues such as nativism, anti-Catholicism,
temperance, and economics.

Examinations of voting records

in northern states where the American Party :Tas strongest,
however, have emphasized that the majority of Know-Nothings

therein were more concerned with nativist and anti-Catholic

issues than with the anti-slavery movement and its radical

leaders, or with the growing sectionalism of the country.
Far from being a party of displaced Whigs, former Locofocos,

Free-Soilers, or assorted political cranks looking for a

home, the Know-Nothings represented a legitimate attempt by
a substantial group to articulate a platform and promote a
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party that would respond to their fears.$ Know-Nothings
perceived a growing threat to the American nation by the

influx of foreigners who were primarily lower-class, quickly
naturalized, largely controlled by the Democratic party

madhine, and held responsible for the growing corruption and

dissoluteness discernible in the American body politic.*
For the American Party, that threat was far more important
than the issue of slavery expansion or control.

In the border state of Maryland, as in the more

northern states, corruption, nativism, and anti-Catholicism
were the major concerns of the Know-Nothings, in spite of
Maryland's status as a slave state.

These were the issues

that attracted the majority of supporters;

few expressed

great concern over abolition and the slavery question.
Carroll, for instance, had embraced the American Party for a

number of different reasons.

Her father had been a Whig

supporter, as had she, and both had been disheartened when

Henry Clay lost the 1844 presidential race to James K. Polk.
Many Maryland Whigs had blamed the foreign Democratic vote
in Baltimore for helping to give Polk the victory, even
though Maryland had gone Whig in the election and the margin

in Baltimore had given Polk a plurality of only 473

votes.6 Although Thomas Carroll had benefitted from his
Whig patronage position in 1849, by 1853 the Whigs were out

of office, and he was out of a job.

The Whigs' continued

decline by the mid-1850s made the Know-Nothings an
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attractive, non-Democratic alternative.

An additional influence on Anne Carrol1 ’ s political
choice was the Reverend Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge.
Breckinridge, minister of the Second Presbyterian Church of
Baltimore, which Carroll had joined in 1845, was a powerful

orator and an ardent anti-Catholic.

His tirades against

foreigners and Catholics made a deep and long-lasting

impression on Carroll:

twenty years later she would recall

his sermons as she wrote to him of her life's work on behalf
a
of the anti-Catholic movement. Breckinridge, like a
number of other Protestant ministers and leaders, was more
than willing to use the government to accomplish the
anti-Catholic goals of the Know-Nothings.

Rivalry between

Catholics and Protestants in Maryland was nothing new.

By

the 1850s, it was exacerbated by the disruptions to society

caused by inmigration, by political corruption, by the

ineffectiveness and dissolution of traditional parties, by a

sense that something was wrong.
under siege;

Protestants felt they were

the world for which their forebears had fought

and worked and died was under attack.

Because they could

not blame themselves, they looked outside themselves and

their Protestant cultural matrix to the foreigners, to

incoming "tribes" with their clannishness, their strange
tongues, their different values, beliefs, and cultural
systems.

Foreigners became an easily identifiable enemy.
If foreigners could be enemies, foreign Catholics
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could be doubly treacherous .

Not only did they represent a

threat to 11Americanism” by retaining their Old Country ways,
they represented an additional threat by their allegiance to

a foreign potentate, the Pope, who, "sitting and trembling

upon the great shield of the Vatican at Rome," had
supposedly "evinced a great desire to control the spiritual

and temporal interests of this young world.

Thus had

the Know-Nothings, in a classic example of paranoid

political behavior, leapt from the undeniable (that politics
were corrupt and society in disarray) to the unbelievable
(the Pope's Jesuit monks were infiltrating and subverting

the American political system).

Know-Nothings felt that

their access to the political process was being threatened

or limited by foreigners.

Considering their politically

unsound demands and the growing bloc of foreign-born

registered voters controlled by party bosses, their sense of
powerlessness was not entirely unjustified.

But their lack

of political control was perceived by them as a measure of

an enemy's power that had been achieved by conspiratorial
means.

With such an enemy to fight, the Know-Nothings could

unite as a true political party.

But grounded on emotional

rather than rational approaches to the issues, the American

Party was not disposed to make any sort of compromise, a
stand that in the troublesome 1850s meant death to ordinary

politics.

11

It is through this prism of fear, irrationality and

41

emotion that characterized the Know-Nothing Party that its

literature must be evaluated.

Know-Nothing writers, Carroll

included, were not only convinced of a Jesuitical
conspiracy, they were, like most missionaries of a cause,

convinced of the righteousness of their own position.

Carroll's first book of 1856, The Great American Battle,
could be viewed as an American Party Bible, so accurately

did it portray the Party and its dictates.

Like most

political tracts of the times, Carroll's works were scarcely
literary masterpieces.

She tended toward overly dramatic

prose, hyperbole, italics, and exclamation points.

Still,

her work is fairly coherent in its approach to its task:

to

state the danger and propose appropriate action to

circumvent it.

The Great American Battle can be divided into three
major sections.

The first five chapters alert American

women, men, and children, along with the Press, to the
dangerous aim of the Roman Catholic Church "to unsettle the
principles of our liberties and hence to destroy
them .

. .

."12 Woman's task was to perceive the danger

and act upon it, "but only as a moral agent" even though her
13
actions would be political in their ramifications.
Her

province was the education of children and of men.

By this

education she sought and propounded "man's moral and

ultimate good."

Of course, to accomplish this goal she had

to be educated herself, for with education, "united with
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moral power, she becomes an arm of strength to free

America.”14 In her call to women, Carroll combined all the
characteristics of Victorian culture:

the high status of

the mother as the transmitter of cultural identity and

values, a faith in the redemptive power of education over
ignorance and sin, and the imposition of the Protestant

Christian framework upon extant institutions, thus reforming

those institutions to reflect more closely God's will until
that version of His will would "govern the mind of
America. "15

The tasks of the Press and the men of America seemed

less noble by comparison.

While the "women of America now

may be said to control the destinies of ages yet unborn1"
because of their influence over children, the Press was

primarily urged to take the subject seriously.15 As the
"judgement-seat of public opinion" its dismissal of American
Party fears as "frivolous" could result in its own
I

destruction, warned Carroll.

o

Men of America, on the

other hand, were by the Jesuit threat afforded a perfect

opportunity to emulate patriots of old.

To men, as to

women, education was the key to meeting the crisis:

"the

instrument of liberty, property and security to

America."15
The educational process Carroll called for had to be
one that did not involve the use of Catholic schools,

popular in the United States for their rigorous curriculum.
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Such schools posed a significant danger since education

nourished "the very soul of America.11

The Catholic

church offered education as a way to influence and
eventually control those souls through convents, schools,

and colleges, she argued.

The school issue was a

particularly touchy one for Marylander Carroll.

In 1852,

Delegate Thomas Kerney of Baltimore had introduced to the

state legislature a school reorganization bill designed to

simplify the administration of state-funded, locally
operated schools.

The bill made provisions to give state

aid to private (including parochial) schools if their

curriculum was state-approved.

In practice, the bill would

have meant public funding for Catholic schools.
Know-Nothings seized the issue as evidence of a "deep-dyed

Popish plot" designed to negate traditional separation of

Church and state, to gain control over the disbursement of
educational funds (their next step, no doubt, was to seek
control of all public funds), and underhandedly to unite

church and state into a theocratic government answerable
only to the Pope.

Commuting between her father's

residence in Baltimore and her own work in Washington,

Carroll would not have been able to miss the issue.
The bill was eventually buried in legislative

committee, but the clamor it raised continued to be fuelled

throughout the 1850s not only by such political tracts as
Carroll's work, but by arguments over the social, moral, and
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political implications of using the Protestant Bible in

public schools, or banning the Bible entirely at the request

of Catholic bishops so Catholic students would not be
exposed to it.

Censorship by the Catholic church over

reading matter in school continued the controversy with more

protests by Know-Nothings like Carroll who thought that

history would thus be "murdered" and literature "maimed and
mutilated."22

The most famous of Catholic educators, of course,
were the Jesuits, and Olis special branch of the Catholic
priesthood came in for the most virulent attack by Carroll.
Through education "the humble of our land have been made

lofty, the poor have been enriched and blessed,"

and she

herself had been able to participate actively in the

political world she loved.

"Jesuitism," which Carroll used

interchangeably with terms such as "the Romish Hierarchy"

and "Popery," by corrupting children in their schools, was
"threatening . . « to swallow up America»

and springing its

shuttle of death across her shores it pants to be able to
water its steed in her great Mississippi."

Mixed

metaphors aside, the American Party had been formed,

declared Carroll, to forestall this Jesuitical takeover.
Through (Protestant) education, legislation and, if
necessary, deportation, the Know-Nothings were determined to

defeat the foe.
In the second section of her book, Carroll develops
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the literary device of a garden tea-party at which America

and his mother (never named) visit with each other and
friends and discuss the history of America's birth and rise

to manhood, as well as the enemies that will assail him once

he leaves the [American] party.

Day by day, chapter by

chapter, America and his mother discuss the nature and

characteristics of the American party:

comparable to the
eg
"Liberty Party" of the Revolutionary period,
secretive

only because it needed time and trustworthy party members to
guarantee solidity and strength of organization,

opposed

to the sale of public lands to immigrants instead of to
"native American citizens for public improvements and their

education!"%? The Union's national interests and its
preservation were more important than any sectional gain.

The spoils system which had resulted in the selection of
"foreigners" over native-born citizens was a "Jesuit
mechanism" to take over the country.

To meet those

threats, the American Party, a "'purely defensive'"
organization was formed;

it would retire itself "'when the

aggression of foreigners ceases."'

29

In like manner, Carrol1 continued for many pages,

presenting the American Party stance on all the major
political issues of the day and benumbing the reader with
her accusations against the "timid, servile serpents" of the

Pope,30 Ker writing was a classic example of "paranoid

scholarship":

apparent facts marshaled in a rationalistic
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and scholastic manner that led to a conclusion neither

rational nor scholarly.

Carroll brought in the history

of European monarchs condemned by the Pope to prove the
papal interest in controlling temporal matters.

She

discussed the Index of Prohibited Books and the Inquisition

to prove the Catholics' attempt to restrict freedom by
controlling minds.

In the last section of her book, Carroll brought the
troubles caused by this supposed Papal conspiracy to the

present day.

She accused the Naval Board of Fifteen, which

had reorganized the Navy officer line in 1855, of being
controlled by the Jesuits.

The reorganization had been

controversial and several officers had written Carroll
complaining of their reserve status.

She took up the cause

and found the "proof" of conspiracy in the Catholic
backgrounds of Senator Stephen A. Mallory, who had

introduced the original bill of reorganization, and of board
members Commander Samuel F. Dupont and Commodore William

Shubrick.

Why would the Pope want to use these men to

destroy the American navy (supposedly the true purpose of

the reorganization)?

For the same reason he wanted his

subjects in patronage positions:

it was "to sap the

foundation of our democratic liberty and our glorious
Constitution," as well as to destroy the only arm of the

United States' government that could conceivably interfere
in the Crimean War.

Chronology aside (the war ended just
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before the book went to press), Carroll was convinced of the

Pope1s desire to crush Russia and the United States somehow
so there would be no rival to the Pope1s European base of
power.33

In the end, Carroll called for the expulsion of all
Jesuits and the cancellation of all treaties with countries

which would not allow the free practice of Protestantism.
And, of course, all true patriots should join the American

Party.

If a man, one was to vote for Millard Fillmore;

if

a woman, one's "holy mission" was to "plead, in Gospel

sincerity and patriotic fervor" with the men of America to
vote for Fillmore, thus preserving "our Sabbath, our

schools, our Bible and Liberty."3^

Beyond a statement of American Party principles of
the more moderate wing of the Know-Nothings (Carroll did
differentiate between foreign and native-born Catholics;
the latter were still acceptable as citizens). Carroll's The

Great American Battle is valuable for the insights it
provides regarding her views of women's place, women's work,

and of her consciousness of the societal strictures placed

upon her.

Carroll began her work by apologizing for her

intrusion into the masculine world of politics, protesting
her innocence of intent.

"I have no affiliations with any

principles which place [woman] in a sphere at variance with
that refined delicacy to which she is assigned by Nature,"

she wrote, thus maintaining both her distance from the
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burgeoning woman's rights movement and the individual nature

of her work.35 She had "no aspirations to extend her

influence or position."
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Yet the present dangers to the

survival of America meant women could not shrink from their

duty.

"God has given to woman to enlighten America, and to

America to light the world . .

. ."

on "the work of America's daughters."

America's fate depended
While this was a

"high political mission," Carroll again reassured her
readers that it was only as a moral agent that women should

"her aim is to develop the child for God and his
qg
country."

act:

This ideology of the republican mother, common in
the mid-nineteenth century, and the portrait of the moral

superiority of woman compared to the "blundering and
quarrelling of men"3^ recurred throughout The Great

American Battle.

Woman's "true position" was filled when

she worked for man's moral improvement, and to achieve that
goal, Carroll argued, "the intellect of woman must then be
cultivated—her first and last refuge is education," since

only when educated could woman secure the "respect,
confidence and appreciation" necessary to become that "arm
of strength to free America.
Even when using analogies to compare the women of

her day to the women of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and the

American Revolution, Carroll was very careful to present her
readers with heroic women within the cultural imperative of
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the republican mother and the cult of domesticity.

We want no Joans of Arc to make America vascular and
alive [as religious as Jeanne d'Arc may have been, she
was Catholic, dressed in men's clothing, and led men
to battle, none of which appealed to Carroll's view of
what women should do, even in times of national
peril] ... we want faithful and true women, who
neither shriek nor protest, but pray; women who
neither mount nor sink; who are neither heroines nor
fools; but American women, who can stand in their own
shoes . . . ."
Of course, the most obvious presentation by Carroll
of the republican mother ideology was her use of the garden
tea party device to present the history and platform of the
American Party.

By using mother and son figures as her

party spokespersons, she was able to convey the respect due
women as mothers and participants in the nation's life in

terms of day-to-day existence, noble acts in emergencies,
and as grantors of new life by their procreative abilities.
The son provided a way to express gratitude as a measure of

woman's worth within the cultural framework as it existed
and without the need for enfranchisement.
[America] maid, "'you made me a man!

"'My mother,'" he

You taught me to love

God in my cradle, and to love my dear country .... I wish

all the children had such a mother, then our dear country
would have patriot sons."' The happy result?

"'They would

all belong to the American party. "'*2
At the same time that Carroll wholeheartedly
embraced the use of the imagery of the republican mother,

she occasionally used adjectives of political weight and
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force to describe her:

"She was indeed the most original

and commanding of women, an elemental force of great power,

and like a solvent of such range of affinity, as to combine
and reconcile heterogeneous spirits into one society."^
But these stronger terms were seldom used, and Carroll
always returned to the less politically threatening mother

image, reestablishing her subservience to the more political
animal, man:

"... our Divine Creator saw fit to dignify

woman by the name of 'Mother' when he gave her to the
companionship and comfort of man.

It was in this sense [as

a potential mother] that she became the Eve to the American

family . . .

Even when dealing with the history of

women's past patriotic deeds, for instance, noting that

Washington had expressed his belief that, "with [women's]
active national sympathy, we had nothing to fear," Carroll

was careful to attribute women's success not to masculine
incentives such as dreams of achievement and glory, but to

"'duty:

and [they] would have fallen short, had they done

less!'" Finally, to make herself perfectly clear regarding

women's place in politics, Carroll stated in no uncertain

terms, "Let no cry of 'woman's rights' deter you.

That

charge has no significance here."^^

The Great American Battle seems to have been a fair
success.

Carroll finished the book in early March 1856, and

by May wrote to her father of the papers' announcement of

the sale of "10,000 copies of the Battle and the whole

51

country is alive in its praise—I wish you could see half
that is said.1,46 She was startled, she wrote, to find that
her publisher had "a woman agent," but she appeared to be a

good choice since she was "getting a large number of

subscribers . . .

Her biggest concern was the number of

newspaper editors who had not yet acknowledged receipt of

the copies sent them.

"This is Pierce acting through the

P.[ost] 0.[ffice]" she declared, reiterating her belief that
Pierce's Catholic Postmaster-General was taking advantage of

his position to purge the mails of all anti-Catholic

materials.4^
But compliments for Carroll's work did make their

way to her in Hew Mork City, where she was writing campaign
tracts from her rooms at Holdridge's Hotel at 8th and

Broadway.

One letter of praise came from North Carolina

American Party leader Kenneth Rayner.

He looked at the book

as an opportunity for the party to explain the "deep
philosophy" of the Know-Nothings.

A restatement of purpose,

he hoped, might turn the party away from its current state,

in which its principles had been "adulterated by the
selfishness and sectionalism that have marked its late

progress."

Rayner feared the widening split in the party

over the slavery issue would overshadow the more important

issue of anti-Catholicism.4® "Edifying" and "productive of
great good to the American cause" though the book was,

Rayner did find fault with one matter:

"the distinction you
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attempt to draw between native and foreign Roman
Catholics .... you are wrong .

... in the main, the

native papists are as intolerable as the foreigners."

Both

groups, he believed, gave a spiritual supremacy to the Pope

that was able to release Catholics "from the obligation of
an oath—the oath of allegiance to the
constitution .... we must make war upon the whole

system . . . ."

Candidate Fillmore, to whom Carroll had sent a copy
of the book's opening chapters, apparently never actually

read it, but did "commend her zeal in the cause.His
own zeal was a bit more suspect.

Fillmore as a candidate
Not a particularly

did not give Carroll mudh to work with.

charismatic politician, he was decidedly lukewarm about most
of the tenets of the Know-Nothing Party.

anti-Catholic, nor was he a nativist.

He was not an

But he was aware of

the growing popularity of the American Party and, like most

retired presidents, he was interested in employment which
would not demean the office he had once held.

the White House would suit him just fine.

A return to

The demise of the

Whigs had left him temporarily homeless politically, since
he viewed the Republican Party as too sectional to guarantee
the country's stability.

Fillmore had supported

Know-Nothing Daniel Ullmann in the New York gubernatorial

race of 1854 and wrote of his concern over the "corrupting

influence" that the struggle for control over the foreign
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vote in the state had occasioned.

Protesting that he had

"no desire to mingle in political strife," Fillmore
nevertheless had become a sworn Know-Nothing and had

accepted the nomination.^ But even as the American Party
nominee, Fillmore still spoke not of anti-Catholioism or
nativisim, but only of "freely adopt [ing] the principles of

the Know-Nothing party."
The religious issue, about which Fillmore refused to
take a stand, was one whldh Carroll had hoped to resolve for

the American Party by drawing a clear distinction between

native-born and foreign Catholics.

It was the "system of

popery" against which she wrote,"foreign, ungrateful
refugees" who maintained allegiance to their native faith
even after naturalization.5* As the Gallican Catholics in

France had stood for no papal interference in temporal

matters, so native-born Catholics stood against papal

interference in the American political system.^ This
distinction was crucial for Carroll to make, not only
politically, but personally as well.

Everyone knew the more

prestigious branch of the Maryland Carrolls were Catholic.
She could "honor that paternal ancestry"^ but felt that
"so baneful an evil"^? was Papal control over votes that

it had become pardonable "in all eyes,"^^ presumably
including familial ones, to work to expose the evil even if

she, and the American Party for which she wrote, appeared to
g©
soxae to be ^bigote and blockheads e 00
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Politically the distinction was required so that

those states with strong Know-Nothing parties and large
Catholic populations would stay with the party instead of

defecting to the Democrats or, far worse, to the
newly-formed Republican party.

Both Carroll's native

Maryland and the southern state of Louisiana, for instance,
had substantial Catholic populations who were a part of the

strongly nativist Know-Nothings.

presented a problem.

Louisiana in particular

At the American Nominating Convention

in Philadelphia in February 1856, the Louisiana delegation

contained a number of Catholic members.

The Convention

allowed their credentials, but the feasibility of seating

Catholic delegates in a strongly anti-Catholic convention
depended upon this distinction between native and
foreign-born Catholics Carroll had laid out.

Carroll could—indeed, had to—accept the
distinction.

She believed it, too, since she had her own

family and state history to provide her with familiar and
familial examples of patriotic native-born Catholics.

Radical Know-Nothings such as Kenneth Rayner, however, were

under no such illusions as to the contradictory nature of

allowing the Louisiana delegates in.

"I can not tell you

the deep mortification I feel at the compromise with
Jesuitism made ... by the Nominating Convention," he wrote

to Carroll.

The "anti-Romish element of the order has been

its great element of strength with the masses," he argued,
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and admitting the delegates 111 fear . .

step .

. was a fatal

. those bodies surrendered to the enemy the citadel

.

of our strength.1,61 The damage done to the fortunes of the
American Party was primarily over this issue, according to

Rayner, not over the sectional question of slavery, also
present at the Philadelphia Convention.

Northerners had

bolted from the convention, and the Know-Nothings were
"likely to lose all" over "our divisions and discords."^

But such uncompromising anti-Catholloism as Rayner's was too

offensive to survive politically.

If the American Party

wished to win the election, it had to tone down its
anti-Catholicism enough not to lose voters to the other
parties.63

The Great American Battle had concentrated on the

impending takeover by the "Romish Hierarchy."

In election

pamphlets she wrote throughout the spring and summer of
1856, Carroll shifted emphasis to concentrate on exposing

corruption at the ballot box by foreign voters and on the
necessity of preserving the Union. && The sectional appeal
of Republican nominee John C. Frémont had provided the
American Party an opportunity to present Fillmore as a
national candidate.

Unlike Frémont, Fillmore was not a

candidate for those "'who desired an administration for the
North as against the South, or for the South against the
North . .

.

instead, he said, "'I know only my country,

my whole country and nothing but my country.
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The preservation of the Union as a campaign issue

was further discussed in Carroll's pamphlet, The Union of
the States.

While there was still mention of the dangers of

a corrupted democracy because of foreign voters, Carroll
devoted most of the pamphlet to other issues.

Fanatical

abolitionists had combined with Democrats to cause sectional

strife, and it had been only "the Roman firmness of
Mr. Fillmore," exhibited best when Fillmore signed the
Compromise of 1850 after President Zachary Taylor's death,
that had saved the Union. *6 The civil war that raged in

Kansas, she argued, resulted from the Democratic

administration's incompetence, a situtation that could have
been avoided had Fillmore been renominated and reeleoted in

1852.

Continued "agitation" in Kansas and continued

Democratic interference with the ballot box were in store if

Americans did not return to Fillmore in 1856.6?
Carroll did not directly attack the Republican Party
in this pamphlet, as she did the Democrats, but she did
argue that Fillmore was a better candidate because he had

been nominated by a national rather than sectional party.
In so doing, she conveniently ignored the "Northern
American" convention in New York City in June that had

effectively fused with the Republicans by endorsing their
candidate, Frimont.

Carroll had attended the convention and

been dismayed at the intransigence of the dissident

northerners.

It was "treason to the Union" and "madness" to
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nominate a sectional candidate, and since she saw both

Democrats and Republicans as sectional parties, she

presented Fillmore as the only national choice.6*
Also issued prior to the election was Carroll's
Review of Pierce's Administration.

This was an exhaustive

year-by-year critique of four years of Democratic blunders

under the administration of Franklin Pierce.

While the

Review contained many of the same ideas as were in The Great
American Battle and Union of the States, it was particularly

informative regarding Carroll's ideas on foreign policy.
Her opinions were characteristic of the antebellum

expansionists such as Matthew Fontaine Maury, Asa Whitney,

and William Henry Seward.

Not limited to the continentalism

of Manifest Destiny, not interested in the Young Americans'

call for intervention in Europe, Carroll was primarily a
commercial expansionist.

She argued for a foreign and

domestic policy that would benefit trade, a consular and

diplomatic service to promote the expansion of American

markets, reciprocity treaties with South America, a strong
navy and a forceful Commander-in-Chief to protect Americans

abroad, and peace with Europe to avoid the disruptions of
trade any war would bring.

These were all points upon which

she could attack Pierce's administration as being singularly

ineffective.
The Review, like The Great American Battle, was a

fairly coherent statement of political criticism combined

58

with a recommended course of action for its readers.

Here

again, Carroll took care to reassure her readers that she
knew her limits "within the province of feminine delicacy."

At the same time, she knew "of no rule to exclude females
from society or the discussion of any subject which has an

immediate bearing on the social, moral, and political
destiny" of the country.

She pointed out, rather

sarcastically, that "an American female is not an idle
statue of a pagoda, or of a Turkish seraglio . .

. ."

Readers should have no fear that Carroll, or any woman

expressing a political interest within these particular

provinces, would "trespass either on the rights of the male

sex, or wantonly expose herself to a charge of temerity."
In a search for truth, all should be given an opportunity to
participate since "its aim is for the welfare and highest
good of individuals, of society, and of the nation."

In

such an interdependent society, "the interests and destiny
of the mothers and daughters are in common with those of

their fathers and brothers."

Onoe again, it was part of

woman's duty as a mother figure not to "be ignorant on

subjects which relate[d] to the manly development of the

mind," since women were responsible for "the moulding of the
rising generation . .

. ."

Carroll's own motivation for

stepping into the sphere of politics was solely her love of
country and her "desire to awaken the reader to the vast

importance^ of the subjects treated by her works
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The summer of 1856 wore on, and Carroll wrote on.

Fillmore had returned to the United States in late June and
had greatly angered Carroll by his failure to call on her,
especially considering "all I did, nay permitted, in your

behalf, for I have been the author of articles which were
71
made effective by ignorance of their source . . .

Perhaps Fillmore feared the effect of acknowledging her work
printed under her own name.

"For the first time in our

history a woman has ventured openly and without disguise to

espouse the cause of her Country . . .

something not to fear but approve.

But this was

It had "drawn the

applause of your sex, and every distinguished member of the
party . . . have [sic] called, while, you . . . have seen

fit ... to show so much indifference .

. . ."

Those

men,she wrote, included Erastus Brooks, Mew York's
Know-Nothing gubernatorial candidate hoping for a ride on

Fillmore's coattails, E. B. Bartlett, the National President

of the Know-Nothings, and Thurlow Weed, leading New York

Republican and power broker.

In addition to their calls,

Carroll kept up her correspondence with Thomas Corwin of

Ohio, Kenneth Rayner, and Josiah Polk of Washington.
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By July, Fillmore had apologized for his neglect,

writing Carroll from Buffalo where he spent the summer.
Carroll wrote back for information on his previous

administration to use in the Review and other pamphlets.
replied, promising a visit with her should she come to

He
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Niagara Falls.

Her hard work on his behalf was not

unappreciated as it was °. . . gratifying to know that I

have at least one friend on whom I can rely through good &

through evil . . .

*73

Along with her campaign tracts,

Carroll was finishing her massive The Star of the West;
National Men and National Measures.

or,

Her workload was

beginning to take its toll, both on her health and her work.
By August she had to stop work for a while to recover her
energy, but she soon picked up her pen to continue.

By

September, The Star of the West was ready for the press.
Perhaps reflecting the strain of overwork, The Star
of the West was the poorest of Carroll's campaign works, the
most disjointed and incoherent.

Apparently it was a

collection of articles written and previously published.

Gathered together for the book, the essays had little in
common.

She re-examined the Naval Board's reorganization

work of 1855, concentrating particularly on the sad plight
of Commodore Charles Stewart, the ranking officer of the
United States Navy, who had been placed on the reserve list

and to whom the book was dedicated, and on Lieutenant
M. F. Maury, a top meteorologist also "reserved.in

"The First American Exploring Expedition," she took up the

cause of Jeremiah N. Reynolds of New York who had fought for
years for Congressional funding of an Antarctic expedition
and then was refused permission to join the United States

Exploring Expedition of 1838-42 led by Lieutenant Charles
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Wilkes.76 She wrote a promotion of a transcontinental

railroad which would benefit trade by giving Americans "a

hold on the wealth of China .

. . and her 700 Millions of

inhabitants." 77 The railroad would have other salutary

effects.

It would make the gold of California more

accessible;

it would save time, expense, and trouble in

trade and commerce.

It would also prevent the secession of

the Southwest from the United States—a worrisome

possibility because of the area's isolation.

Isolation

in the region had already led to abuses of democracy, to

"disorders .

. . the villainous practice of stuffing the

ballot-box, the elevation of the scum of society and

traitors to office . .

.

."A transcontinental railway

would change all that, as well as serving to unite the

country and to advance Protestant education and
civilization, which Carroll held to be more conducive to

economic growth because Protestants had fewer holidays than
Catholics.*0

Incoherent as The Star of the West was (Carroll also
included essays on her favorite topics of Jesuitism and the

dangers of Jesuit education), it did have one unifying

theme:
mission.

Carroll's fascination with the idea of an American

Expanding ideas she had mentioned briefly in The

Great American Battle, Carroll described the mission of
Americans to "spread their Protestant Bible and their
American Constitution on the wings of the American eagle,"
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so Americans could throw their weight "in behalf of equality

and justice over the countries of the world . . .

."

Not

incidentally, those actions would also mean that "our own

strength shall increase, our own resources expand, and an
additional impetus be given our moral, commercial and

political greatness."

RI

In The Star of the West, Carroll

was able to develop the subject of expansion more fully,
particularly in her essay in support of William Walker's

popular filibustering adventures in Nicaragua.
Walker's actions appealed to Carroll's sense of
mission and duty that were so much a part of her

expansionist outlook.

She compared his work with what

"Lafayette, DeKalb, Pulaski, Kosciusko, had done for

American liberty .... Who, then can repress patriotic
emotion or deep sympathy for his triumph?"

America was

right to "extend the protection" of its laws and systems of
government to a people who had supposedly "invited" the

United States "to take up their cause."

The triumph of

self-government in the American tradition for such a people
tied in well not only in spiritual terms with American
interest in liberty and justice, but in economic terms as

well.

To Carroll, Walker in Nicaragua meant that "our stars

and stripes will yet float over the Pacific gate of the
Nicarauguan transit" on the road to the China market, and
thus the key to the Gulf of Mexico would "never fall into

the hands of savages."

The Central American states, so
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"essential to the commerce of the United States" must never
be "owned by their enemies," or by the enemies of the United
States.83 Walker's activities provided Carroll with the
perfect example of what she viewed as the nobility of the
American mission in action in Central America, restoring

order and peace through American systems of government, and,
at the same time, ensuring the preservation and promotion of
United States trade.

Carroll must have been greatly pleased to receive
Walker's note thanking her for the copy of The Star of the

West that she sent him after its publication in October
1856.

It was, he wrote, "a source of consolation as well as

of encouragement ... to receive such assurances" as she
had manifested "in the cause of Nicaraguan regeneration."

He promised to try to visit her before he returned to
Nicaragua to converse with her personally "about some of the
subjects you treat of in your volume."

indication that the two ever met.

There is no

Her description of his

public speaking presence, however ("an expression of

meekness, accompanied by a nasal tone and sluggish

utterance, which would arrest attention in any assembly"),
was peculiar enough to suggest an encounter of some kind
before his return to Central America and subsequent

execution by the Hondurans in 1860.8^
Perhaps because of the essay on the popular exploits

of Walker, certainly in spite of its literary shortcomings,
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The Star of the West was Carroll ' s most popular book,
running to three editions.

The first came out in October

1856, the second by December 11, the third in 1857,

Carroll had no time to rest on her laurels, however.

The

election was fast approaching and she cranked out two more
short pamphlets.

One was distributed in Boston, where she

had gone to work with her publisher on The Star of the West,

the other in New York, where, she wrote Fillmore, it had
been declared "the best effort now that can be made to save"

that state for the Know-Nothings.

Carroll attacked Democratic nominee James Buchanan
most vigorously in the first of the two pamphlets.

Which?

Fillmore or Buchanan I dragged forth the spectre of war with

Spain over Cuba by reviving the issue of the Ostend
Manifesto, for which Buchanan had been partly responsible,

and which he was supposedly pledged to carry out if elected.
The result would be "War immediately with England, France

and Spain! "B** More domestic concerns were found in
Carroll's Who Shall be President?

Carroll dismissed

Republican Frémont's election as a

"mathematical . . . impossibility" because of Southern

opposition.8® At that, she may have at last realized that

Fillmore's chances for victory ware slim:

"every

vote . . . cast for Frémont, is a vote really given to

Buchanan."88 Buchanan would bring Kansas in as a slave
state;

Fillmore would send in troops to restore order.

The
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disunion of America that was sure to result under Buchanan's

administration would lead to a "general paralysis" and
eventual destruction of the country.*1 Carroll was

becoming aware of the very real possibility of a
Know-Nothing loss if the party could not attract more votes

from other parties:

"Republicans, Democrats and Whigs, join

the American army . . . and aid us in electing
Fillmore .... Do this now and settle minor differences at
a more convenient season."

Carroll clearly did not comprehend that the
Republicans would never make the necessary compromise on the

slavery issue that was required to embrace Fillmore's

candidacy.

For Republicans to support the American Party

platform of popular sovereignty, instead of their own
platform which opposed any extension of slavery, was not a
"minor difference."

It was political suicide.

The

non-extension of slavery was the raison d'etre of the

Republican Party.

Co-optation through compromise would

inevitably mean its destruction.
The "more convenient season" which Carroll hoped for

would never arrive.

Wanting to share information

"infinitely important," Carroll left Boston to meet with
Fillmore one last time before the election.

She was

unsuccessful in her attempt to meet Fillmore at the Cataract
House in Niagara Falls in late October.

Fillmore, no doubt

concerned with election matters, did not respond to
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Carroll's letters asking for an appointment.

Carroll,

disproportionately offended when put off, was convinced that

11 some malignant influence" was swaying Fillmore * s mind

against meeting with her, especially considering all she had
done for him.

Or perhaps Fillmore did not "like a political

woman, but my friends say I have been more than a Jessie
Frémont to the Fillmore cause," she wrote, referring to John
C. Frémont's politically ambitious spouse.9* Hurt at his

silence, she took the train to Buffalo to await his
appearance.

She added a postscript to a note requesting he

call on her with what might be considered a threat, and was
certainly less than gracious:

"You better let me know what

time it will suit you to call here."^^ That night or the
next day Fillmore must have called and soothed Carroll's

wounded feelings, for their correspondence would continue

after Carroll returned to Hew York City to await election
day.
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Chapter 3

Losses

Fillmore lost.
won;

James Buchanan and the Democrats

John Charles Frémont and the new Republican party were

second.

Returns came in slowly enough to New York City that

Carroll hoped that the election would be thrown into the
House of Representatives.

On November 5, she met with

"leading Republicans" to suggest a fusion between

Know-Nothings and Republicans, with Fillmore as the
candidate of choice should the House vote be needed.

Fillmore, she argued, was the only "national" candidate and
had successfully avoided the issue of slavery.That

issue, according to Carroll was the "false" one of the
campaign, but because the Republicans had dealt with it and

thus split the national vote, they had "left the D-— to
sweep the stakes.

If others had fought on the same

principle I did, the victory would have been complete."

blamed her sex for holding her back:

She

"Had I been a man, I
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would have had this. "

More important, though, was the lack

of funds for the campaign:

. even as a woman, had I 20

thousand dollars to have worked with, to this end," victory

would have resulted.
At the least, Carroll was pleased that Maryland had

maintained its loyalty to Fillmore.

win.

She took credit for the

After all, her works had "most circulated" there, and

"my opinions been most freely consulted."

been New York state.

The problem had

"For weeks I believed it safe," and

sure to bring victory to Fillmore.

Her beliefs, in spite of

reports to the contrary, marked the difference between the
"cold selfish calculations" of professional politicians and

"My heart enters into my acts and I loving the

herself:

cause, believe in its triumph," even when political factors
p
suggested the opposite.

Carroll received a warm letter of condolence from
Kenneth Rayner on November 14 which praised her for her

"pure and disinterested devotion to those immortal
principles of liberty" in the late election.

She grew

impatient to hear similar sentiments from the defeated

candidate.

She wrote him a letter of condolence and

support, heaping praise on Fillmore's head, comparing him to

George Washington, sure he would "be admired by yr. whole
country at a future day."

In spite of her earlier claim

that the slavery issue was not of paramount importance to

the campaign, she predicted that his recent position
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regarding slavery would be the path chosen by all "sensible

people North & West.

And the soi disant [so-called]

Republicans and our party must fuse" on that position to win

in 1860.

As much as Carroll admired Fillmore and his

alleged, and unappreciated, political acumen, however, he
must learn to be kinder to those who worked for the cause.

"My complaint is that you can't see me as I do you—I am
great in my womanly sphere."

She closed her letter with a

request for a letter of reference for a book tour she was
about to embark upon.

"I intend to disseminate my 3 works

wherever I go and mean to be a power yet in this land, which

it will be well to propitiate."* Showing signs of her

obsession for power and recognition which would eventually
dominate her life, Carroll got what she wanted this time.
Fillmore apparently sent the letter despite her threatening
tone, and thus inadvertently opened the door on the shady

side of Carroll's life.
Carroll took Fillmore's letter, along with one from
Rayner and one from Thomas H. Clay, Jr., of Kentucky, and
presented them to the press as support for a testimonial

dinner to be given to show the American Party's appreciation
for her work in the late election.

This practice was common

in the nineteenth century, but was usually done for, rather

than by, the recipient.Carroll was still in New York
City in late November and was apparently having difficulties
raising enough cash for her book tour.

The testimonial may
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have been her idea, or that of William Scudder Tisdale, a

writer for DeWitt Publishers, a New York publishing company
that carried a number of Know-Nothing publications. 6
Fillmore apparently discovered the unauthorized use of his

letter and wrote to Daniel Ullmann in Naw York for advice.

Ullmann had run unsuccessfully for New York governor as a
Know-Nothing in 1854 and was now practicing law on Wall
Street.

Ullmann's reply of November 25 was less than

flattering regarding Carroll;

clearly Fillmore had not

mentioned that he knew Carroll fairly well.

"She is a

regular Jeremy Diddler in petticoats," Ullmann wrote, "and

was once, soma eight or ten months ago, arrested for
swindling."

Apparently Carroll had embroidered upon her

family lineage to Fillmore, linking herself with Alexander
Hamilton, but it was "the first time" Ullmann had heard of

the alleged familial relationship.

Ullmann was not

impressed by Carroll's "'political proclivities.' I

apprehend they hang very loosely upon her, and I suspect are

adopted for each occasion."

Ullmann had met Carroll about a

year previously in a "circle of vary respectable people" who

had become "very much alarmed when they learned her real
character."

In fact, Carroll had "tried her game on two or

three of my friends and upon me, but we ware too old
soldiers to be taken in."

Fillmore's letter amused Ullmann,

"as it is pretty much a repetition of enquiries that I have
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had addressed to me several times."8

Fillmore was not amused.

Unaware of his

perturbation, Carroll wrote on December 5, telling him she

had fired his letter "to suit" her purposes for the
dinner.8 Two days later, the notice for the dinner, with

the altered letters printed below, appeared in the New York
Dispatch.I8 On the 8th, Fillmore heard from Tisdale,

demanding money for the dinner.

"The design is to make it a

national affair," he wrote pompously.
When we remember that a lady of Louisiana was
presented with a set of magnificent jewelry for merely
stepping on board a steamboat on the Ohio River, as a
representative of the Southern States, it is certainly
right and proper that one who has performed ten
thousand times . . . more than this mere physical act,
should be the recipient of a testimonial ten thousand
times more valuable than the one presented to the lady
who stepped on board the steamboat.

Tisdale closed his missive with a list of the members of the
Presentation Committee, which included Clay, Rayner, Thomas

Whitney of New York, Senator-elect Anthony Kennedy, of
Jt
Maryland and Jacob Broom of Pennsylvania.
Not only angry, but now suspicious, Fillmore wrote

again to Ullmann, asking his opinion as to the dinner's
legitimacy.

"I shall most cheerfully contribute my mite,"

he emphasized, but only if "the money goes into safe

hands.Ullmann replied the next day.

Fillmore's letter

was the first he had heard of the testimonial, and he would

be glad to investigate.

The New York Dispatch had made it

seem as if Fillmore had "a high appreciation of the lady and
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the value of her services.

of either."

I never did have a high opinion

Tisdale, he thought, was ”a little hack writer"

in publisher DeWitt's employ.

In Ullmann's opinion, he

belonged "to that numerous class whose pretensions are

vastly in excess of their performance."

He knew of no real

scandal involving Tisdale, "yet I have conceived a rather
unfavorable opinion of him."

In fact, Tisdale had earlier

"beguiled" Ullmann into writing a favorable account of his

abilities that "was made use of vary improperly .

. . ."

As

for the weighty individuals on the Presentation Committee,

no doubt, Ullmann suggested, they had approached in the same

way as Fillmore.
Carroll's primary motivation for using Fillmore and

the idea of the testimonial dinner was doubtless financial.
Had the Know-Nothings won the election, her books would have
sold well.

As it was, she wrote Thurlow Weed (whom she

presumed she knew well enough to have sent a flirtatious

demand that he call upon her) to borrow a hundred dollars so
she could "buy up 500 vols Star of the West" [sic] which she

could then resell for $1.25 eaoh.^ she had to survive on
her writing as best she could.

No patronage positions would

fall to her after the defeat of the Know-Nothings.

But

while Fillmore was willing to commend her for her work for
him, he had "only glanced at her publications,

never . . . read one through," and was altogether unhappy
that Carroll had taken advantage of her contact with
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him.15

A letter on December 15 to Fillmore from Jacob Broom
in Washington discussed party matters and made no mention of

the dinner or the committee of which he was supposedly a
member.15 A second letter arrived from Tisdale, demanding

an immediate reply, and a note came from Ullmann reporting
that, while he could not "learn anything very definite"

about the affair, he distrusted the whole, as did those to

whom he had spoken.

"My own opinion is that they wish to

obtain your name on which to base their operations."

The

same mail also brought a letter from Carroll, apparently in
reply to a demand from Fillmore that she return all of his

letters to her.

"This is the first time in my history,

amidst all my correspondence, that ever such a request as

yrs was made."
she said.

She was too busy to accede to his request,

She was hard at work, preparing a new book of

reminiscences of great Know-Nothings and other politicians,

to be called "Men as they Seem and as they Are."

Besides,

she had burned all but two or three of his letters.
she could not see why he was so angry.

Anyway,

"The part published

has done you more good than that of any letter, you ever

wrote in your whole life before," she wrote indignantly.
Carroll blamed Fillmore for many of her financial
difficulties.

"I have embalmed you so entirely in my Books

that, their sale is utterly destroyed in certain sections."
Even though she had been "repeatedly invited" to publish new
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editions minus Fillmore's name, she refused "to emasculate

and alter my Books .... I will not depart from my
principles to put money in my purse.19

If Fillmore wanted to

complain about the alteration of his letter, he was free to

do so privately or publicly.

"That man is yet to be born in

this world whom I fear or am not ready to meet through the

Press or elsewhere."
It took Fillmore nearly ten days to recover enough
of his sang froid to reply to this remarkable defensive

Not even a flattering letter from one Samuel

missile.

St. John consoling him on his recent loss could help—for
St. John referred to his "excellent friend, Miss
Carroll. "19 Carroll herself added fuel to the fire as she

sent Fillmore a copy of the second edition of The Star of

the West and asked him to pass it along to the editor of the
Buffalo Commercial Advertiser so the paper could review it.

John B. Floyd of Virginia and others had been to see her,
she wrote.

"... would you believe I could have defended

the charge of your cold personalia [personality]?"

Seeming

unaware of Fillmore's anger, she inquired, "Don't you mean

to answer my last letter?"
Fillmore finally answered, coldly and efficiently,

on the 27th.

He had sent her book on to the editor;

as for

an answer, "... some letters are best answered by
expressive silence."

The abuse of his private letter would

teach him caution in the future.

Weakening somewhat —after
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all, Carrol I was a charming woman, and in spite of Ullmann's
accusations, she had done a good job for him and his
party—he "would fain believe the act was not yours," but
21
that of her "evil genius," Tisdale.

Carroll seized upon the way out graciously provided
by Fillmore, but not without a few parting shots.

"Of all

the trying things in my life, and you know of some, your
last letter was perhaps the most so," she began.

She had

"sacrificed & slaved" for him, had given him time and "my

hard earnings beside .

. .

."

The letter was given to her

with no notice or marking of confidentiality.

Besides,

"Heaven knows it was not strong enough, or warm enough, to
attract any particular notice . .

.

."

She had been his

friend and had worked for him and the Party, and both owed
her thanks and recognition in spite of the fact she had

neither asked for nor been given "a single farthing" for her

work.

As for Tisdale, well, she had little control over his

activities.

He had been hired to do her proofreading and

correspondence, and she saw him "very seldom."

Tiring of the matter, yet determined to maintain his
position, Fillmore tried one last time to make Carroll

understand the impropriety of her (or Tisdale's) actions.

Unaware that he "had exhibited such a want of gratitude as

to justify" her actions, he reiterated the private nature of
the letter of recommendation and expressed his sorrow at her
"most extraordinary lecture" and her threat to eliminate him
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from her works.

"But you will pardon me for saying that

such threats have no terrors for me.”

If her friends gave

her a dinner, he would make a contribution, but that was

all.

"Standing as I do, I can not .

. . single out one

friend from all the rest for public honors.
sense must convince you of this . . .

Your own good

He would blame it

all on Tisdale rather than Carroll, "determined to believe"

that her "upright and generous heart" was incapable of such
an act.23
Again Fillmore had provided Carroll with a graceful
way out:

a belief that her feminine nature would

automatically preclude such trickery.

it;

Again, Carroll took

but again, not without a few acerbic remarks about his

part in the affair.

If he had just told her, she would have

maintained his confidence, "... that I might not have been
the innocent cause of inflicting a pain .
that of your defeat."

. . greater than

She would earn her laurels from

public approbation of her works in the future, though
Fillmore's distaste for singling out any one friend for

notice did seem to her rather curious.

"Bad there been

other ladles—or any one lady in the land, who had also
occupied a position” similar to hers, she could have

understood his reluctance.

But there were not.

And she

could scarcely believe his male friends would be so "devoid
of their vaunted chivalry as to envy a poor little woman"
who had received special notice from his pen.

As for
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Tisdale, he had taken advantage of the situation, and she
had taken care of him:

"I found out the man—And I have

freely expressed my opinion to his own Mother, who is a true

woman—He will do no more for me. "

She remained "your tried

& trusting friend, and I have to live and die with an

unchanged feeling for you."2*
Like many incidents in Carroll•s life, this one is

frustrating in its lack of further evidence.
swindler?

Was she a

Had she been arrested for the crime, she might

not have been convicted;

no record of conviction has

survived, and there seems to have been a common reluctance
by nineteenth-century judges to convict upper and
middle-class women of such crimes.How valid was
Ullmann's evaluation of her "political proclivities"?

Party

leaders Kenneth Rayner and Jacob Broom certainly valued
Carroll's opinions.

grapes:

Ullmann's opinion may have been sour

after all, Ullmann had been defeated in 1854, and

his party had just lost again.

Anger at his party's

failings might have taken the form of scorn at Miss

Carroll's claims to have dona valuable work for it.

If she

had tried to swindle him or his acquaintances, that would
necessarily have colored his judgment of her political
abilities as well.
case of misogyny.

Then again, it might have been a simple

Perhaps Ullmann just did not like or

approve of "political women".
Why did Fillmore keep trying to explain his
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disapproval of her actions to Carroll?
off?

Why not just cut her

Here again, a lack of evidence frustrates

understanding .

Perhaps, like all politicians, Fillmore

preferred to withdraw with a door left slightly open.
might have viewed Ullmann's accusations as spite;

He

he might

have been willing to give Carroll the benefit of the doubt
because she was female and therefore, in his mind, not
altogether responsible for her actions.

Certainly, she

reinforced his notice of her femininity when she was in

After the election she was a "power to propitate."
çg
After their quarrel, she was a "poor little woman."
trouble.

Perhaps he simply preferred, vain and ambitious and
sensitive to slight as he was, to swallow Carroll's
explanation whole, along with her ever-present flattery.

If

he chose to disbelieve a part of what she said, at what
point could his questioning stop—before or after her pretty
9 «y
remarks about his noble being?
What is clear in this incident was Carroll's choice

to use her sex as a defensive weapon when it suited her
purpose.

Clearly desiring to placate Fillmore, a powerful

man still in New York and a useful contact for her, Carroll

took the easy way out by blaming her indiscretions on her
womanly soul.

This excuse was readily accepted because of

widely-held beliefs about the nature of women, and, further,
it served to reinforce Carroll's overall political
methodology of duty, apology, and personal petition, rather
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than woman's rights or equality.

Ill in January "from the effect of a continued use

of my brain & a crowd of matters pressing on

me ...

. until the slightest agitation will . .

. send my

pulse to incredible speed," Carroll postponed her tour west

until the late spring.

She revised The Star of the West

again, dedicating the third edition to U.S. Navy Commodore

Charles Stewart, who wrote to thank her for her "generous
espousal of the cause" of those still fighting the Naval

Retirement Board.

She was not particularly enamoured of

the trip, which she was to take with her brother:

"To think

one like me should have to push my own Books is hard, " she
wrote, "but if my friends will stand true, I can do it like
a lady & make a competence."

By Aprxl, she had been to

Washington and then was off to the Midwest, stopping in
Chicago in June.° She maintained her contacts with her

New York City acquaintances, asking Thurlow Weed to give one
A. O. Alcock a job in the New York City Customs House.

Weed

was powerful in New York, but unlikely to have control of
customs positions.

No matter to Carroll.

She assumed power

was power and it could be wielded where it was wanted.

As

always, she couched her demand for a patronage post in
personal terms ("You have kindly promised me your

aid . . .

.") and appeared to have learned little from her

experience with Fillmore, as she included a sentence which

could be easily construed as blackmail ("The obligations I
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have placed [sic] certain parties, in withholding valuable

information . . .

.")

As the anti-Catholicism of 1856 gave way in national

pre-eminence to the slavery issue in 1857, Carroll thought
of writing a book on the latter issue.

She was apparently

dissuaded by Kenneth Rayner's argument that passion had
overruled reason on the matter.

"I fear that the proper,

the just, the constitutional view of the question would not
please either section," he wrote.

"Would there not then be

danger of you hazarding the prestige you already have in the
public estimation by your failure to accomplish that which I
do not regard as within the scope of human

achievement[?]"

She worked instead for Maryland Governor

Thomas Hicks' election in 1857 and again in 1859.

Also

in 1859, she published Pope or President?, another
anti-Catholic text.

Once again, her goal waa to point out

the danger facing American institutions from the Roman

Catholic Church in America.

"... some one should dare

assume the responsibility of revealing the astounding

mysteries of the Vatican.

We have alllowed its own writers

to untangle the fearful mashes of their crafty and corrupt
system."

The "extreme incredulity" of Americans to believe

in the Jesuitical threat had demanded she publish the
work.S*

Considering Carroll's vanity and her known

reputation as an anti-Catholic, Pope or President?,
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surprisingly, was published anonymously.

Carrol 1 may have

chosen to hide her name and sex because of the lurid tales
contained therein.

She dealt with matters with which few

women, and certainly no unmarried Southern lady, should dare

admit acquaintance.

Tales of physical torture were bad

enough, but stories of incest, adultery, and mesalliances,
even when couched in Victorian euphemisms, made it clear the

author knew what those terms meant.

While Carroll had

clearly done her "research," though no doubt limiting it to

unfavorable and anti-Catholic sources and citing evidence
out of context, such a book presented to the public with a

woman's name on the title page might cause as great an

uproar as earlier anti-Catholic works such as Maria Monk's

Awful Disclosures.

Carroll's intention seems to have

been more scholarly than sensation-seeking.
Jesuitical conspiracies seriously.

She took her

She approached the

problem with the mind-set of the scholar and the
argumentative style of a lawyer:

show . .

. ."

. .we now proceed to

"We give the dates and proof . . .

exhibit it . . .

"Our proofs will be clear and

incontrovertible . .

.."

."

"We

"We shall fortify our facts as we

proceed from step to step, by the highest and most

incontestable proofs."^ yer goal was to sway the American
public and, more directly and specifically, the American
press to take the threat as seriously as she did and then
commit itself to the appropriate reaction.

Sensationalism
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would not do for her purposes, and a woman as author would
have raised quite a stir.

A second edition of The Great American Battle came
out early in 1859.

In March Carroll proposed a book on

Dr. Robert Kane, the famous Arctic explorer who had died in

1857.

She wrote to his brother for approval of the

project.3? By April, she had started the work as she
resumed her correspondence with William Seward, who was a
member of the Kane Monument Association.

In that same

letter to Seward, she mentioned a work on Kansas that she
was preparing, "of immense benefit to the Republican

cause."3^
This was the first evidence that Carroll had
apparently dropped her allegiance to the American Party and

turned to the Republicans.

While she maintained her

allegiance to the ideas of the Know-Nothing party throughout

her life, particularly her support for its Unionist stand
and her fear of the Jesuits' influence in American politics,

she was enough of a politician to realize that the
Know-Nothings were losing power.

To maintain whatever

influence she thought she had and to gain more, Carroll had

to extend herself beyond the limits of the American Party.
The Republicans, while offensive in some political matters,

were a rising force in the land.
them.

Carroll chose to work with

Weed, a leading Republican in New York, had written

her a letter of recommendation to Horace Greeley.

He
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remarked that "though for some time Americanist,11 she had
done, "and is doing, much for Republicanism. "

He commended
39
her to Greeley's attention (and presumably his payroll).
But Carroll had not given up the Know-Nothings entirely.
For as long as she could, she worked for both parties.

Her

goal was to elect a man to the White House in 1860 who could

serve the ideals of both parties.
made her choice:

By April 1858, she had

John Minor Botts of Virginia.

Like Fillmore, Botts appealed to Carroll as a
national candidate.

West:

"I know no North, no South, no East, no

I only know my country, my whole country, and nothing

but my country."There is nothing local about him,"

"There is nothing sectional about him.

Carroll wrote.

He

is emphatically, a national man .... he is the only man
now left, who can occupy the position of such men as Clay
and Webster."

It might be "premature" to pick a candidate

as early as more than two years before a nominating

convention, but it was going to be exceedingly difficult to
find one who could "harmonize and unite the contending
influences .

. .

in an increasingly divided country.

By May 11, Carroll, who had no doubt met Botts
through the American Party, had become his campaign manager.

He sent her copies of his speeches;

she was to send him all

her press releases.*^ Botts was an experienced politician.

A Whig, he had been in the Virginia state legislature from
1833-1839, in the House of Representatives from 1839-1843,

92

then again from 1847-1849.44 He was an anti-abolitionist,
hated the Democrats, and held both groups responsible for

the agitation throughout the country over the slavery
issue.45 He was not particularly enamored of foreigners

and tended to take a conspiratorial view of Democratic party
policies.45 Most important to Carroll, though, was his
pro-Union stance.

He would, he had written, "make a willing

sacrifice of myself, if, by so doing, I could save the union
and rescue my country from ruin."4?

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill had brought Botts out of
retirement, and he had run unsuccessfully for Congress as a

Know-Nothing in 1854.

He continued to speak out publicly

after his defeat, railing against abolitionist fanatics,

disunionists, and the "Democracy".

Appealing as his

opinions might be to some, like Fillmore, he was not the
most charismatic of politicians.

Carroll thought the

overuse of his "strong reason" in his speeches made him "but
little understood by the general public."

While most

believed him to be brusque in his manner" and uncaring

toward his opposition, "on the contrary," she argued, "he
was a thoroughly refined and accomplished

gentleman . . . with most agreeable manners and . . . most
49
fluent and interesting in his conversation . . . ."
By 1859, Carroll was concerned enough about Botts'

viability as a candidate to do some checking with her
political acquaintances.

Thomas H. Clay, son of Henry Clay
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of Kentucky and a Know-Nothing in 1856, thought Botts a good
choice, but only if "sectional issues” were "discarded” in
the coming election.

Buchanan was out of the question for

the Democrats, he wrote, having "shewn himself worse than

ever his most bitter political enemies had thought him."
Seward and other Black Republicans,he thought, were

"altogether impracticable" on the slavery issue.

That left

men like Botts or Edward Batas of Missouri or John

J. Crittenden of Kentucky, behind whom all "conservative and

rational men could unite.

Edward Bates, indeed, was a name being bandied about
as a candidate.

N. Ranney, a Democrat from St. Louis, wrote

Carroll that even he would welcome Bates in the White House,

should "the democrats divide . .

. [and] the

opposition . . . elect a President in 1860," something he

thought unlikely.51 Carroll saw such comments from

politicians as challenges to her candidate.

She wrote

letters to newspapers, lauding Botts' years in politics over
Bates' inexperience.52 Josiah Polk, her friend and

occasional landlord, wrote Carroll from Washington that he
too was pushing Botts' candidacy to the Know-Nothings and

Republicans.

Botts could serve as the fusion candidate,

instead of Bates or Know-Nothing John Bell or Republican
Seward.52
Botts was cautiously optimistic and properly

grateful to Carroll, thanking her for "the manner in which
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you have presented my name before the country."

He realized

that her work might not be reaching as many people as he

needed to win a nomination, since, for instance, "the
circulation of the [Know-Nothing New York] Express is
limited .

...11

Still, if he were denied the nomination,

he thought, it would be "by the political machinery of the

politicians," not public sentiment.54

Carroll had gone to St. Louis in July, presumably to
measure Missourian support for Botts' candidacy over
favorite son Bates.

She went on to Chicago, where she had

apparently made contact with newspapers to supply them with

pro-Botts articles.

She missed the Fair there, but enjoyed

a "providential escape from a burning car" during her

journey.

Carroll returned briefly to St. Louis, where her

paternal uncle Charles lived.

From there she took the train

across the country to New England.

and partly an excursion.

The trip was partly work

Carroll's health was not always

the best, and her friend Polk was "indeed rejoiced to learn
that your health is improved.

This shows the benefit to

you, of exercise and mental relaxation .... Even the iron

horses has [sic] to stop .

. . now and then.

Botts was beginning to look more and more like a
winning candidate to Carroll.

Jacob Broom in Philadelphia

called him the "man for the times" since he was both a
Southerner and a Unionist.^ Carroll counted Thomas Corwin

of Ohio in Botts' camp, though Benjamin Wade, Judge John
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McLean or Edward Bates would no doubt be considered more
likely as Corwin’s first choice.57 By November, Bates had

"gone over, clean and clear to the Republican party,"
thought Botts, which would most likely serve to drive the

Whig and Know-Nothing elements into Botts’ camp.58
Carroll desperately wanted Botts to win.

supported Fillmore and failed.

power.

She had

Botts was her way back into

But everyone in politics knew that William Henry

Seward was destined to be the probable Republican nominee in

1860.

Carroll would have to have been completely out of

touch with political realities not to have realized that.

She had chosen her candidate, certain, as always, that she

had made the only correct choice, and she was sure Seward’s
abolitionism would destroy the country.

So Carroll lied.

She lied to herself, a necessary deception so she could
continue her work for Botts.

But she also lied to Botts.

CarrolI told Botts that Thurlow Weed, "in sacred
confidence," had told her that "Governor S[eward] is as

politically dead as tho’ he were .

.

. undergoing

putrefaction in his grave, that he will not now be brought

forward in the Convention, nor any other Republican."

She

told him Weed was "determined to nominate you if possible,"

that Botts’ prospects "never were so strong as now."

As the

campaign year began in earnest, however, Botts too had heard
from Weed.

Weed, he wrote Carroll, had said only "that in

the event of their [Republicans] having to go South for a
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candidate—he would prefer me.”

views?

Was this a change in Weed's

"Under what pretense is it they have invited others

[who] .... are entirely cut off & excluded from all

possibility of a nomination?"

Any fusion between

Know-Nothings and Republicans was impossible under those
circumstances.59 Botts was not angry at Carroll, since he

undoubtedly believed her incapable of such a deception

regarding his chances.

But he was furious at the

Republicans for their refusal to consider any fusion

candidate not a Republican.
Perhaps because Carroll knew the degree of hatred

the Know-Nothings felt towards Seward, she could interpret
whatever comments Weed made to her regarding Botts as
support for his candidacy.

The virulent anti-Catholicism

and nativism that had characterized the election of 1856 was
still very much a part of the I860 electoral campaign.

Seward's supporters faced letters such as the one
O. B. Vienz wrote to Weed that remarked on the "widespread
and deep prejudice against Seward on account of his action,

as governor, on the public schools."

This referred to

Seward's support nearly twenty years previously for

public-funded education for immigrants to be taught by
"'teachers speaking the same language .

. . and professing

the same faith.'" Parochial schools would receive public

funds—a most unpopular idea in 1840 as in the 1850s, and a

controversy that clung to Seward throughout his attempts to
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become a Presidential candidate.61 Vienz urged Weed to
drop Seward as a candidate.

"The prejudice [against him]

pervades the entire Protestant church .

strongest with the clergy;

... It is

but is showed more or less by

the great body of the laity, even outside the council of the
Know Nothings . . . while with the Americans, it is

rankest—deepest—-most bitter. "6^

But even Know-Nothing Carroll could not ignore the

primacy of the slavery issue in the campaign of I860.

Sectional tension had increased greatly in the years from
1856 to 1859, thanks to the Dred Scott decision, the civil

war in Kansas, Preston Brooks' attack on Charles Sumner in

the Senate, the Lecompton Constitution, and John Brown's
raid on Harper's Ferry.

As sectional tensions rose,

Know-Nothings were forced either to take a nationwide stance

against slavery, thus losing Southern support to the
Democrats, or to de-emphasize or ignore the issue, thus

losing their northern support to the more inclusive
Republicans.

The Know-Nothings had achieved their victories

at state and local levels because they had been able to

appeal to nativist sentiments in the South and because they

could combine that appeal with anti-slavery-extension stands
in the North.

But the Republicans had, by I860, recognized

nativism as an important political drawing card and an issue
that was not going to disappear.

Accordingly, Republican

leaders made concessions to the Know-Nothings by
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incorporating a degree of nativism in their party
pronouncements.

Combined with their anti-slavery-extension

philosophy and the Know-Nothings1 abysmal performances in
public office, Republicans would eventually gain enough

support that northern Know-Nothings would shift allegiance
to the Republican Party.@3

Given the decline in Know-Nothing power and the
co-optation of their ideas by the Republicans, Carroll had

adopted Botts, a Know-Nothing but a strong Unionist, as a

logical fusion candidate for president.

But Botts was too

unpopular in Virginia, where Know-Nothings were rapidly
weakening.

More important, he could not whole-heartedly

adopt the anti-slavery-extension plank of the Republican

platform.

Kenneth Rayner warned Carroll that unless Botts

could say "no extension" and mean it, there would be no
nomination.

Opposition to slavery extension was now "sine

qua non," and as much as Rayner had hoped for a "union of
the opposition to Democracy North & South .

.

. on a

conservative rational basis of organization .... I doubt

if such a thing be possible.Botts was not willing to

go far enough.

In an effort at compromise, he was willing

to subscribe to the entire Republican Party platform, except
for the resolution regarding slavery extension.

Where the

platform called for no extension in the territories, Botts

wanted to insert the words, "'either by force, or federal
legislation against the will of the people of the
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territories .

.

. .”

With those "modifications,11 Butts did

"not see why every Whig and American in the United States
should not subscribe to the Republican platform."

But his

modifications would change the platform from absolute
non-extension to a form of popular sovereignty, a

"modification" unacceptable to the Republicans.^

Carroll went home for Christmas to Church Creek,

then back to New York City to discuss Botts' future with
Weed.

She returned to Washington in January 1860.

A friend

from New York, John B. Fry, wrote that he had heard she was
"overrun by visitors—the magnates of the land" at her

parlor in Polk's boarding house on Pennsylvania Avenue.6*
And Carroll feasted on the news and gossip her visitors,

including Jefferson Davis, Thomas Corwin, and John Sherman,
brought her.

The biggest topic in town was the Speakership

contest in the House of Representatives.

The fight had

begun on December 5, 1859, and lasted until William

Pennington was elected on February 1, 1860.

Carroll had

discussed the matter with Weed in New York in early January

and had believed his opinion that "Nr. Sherman could be
elected easier than any other of the party," and he was in
fact the candidate the Republicans wanted as Speaker.

By

the 27th, though, Carroll had become "acquainted with the
Bossmen of the Republican, Southern opposition and

Anti-Leoompton parties," and as a friend, thought it her
"duty" to write to Weed "though you do not to me."^?
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Sherman could not be elected, she wrote, and "I
intend to tell him the whole truth as I know it and as no

man ... would ever tell him . ...11

A union between

Southern Know-Nothings and Democrats was forming that would
destroy the Republicans—and Thurlow Weed as wall, since it

was thanks to his "interference" that Sherman was still in
the running and causing no end of trouble.

Weed was to pull

back from his support for Sherman and push for Thomas Corwin

of Ohio instead.

Corwin's name had already been suggested

on January 17 by Roger A. Pryor of Virginia as a compromise

candidate.68 Weed must come to Washington immediately and
take charge of things, or he would "never survive the

obloquy which will be heaped upon you if you allow a
Republican organization to be defeated by the persistency of
this present course."

Carroll thought herself fully

justified in both her plans to tell Sherman all and to force
Weed to come to Washington.

I feel that my position before the country, my
knowledge of what I am about, my principles and my
sincerity in the maintainance [sic] of Republican
sentiments, which I will cherish while I live (for
better reasons than influence you politicians) enable
me who heard [gossip about the matter and was thus
able to advise Sherman to withdraw as speaker
candidate] . . . will make me indifferent even should
Mr. Sherman not adopt my wise and patriotic counsel.
I shall have the approval of my conscience and my
country hereafter—when the whole party will feel the
direful calamity which will come from their own doings
or those of.the leaders to whom the matter is
entrusted.
Carroll was growing a bit desperate.

She had spent
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over three years trying to force a fusion of Know-Nothings

and Republicans.

She had spent nearly two years pushing

Botts for the presidency, with no real sign of Seward losing
support from major Republican leaders.

Weed was not

returning her letters, even if he did consent to see her

occasionally when they were in the same city.

Botts as a

candidate seemed to be out, and Carroll wanted in.
Speakership contest provided her a way.

an old and intimate friend*

The

Thomas Corwin was

if he were elected Speaker,

surely not only some of his glory, but some patronage would
fall her way.

Carroll may have seen this election year as her last

chance.

She was, after all, forty-five years old.

Her

party had almost entirely lost its place in politics*

friends and acquaintances, taking her word at face value

about her influence, were hounding her for jobs*

she

herself was chronically short of funds and, as always,

concerned about her family.

She was also growing deaf.

For

a woman whose main attractions were her intelligence, wit,

and flattery, it would be disastrous not to be able to

participate in the political discussions that made her
parlor so lively and provided her entree into the political
world she loved.The year 1860 became a frantic one for
Carroll as she searched for the next President to latch onto

his star to ensure her own future.

She even wrote for

Fernando Wood, the Doughface Democratic mayor of New York,
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suggesting he be a candidate for president.

Wood thanked

her for "keeping his name before the public" and

acknowledged draft attempts, but laughingly remarked that

"but for the common sense my mother gave me I should be made
dizzy" by such attention.

He would be satisfied with a seat

at his party1s nominating convention.
Besides her own self-interest, though, Carroll was

still vitally concerned with the preservation of the country
from the agitation that seemed ready to tear it apart.

She

supported Wood because of his stand against the agitation

promised by anti-slavery Republicans.

By March she had

written to Weed again, telling him neither Seward nor Bates
would take the nomination, and therefore Botts "is your only

man."

If that were impossible (Carroll's first admission of

doubt), Botts would be willing to accept the vice-presidency

under Judge McLean.

McLean's age, 75, was a major factor in

considering his candidacy.

Carroll dismissed it rather

callously, deciding that "if McLean did die, the North would
have as good a friend" with Botts in the White House as ever

Seward would be.
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In April, Carroll wrote to Weed once more, telling

him that McLean would be nominated at the Constitutional
Union Party's convention in Baltimore on May 9, and that "he

is the only man who can defeat the democracy."

For the

vice-president, she wanted Weed to "let it

be .

. . Botts

. . You have got more power than they
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[the Constitutional Union party members] will have?

their own party!

even in

For you can regulate the Republicans.1,74

If weed did have the power over the Constitutional
Unionists, he chose not to exercise it for Carroll1s

candidates.

The Constitutional Union Party's candidates

would be John Bell with Edward Everett as his
vice-presidential running-mate.

McLean and Botts were both

nominated in the convention, but won only 21 and 9 1/2 votes
on the first ballot respectively;
respectively on the second ballot.

they dropped to 1 and 7

Carroll, in keeping with

her search for power in the winning party, quickly wrote a
congratulatory note to Everett.
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It could not have been too much of a surprise to
Carroll that Botts had not been nominated in Baltimore.
himself had given up by May 1, writing sadly that ".

hope, expectation and .

He

. . all

. . desire has pretty well died

out," as he saw "State after State, meeting in Convention

and my name not mentioned with approval in any one ... it
looks to me very much like the game is up."7^ But Thurlow

Weed's inability to "regulate the Republicans" at the
Chicago convention must have shocked Carroll.

She had

worked hard to establish a relationship with both Weed and
Seward;

who was Abraham Lincoln?

After the Republicans

nominated Lincoln on May 18, she must have been in despair.
She had gone home to Church Creek, when John Wilson, another

boarder at Polk's in Washington had written her that things
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were "quiet and dull without you."
hope:

He held out a crumb of

Bell's prospects were brightening, he thought, since

Lincoln's nomination would necessarily mean the alienation

of votes in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts,

which states had had their favorite sons eliminated by the
dark horse from Illinois.
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By June, no doubt exhausted, Carroll had fallen ill

and could follow the campaign only through letters from Polk
and other friends.

By September she had recovered, but her

sister Julianna had died during her stay in Church Creek.
Botts successfully predicted Lincoln's election to her, and

prophesied the immediate secession of the South upon the

commission of any "aggressive act" by the new President.
Carroll herself was soon ready to "speak of the Union as
already dissolved."?* She returned to Washington, needing

to discover where she could fit in with the new

administration, only to be met with another loss.

The

National Intelligiencer announced the death of former
n 7Q
Maryland Representative John M. S. Causin.

John Causin had apparently met Carroll in Chicago

about 1858.

She may have known him from his earlier

political career in Maryland.

He had been to visit his

family in Arkansas and was returning to his law practice in

Chicago when he died of apoplexy.

In three letters from

Causin's brother-in-law to Carroll, their relationship as
intimate friends and probably lovers survives.
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Causin's brother-in-law, L. E. Barber, wrote gently
of John's death to Carroll, and of the death of his mother
as she had waited for her son's body to come home.

Aware

that Causin had "regarded you with affectionate esteem,"
Barber promised Carroll that he would return her letters.

Carroll wrote to request a copy of Causin's last speech and
when Barber replied, he suggested he burn her letters.
There were "many—very many of them, " and he had
accidentally read one "at a part which gave full expression

to the feelings of the writer—the whole heart was bare
before me."

He was embarrassed by the incident and worried

about sending them through the mail:

"it would be

mortifying if by any accident your letters should fall into
other hands."80

Carroll, relieved at his discretion, requested

Barber burn the letters.

She also asked him to "suspend

judgment" until he "knew the facts" regarding her affair
with Causin.

Barber assured her he could not conceive that

their relationship, whatever it might have been, could
"depreciate you in our estimation .... Can it be that I

would estimate less one whom he loved for returning that
love!"

While Barber could not "altogether acquit [Causin]

of imprudence and of weakness in this respect, " he hastily
reassured Carroll of her innocence in his eyes.

"I know

nothing, believe nothing, suspect nothing . . . other than
the simple fact that there existed a mutual affection."

He
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enclosed locks of hair from both Causin and his mother,

thanked her for allowing his sister to keep Carroll's
daguerreotype, and sent her violets from the graves of the
dead.91
Carroll had suffered greatly during 1860 and early

1861.

Her work would help her recover.

Ill health,

mourning for the loss of Julianna and Causin, and despair at

the turn of events in her life had kept her quiescent for a
time, but the growing threat to her beloved union would soon
galvanize her into action.

r
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Chapter 4

"To Preserve This Union . ...11

With the election of Abraham Lincoln, Anne Carroll

feared for the very existence of the Union.

"I have no

doubt," she wrote in November 1860, that his election would
"lead to an attempt on the part of the Southern leaders to
dissolve this union."

Convinced that the secession of her

home state of Maryland would mean the destruction of the

Union, she urged Governor Thomas Hicks to stand firm against
secessionists.

of Mr.

"Although you were opposed to the election

Lincoln, you are for maintaining this Union," she

reminded him.

Lincoln had been "constitutionally elected

and . . . must be inaugurated on the 4th of next March, as
the President of the whole U.S."

A successful inauguration

depended "more upon your individual firmness than upon all
1
other men in the nation."

Carroll may have overstated the importance of Hicks'

position, but not the importance of keeping Maryland in the
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Union.

If Maryland seceded, the capital of the United

States would be cut off from the North.

The loss of the
2
capital could mean the loss of the Union as well. Both

sides wanted Maryland, and in the early days of the
secession crisis, no one was sure how the state would go.

One party who may not have been sure was Governor Hicks
himself.
Hicks was a slaveholder from the Eastern Shore

county of Dorchester.

He considered himself a Southerner,

and, as did many Eastern Shore residents, resented the
primacy of Baltimore City in state matters.

In the state's

constitutional convention in 1850-1851, Hicks had been
disenchanted enough to call for the secession of the Eastern
Shore, but only from Maryland to another state, not from the

United States.3 Hicks personified the schizoid nature of
Maryland.

He supported slavery, saying at one point that he

had "never lived, and should be sorry to be obliged to live,

in a state Where slavery does not exist, and I never will do
so if I can avoid it."* On the other hand, as a

Know-Nothing he had been elected as governor on a Unionist
ticket.

Slaveholder and Unionist:

the two political

characteristics ware fast becoming uncomfortable for

politicians.

Hicks, like his state, was caught in the

middle.5
Carroll, an old family friend, understood Hicks'
dilemma.

She wasted no time in urging Hicks to stay with
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the Union.

She wrote first from New York City, then from

Washington, where she took up residence as Congress convened

in December.

Over the five months between the election and

the outbreak of war, she alternated between Maryland and

Washington affairs, trying hard to stay in touch with
matters in both areas.

Most of her attention focused on

Maryland, where the issue of seoession had become the issue

of whether or not to call the legislature into special
session.

Hicks had refused.

The Democrats, who thought

they could push a call for a secession convention through a

special session, petitioned Hicks.After a "fair, frank,

rational examination of the subject,” he told leading
Maryland secessionists he could discover no necessity to

convene the Legislature in special session.

was unnecessary, the weather inclement.

The expense

Further, the

likelihood was that those called would spend time spending

money instead of solving the "so-called" crisis, and

Maryland was already $50,000 in debt from the previous
session.

Hicks counselled patience.

He urged seoession

leaders to wait to see what the other states would do, to

allow Congress to convene and take action, to let the
inauguration of the President take place.

Hicks also

rebuffed tentative approaches from the southern states,

turning down South Carolina's allegedly innocent invitation
to join with the Palmetto State in a day of fasting and
prayer.

He had already scheduled one and could not change
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the date, Hicks replied, but he was sure that the people of
Maryland would "unite, heartily with the same

purpose . . . in imploring God's blessing and direction in
this hour of difficulty."9

Carroll kept in touch with Hicks often during this
period, passing along information and articles from

Washington newspapers.
governor:

It was a difficult time for the

"the waves of secession and rebellion are beating

with great fury upon the frail bark of our State's
executive," and he was "borne down at the same time by

domestic afflictions almost without a parallel"—the death
of his daughter.I9 Putting his personal crisis aside, by
the first of the year Eicks was ready with a message to the

people of his state that enumerated what had been done since
the election and what would be done in the future.

He had, Hicks said, consulted with the other border
states.

He was inclined to wait to take any action in

concert with them.

South Carolina's reasons for seceding

were not good enough to persuade him to join that state in

secession and, even if they had been, one state's actions

should not be the sovereign state of Maryland's rationale

for such a drastic step.

No, Lincoln had not promised him

an office if the state were kept in the Union.

In spite of

his lack of support for Lincoln and his party in the late
election, Hicks assured his constituents, he believed that

the Union, even under Republican rule, would guarantee the
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protection of slavery within Maryland.
reason for patience.

He added one more

Considering the state's geographic

location, any war within its borders would be so destructive

that it behooved him to give its citizens 11 time to breathe"

and "try every honorable plan ... to avert the necessity
of War . . .

."

He had two choices:

"to allow Maryland to

slide into the ranks of the seceded States," after it had
been "hurriedly borne along into the turmoil of the

political movements of the day," or, far better, "to wait

with calmness the progress of events. "H

Although pressure from secessionists for calling the
legislature continued in January, so did conciliatory
measures—and so did support for Hicks.

One of his most

ardent supporters was Carroll, as she used her "extended
relation with the leading Presses of the country" "to create

a public opinion favorable to your course of patriotic
action throughout the land."

12

The support was welcome,

but Hicks, tired of "the harassings of calculating
demagogues (and they are terrible)" expressed the "sincere

wish that Congress may early do something to stave off and
save a collision."

Will not the representatives from the Border States go
at once to work and effect something as a salvo and
will not the Northern representatives yield more for
their country's safety? They have the power, will
they not display the needed magnanimity and pass
conciliatory measures and put the Southern extremists
at fault? This I say as a Southern man. The Southern
extremists wish no offers of compromise from any
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quarter, but not so, the masses. And how easy a
matter for Northern members to unite with conservative
Border State members and the few worthies from the far
South and pass a proposition of that good laboring man
Crittenden or some such measure to stave off until the
people-can have light and the fourth of March is
past.

Such firmness of position and such obvious, if overly
optimistic, hope for reconciliation impressed Carroll.

She

shared Hicks' private letter with "several leading

Republican Senators & members" and was pleased to be able to
lay a few rumors of Maryland's impending secession to rest.

Maryland would come out of this trial "like gold seven times

purified," she thought.

Even if Virginia did go with the

South " (which [state], in spite of the secessionists I am

privately assured is true to the Union) I can see no reason
why Maryland should cast her destiny with her."

What would

come next, she was not sure, for John J. Crittenden's
proposals would never pass Congress—it would be "as easy to

build a world."

She was right.

It was too late for Senator

Crittenden's proposals to re-establish the Missouri

Compromise line and to protect slavery in the South with a
constitutional amendment.^

The continued secession of states (Mississippi on

January 9, Florida on January 10, and Alabama on January

11), "the madness of those political metaphysicians, and

aristocratic Southern tyrants" had so angered Northerners
previously sympathetic to the South, thought Carroll, that
they now viewed secession "as rank treason to the
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government, and believe it is the planned work of traitors.
As do I."

In spite of her many friends among Southern

politicians, "I love my country .

.

. far more,” and she

would not support her friends in such a cause as secession.

She could see "nothing for the Border States to do, but to
adhere to their own conservative principles and bow to the
supremacy of Constitutional law,
President of the Nation .

Lincoln is the Lawful

. . .

Hicks continued to buy time for anti-secession

He appointed seven Marylanders as commissioners
1g
to the February Peace Convention in Washington.
Ali,
sentiment.

however, with the exception of attorney Reverdy Johnson,
were notable for their mediocrity.

Johnson, moreover,

proposed a resolution that while secession was deplorable,
coercing "in any form the said States to reunion or

submission" was just as deplorable, and the government
should abstain from such coercion as it would lead to an
"irreparable breach and ... to incalculable ills."
Convention did not vote on his resolution.

The

The question

of coercion raised by Johnson was one Carroll had not yet

settled in her own mind.

She was inclined to think the

Republicans as a whole were against it, since their 1860

party platform had had a plank supporting states' rights.

Yet "if these Southern desperadoes are in earnest, in
impeding the commerce of the Great North West, the carnage
will be terrible I

terrible."^
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Of more immediate importance to Carroll by the close

of January was her safety.

Was she safe in Washington?

sought reassurance from Hicks.

She

She was rooming at the

Washington House in the city and was "the only Southerner in
the whole establishment.

The ladies flock to my parlor, for

news and rely far more on me, than on their husbands for

information & knowledge of Southern intentions.

Leading

secessionists who called to make farewell visits to me, gave

me the earnest assurance that it was no part of the Southern
programme to attack this city . . . ."

If she left prior to

Inauguration Day, not only would it be personally

inconvenient to her as it interfered with her work, but also
"it would be the immediate signal of every Northern lady's

leaving—supposing it be done from apprehension of danger."

Hides apparently assured her of her safety, for not only did
she stay in the city, but she wrote to a New York newspaper
to express her certainty the city would not be attacked,
that

. .we are in possession of such facts as to

authorize us to publish an unequivocal denial to the report
of [secessionists'] intended attempt to seize the

Capital .... no such design is contemplated . .

.

Her state safe, her person safe, Carroll next looked

to her constant ooncem:

patronage.

The fact that Carroll

thought she deserved attention and employment for her

friends and family from the incoming Republicans, after she
had failed to support Lincoln in the election, exemplifies
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Carroll's tendency to view her abilities, actions, and

influence in whatever form that could get her what she

wanted.

Obssessed with a desire for power, attention,

recognition, and reward, she constantly reinterpreted her
own actions and misinterpreted the actions of others until
she arrived at a conclusion which served to fulfill her
needs, however far from reality that conclusion might be.
Carroll's attempt to presume upon her acquaintance

with Thurlow Weed is a prime example of this characteristic.

There exists no evidence that Weed was particularly close,
professionally or personally, to Carroll.

In her letters,

though, she demanded favors of him that few people not well
acquainted with the Republican leader would even suggest.

Weed's position as a mediator between the Seward faction and
Lincoln made him a prime target for Carroll's queries.

She

began soon after the election, pressing Weed to have John

Minor Botts put in the Cabinet, along with John A. Gilmer, a

North Carolina Know-Nothing.%@ Both men were Unionists,
both knew Carroll well, and both would undoubtedly feel
obligated to help her with patronage positions in the

future.

Both Botts and Gilmer were under serious

consideration by Lincoln on Weed's advice.

Though there is

nothing to indicate they were suggested by Weed at Carroll's
instigation, she would no doubt claim the credit if either

man were chosen.

Lincoln settled on Gilmer as the best

choice among the southern and Border State Unionists.
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Gilmer met an offer of a Cabinet position with a demand that
Lincoln publicly declare his intention that the new

administration would back down from its opposition to
slavery in the territories.

Lincoln refused, and Gilmer

regretfully declined the tentative offer.
Carroll had urged that Gilmer and Botts both be put

in the Cabinet to draw on Unionist support in North Carolina

and Virginia.

Failure to include either one—or any

Southern man—angered Carroll greatly, and she did not know

or ignored that the southerners selected had refused office
on Lincoln's terms.She later wrote that Lincoln's

actions constituted "an irreparable blunder" by
"constructing his Cabinet on partisan grounds.

He was

intent alone in harmonizing the radical and conservative
elements of his party.

It was a fatal error not to have

taken . . . some one, or more, representing, not party, but
the Union sentiment of the South."

For Carroll, the crisis

to the country was great enough that party interests should
be put aside.

She held the disproportionate representation

of Northerners in the Cabinet responsible for Increasing
"the power of the rebellion a hundred fold!"
By March, Carroll turned to more personal concerns

in her correspondence with Weed, asking him to use his
influence with Lincoln for an appointment for her father to
the Naval Office in Baltimore.

He had held the office

before, and "there was never a more faithful, efficient &
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valuable officer than he."

She wanted Weed to write to

Seward in support of her petition for her father's job:

"I

want it done as a recognition of my claims & without
solicitation.1,24 What claim she thought she had is
unclear.

Weed apparently made no effort to fulfill her

request, and Carroll resentfully concluded that he did not

"mean to try and aid me .... I thought it would have
given you pleasure . . . ."

She had been ill and did not

want to have to go to see Lincoln herself, but "I suppose
with a hundred friends I shall have to do this myself.

It

is wrong, that I should be obliged to see him .... It is
due to me that my Father be tendered the Naval Office."^
When Weed failed her, she turned to Botts, who saluted her

for being a "dutiful daughter" but had "established it as a
rule, not to interfere with any local appointments outside

my own State.

Convinced that Weed possessed considerable control
over patronage, Carroll continued to badger him with

requests, as friends badgered her:

John Fry wanted her to
97
have a "little chat" with the President on his behalf.
Representative Thomas Corwin, Carroll wrote Weed, was too

ill to accept his appointment as Minister to Mexico, but she
could provide the perfect substitute in Lemuel Dale Evans, a
former Representative from Texas, "eminently

qualified . .

. really a great man in intellect."

Evans

must have been a very close friend, because "if he gets it,"
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Carroll wrote, "I will go with him . .

.

28

Carroll hung

onto the idea of Evans as an ambassador tenaciously.

Corwin

accepted his nomination, so she proposed Evans for a post in

Constantinople, writing to Secretary of State William
Seward's son, Frederick, and then making the same proposal

to Weed.29
in the midst of this constant and continuing

struggle for patronage, in which Carroll had no reasonable
hope of success, the secession crisis in Maryland came to

the forefront again.

The war had begun in April, and the

transportation of United States' troops through Maryland to
protect the city of Washington sparked protests from

Marylanders.

A riot on April 19 in Baltimore against the

6th Massachusetts Regiment was condemned by both Lincoln and
Carroll.

earthy

"'Our man are not moles, and can't dig under the
they are not birds and can't fly through the air.

There is no way but to march across, and that they must
do,"' said Lincoln.^ Carroll wrote to Governor Hicks.

Indignant at the "disgraceful and atrocious outrages in

Baltimore," she warned that unless Hicks could make it clear
the city had been in momentary control of the seccessionists
during the riot, a "terrible retribution" would be visited

upon it.

It was imperative that Hicks maintain his Unionist

stance, and that meant the federal troops must be guaranteed
safe passage.

"You cannot deny the right of transit to the

Northern troops through the territory of Maryland, called by
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the President to defend their capital and your own,” Carroll

wrote.
Maryland thank God is still a state of this Union. It
is the sworn duty of Mr. Lincoln to defend the seat
of government—the troops can approach it only over
the soil of Maryland and what power have you to
prohibit their approach? That Maryland ceded to the
United States a national seat of government and then
withheld the right of peaceful transit over her
highways essential to make it safe and suitable for
the purposes for which it was ceded, or to defend it
in time of war, is so glaringly absurd as to shock the
common sense of any one. And such a declaration would
be [scorned] by the civilized world.
For you to pretend to say, that the trooops shall not
pass through the territory of Maryland would be a
virtual abandonment of your whole former position and
your public declaration of your adhesion to the
Southern Confederacy.

Hicks had had to make one concession to ease tension
in his state:

he had called for a special legislative

session to meet in Annapolis on April 26.

On the 24th, he

moved the meeting place to the more peaceable and strongly

Unionist city of Frederick in western Maryland.

Carroll

wanted to go to Frederick to use her "influence ... to

stop their madness in the disunion movement," but safe

passage to Annapolis or to Frederick could not be
guaranteed.

"So I am flooding the Legislators, Heaven

defend us from such, with letters.

I will be heard there &

if the miserable fools pass the ordinance [of secession],
let them go & suffer the consequences."
did not pass an ordinance;

The legislature

it voted on April 27 that it did

not even have the right to consider secession, and in early
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May, voted that it would not call a convention that could
grant it that power.33 By May 13, troops under command of
Major General Benjamin F.

Baltimore,
realized.

Butler occupied the city of

control over the state by Unionists was at last

Hicks had held out successfully, and Carroll

could breathe a sigh of relief that her state would remain
loyal to the United States.3*

In her letter to Hioks after the Baltimore riots,

Carroll had begun to articulate her view of the nature of
the rebellion against the federal government.

By the summer

of 1861, she was ready to distribute her arguments in

support of the President's policies to the country at large.
From July 1861 until May 1862, she wrote at least four
pamphlets and no doubt countless letters to the press to

disseminate her opinions of the legality of the war.

In

those writings, in those troublesome times, Carroll ignored
Wie fact she was a woman in a man's world.

She made no

apology for her intrusion into the political arena, as she
had done in her 1856 election books and pamphlets.

Perhaps

she had seen enough women working for the war effort to know

her apologies were no longer necessary.
save the Union;

Her object was to

all else beside was frippery.

She went

straight to the point in her writing, wasting no time on
decorating her arguments with the ideas of republican

motherhood or recognizing the limits of the cult of
domesticity.

If her arguments did not help win the fight,
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there would be no republic to be mother in, and domesticity
would continue to be sadly disturbed.

After the crisis, she

could return to the style of her antebellum writings, but

for the present, the Union was all that mattered to Carroll.

She would not weaken her arguments by making distracting

references to her sex.
After the excitement of the spring. Carroll had gone
home in the early summer of 1861 to her father's house in

Church Creek, Maryland, to be treated by her brother,
Dr. Thomas Carroll, for an eye problem.

and read and wrote.

There she rested

On July 13, she wrote a letter to

Edward Everett that was published in Living Age, in response
to Everett's July 4 oration at the Academy of Music in New
York City. 36 Everett had set out to define the purpose of

the war, "the justice of the cause," and the fallaciousness

of the arguments employed by the South to support its

actions.

37

Everett held that the Union was not a compact
between states, that the constitution was entered into "by

the People of th® United States," not the states as separate
entities.

To use the general reservation of powers not

granted to Congress as given to the states to imply a right

of secession, Everett thought absurd.

He argued that in

order to use this supposedly implied power of the right of
secession, the states had had to make war—a power expressly
limited to the national government.using coercion to
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re-establish the Union as it had been was necessary, Everett
argued, since "within the sphere of its delegated powers,

the General Government deals with the individual citizen."
If coercion was necessary to enforce the laws of the Union,
so be it.3®
The resumption of sovereign powers by the people of

a state (an argument Virginia used in her ordinance of
secession) was invalid as well, declared Everett.

The

argument, used by John C. Calhoun in 1830 in the midst of
the growing controversy over nullification, had been

rejected by James Madison that same year because the
resumption of sovereign power could be made only by the
people of the whole United States, not by individual states.

Protest, repeal and amendment were the only legitimate ways
to deal with unwanted laws—nullification and secession were

out of the realm of legal possibilities.

Calhoun, the

patron saint of these two latter ideas, had not dealt with

Madison's arguments against the idea of nullification, said
Everett.

But the disciples of Calhoun had "gone beyond the

master."

Calhoun had never really promoted secession as a

right.

Only one sentence in his Discourse on the

Constitution claimed the right of a state to secede from the

Union.

His focus in that work was on the right of

nullification.

Calhoun maintained the right of revolution,

but if the South were revolting, argued Everett, the causes

they had given were not enough to justify that
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revolution.40
Everett1s comments on Calhoun caught Carroll•s

attention.

Everett had supported his contention that

Calhoun had not maintained the right of secession with a
letter by Maryland lawyer Reverdy Johnson appended to his

Johnson had boarded in the same house as Calhoun

address.

during two sessions of Congress and had talked with him
often.

Calhoun, said Johnson, had placed secession on the

same ground as revolution.

Both would destroy the

government, "and no Constitution, the work of sane men, ever
provided for its own destruction ."

Nullification, on the

other hand, was meant to preserve the Constitution
"practically, but to amend it, and in a constitutional

mode."41

Reverdy Johnson was wrong, wrote Carroll.

While

"unquestionably a gentleman of profound legal
ability . » . it is in vain for him, or any individual, to

attempt to prove that the secessionists assent or appeal to
any other principle now than that which Calhoun

enunciated . .

. disseminating which he spent the labor of

his entire life, and ruined two generations of Southern men,

who have been educated to believe it."

Calhoun's Fort

Hill address, quoted by Carroll, made clear his stand, she

argued.

Therein, Calhoun had said that "'the final

cognizance of a question of contested power would be in the
states and not in the General Government."' Since
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nullification was the arrest of one or more federal acts by
the state, and secession the arrest of all federal acts by
the state, it was impossible for any mind to distinguish

between secession and nullification.43 Both doctrines
meant that states could not be coerced into following

federal laws, and both were insupportable if the United

States was to survive as a federal government.
Having blamed the war on Calhoun and his followers,

Carroll moved next to defend the President's war measures.
She returned to Washington in the heat and humidity of
mid-July, where she read Senator John C. Breckinridge's

speech opposing a resolution to approve Lincoln's actions in
the Washington papers.44 On August 7, Breckinridge had
gone to Baltimore where he asserted before a large crowd

that the State of Maryland had been abolished, a military
dictatorship had been established, and the people of

Maryland should prepare to revolt.4^
John Breckinridge had been Vice-President under

Buchanan, Senator from Kentucky, and the Southern Democrats'

Presidential nominee.

He was also the nephew of the

Reverend Robert Breckinridge, Anne Carroll's old friend and
minister.

With deep pain, Carroll had watched him as he

voted against Lincoln's policies in the early days of the
war and gave speeches "for the purpose of stimulating and

strengthening the Confederate rebellion." 4@ Breckinridge's
opposition stemmed from his belief that the President had

135

taken upon himself powers he did not possess.

He had

established a blockade, made war on the South, called for

enlistments, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus, all
powers which Breckinridge thought the Constitution had

granted to Congress, rather than to the Executive.

The

government could "exercise such powers and such only as"
were given "in this written form of government . ... If

the powers be not sufficient, still none others were granted
and none others can be exercised."*? In a pamphlet
entitled Reply to Breckinridge, Carroll stated that the
whole argument of whether or not the President had acted

legally turned on the question of "whether the overt act of
treason, which the Constitution defines to be levying war
against the United States, had been committed?

Whether the

Confederate States of the South commenced the war?"*** Or
did the President make war upon the South?

When considering the accusations against the

President, Carroll wanted the reader to keep the source of
those accusations in mind.

The first few pages of her short

pamphlet were thus devoted to showing the decade-long

conspiracy of Southerners, begun at the Nashville Convention
in 1850, to secede from the United States and form a

Southern Confederacy—a conspiracy in which Breckinridge
took part.The Southerners had also conspired to prevent

Lincoln's inauguration, had seized federal property,

"improvised armies," acted as provisional governments,
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recruited soldiers to fight, "stormed Fort Sumter, and put
in motion a formidable army for the capture of Washington
and the overthrow of the Government.»50 The President’s

actions in meeting these threats to the nation were thus
defensive by their very nature, for they were designed to
defend the country against attack, to prevent the

"subversion of the Government, " and to ensure the national
K]
existence.
Granted the premise that the South and not the

President made the war, Carroll’s next task was to consider

the duties of the Executive in such a position.

The

Constitution provided that Lincoln should "faithfully

execute the laws."

While he was not given the power to

declare war, he could, given the absence of a sitting

Congress, ". .

. defend the assault on the nation’s life;

because his right rests on the supreme or universal law of
self-defense, common to nations as to individuals."

As the

defender of the life of the nation, he was expressly granted
powers as Commander-in-Chief, Carroll argued, and that

"express grant of war-conducting power . . . carries with it
the implied power to use every belligerent right known to

the law of war."^

Carroll interpreted the war as an insurrection

because she thought that interpretation would not grant the
Confederacy belligerent status as an independent nation.

Thus the power of war would stay in the President’s hands as
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a defender and executor of the national laws, rather than be

put into Congressional hands as the body to declare war
against a foreign nation.

This interpretation meant that

all the actions that followed:

the blockade, the call for

volunteers, even the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

were merely means (expressly and constitutionally granted)
to the end of defending the Union and the Constitution . 53
While Carroll's overall interpretation of the

President's war powers coincided with the administration,

she was confronted with the same dilemma that faced all

Union propagandists seeking to support Lincoln's war
measures.

Lincoln's actions as the chief executive could

not be legally reconciled with his actions as
Commander-in-Chief.

If he were acting as an executive

officer and controlling an insurrection, for instance, he

had no legal right to institute a blockade of Southern
ports.

A blockade was an act of war, and war existed

between two belligerents, not between the civil government

and its insurrectionary citizens.

But Carroll supported the

President's actions by arguing that his status as

Commander-in-Chief gave him war-making powers to use as a
law-enforcer, and that any power normally used in war was

his to use in putting down the insurrection.
In the long run, Carroll was forced to fall back to
the same position that Lincoln occupied when his actions

were criticized as extra-legal.

"... are all the laws,
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but one, to go unexecuted," Lincoln asked of Congress on
July 4, 1861, "and the government itself go to pieces, lest

that one be violated?"

Carroll’s.

Lincoln’s answer was no, and so was

The extraordinary danger to the survival of the

Union itself outweighed the temporary suspension of specific
laws.

55

In her Reply, Carroll’s statement that Lincoln’s

war-powers carried "the implied power to use every
belligerent right known to the law of war" served to weaken
With her careless choice of legal vocabulary,

her argument.

she seemed to be saying that the federal government should

view the Confederates as belligerents.

If the Confederates

were formally recognized as belligerents, however, the

insurrection within the southern states would become a war
between two national governments.^ The administration

would never make this legal distinction and, in fact, went
through extraordinary manipulations of vocabulary to ensure
the distinction was not made.

Perhaps what Carroll meant

when she referred to belligerent rights was what happened

during the war.

While the United States never formally

recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent, the federal

government conceded it belligerent rights.

Captured

Confederate crews were held as prisoners of war, for

example, rather than as pirates.

Confederate officers and

soldiers were regarded as a rebel army, not a motley group

of traitors.

The inherent contradiction between the legal
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theory and the practice of war, however, remained a
controversial issue.

Proclaiming Lincoln1s war measures as defensive in

nature, Carroll did not hold Lincoln responsible for
starting the war.

She did view his decision to stand firm

with his party's position regarding territorial slavery as

the precipitate cause of secession, however.

But though his

decision was criticized by pacifists, Unionists (including

Carroll herself), Southerners and historians, the
pro-secession "conspirators" had done everything they could.

Carroll argued, to ensure that no compromise on the issue of
slavery would pass Congress.

They wanted out of the union,

and they had fired the first shot.

The war was their

choice, she wrote, and in making war, Lincoln was merely
defending the country and exercising his constitutional
authority to put down the "heretical" doctrine that the
government could not coerce a state to obey federal
laws.

The last section of Carroll's pamphlet defended the

President's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
arbitrary arrests, and the suppression of the press.

This

last charge gave Carroll particular pause, for "as an

independent member of the press I will never consent to see
its power trammeled or its freedom abridged by President or
ruler."59 But the press (in this case a pro-Confederate
St. Louis paper) had been used by Confederates to trample
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the very institutions it was supposed to defend by calling
for their destruction through the destruction of the United

Therefore, argued Carroll, that press should be

States.

shut down.

Here again, the temporary suspension of various

constitutional rights, if necessary to preserve the whole

Constitution, was the proper course of action for the

President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take.

Martial law

transcended civil law when it was imposed for the

preservation of that civil law.^^

Carroll's Reply to Breckinridge was well received.

Samuel T. Williams, attorney for the Congressional Globe,
wrote that he was sure that 'if spoken in the Senate, your
article would have been regarded by the country as a

complete and masterly refutation of Mr. B's heresies."^
She sent copies of it to Caleb Smith, Secretary of the

Interior, and to Attorney General Bates, who also passed
along a copy she left for the President.^ She printed

some 10,000 copies for distribution throughout the Border

States, primarily as her own idea, but also as a way to
convince the War Department to recognize the value of her
services and hire her as a pamphleteer.

tactic worked.

Momentarily, the

On October 2, 1861, she met with Assistant

Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott, who led her to understand

that any pamphlets she wrote, if approved by his office,
could be billed to the War Department for printing and

labor.63
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Carroll continued to defend most of Lincoln's
actions.

In September, she had issued a short pamphlet

supporting Attorney General Bates1 defense of the

President's actions;

in December 1861, she issued The War

Powers of the General Government.64 Her primary argument
therein was, once again, that the actions the President took
such as suspending the writ of habeas corpus or making

arbitrary arrests were legal, as long as they were taken to

fulfill his function as President, executor of the laws of

the land, and Commander-in-Chief.

But Carroll also used

this pamphlet to argue against the confiscation and

subsequent emancipation of slaves.
Carroll had feared Lincolns's "abolitionist

tendencies" from the beginning.

By August of 1861, she was

sure he was bent on destroying slavery as the Confiscation

Act of 1861 became law.

assuage her fears:

Samuel Williams had tried to

if Lincoln were an abolitionist, he

wrote, he would, as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell

Phillips had done, rejoice "over the secession of the South,

because they believe & with good reason, that separation
dooms slavery by removing it from the protection of Federal

law.

Lincoln, therefore, if he favored abolition, would, if

he acted consistently, end the war."6^ Carroll may have
believed this argument;

after all, she had written

Jefferson Davis, with whom she was warmly acquainted, on the
occasion of his inauguration, that "if you
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continue . .

. war will result.

Slavery will perish, for

the nations of the earth, however they may hate republican
government, cannot in this age of the world aid or abet it

on this continent.1,66 Carroll hated slavery, and she was
sure it would eventually disappear, but she believed that

the federal government could not legally interfere with the
institution.

If slavery were to die, it would be a natural

death, not an execution.
In the rough draft of The War Powers, Carroll wrote

of one correspondent who had described Lincoln to her as an

abolitionist, "a renegade Southerner, narrow minded, as all
ignorant men are, [who] hates the South intensely, because

he did not get its votes."

Carroll feared that hatred would

end the possibility of restoring the Union with slavery

intact, a condition which she deemed essential to preserve
the Southern economy and society.

Lincoln must recognize

the South as part of the "great family of the Nation," in

spite of its peculiar institution, and he must respect the

South's constitutional right to hold slaves.

Only through

the efforts of "allies on the soil" of the South, Carroll
held, could the North hope to restore the Union.

But "while

[Lincoln] acts exclusively on his anti-slavery prejudices,"

by threatening emancipation through such acts as

confiscation, "the American people may abandon at once all
reasonable hope or expectation of his ending the war.
cannot be done."6?

It
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Carrol1 interpreted the government’s confiscation

policy as the first step toward forced emancipation.
not.

It was

It was a way to weaken the enemy by depriving him of

money and materiel.

The August 1861 act provided for the

condemnation and seizure of all property used to aid the

rebellion.

Such property of course included slaves, some of

whom had helped build Confederate batteries.

While

confiscation may have been militarily sound and a politic
measure, it was legally questionable, and was rarely

enforced.69 Still, Carroll viewed the act as an

opportunity for the President to emancipate slaves and held

Lincoln personally responsible for enforcing an

unconstitutional law.
At one point in her rough draft of The War Powers,

Carroll even called for the removal of "every obstruction"
that stood in the way of pursuing the war to its

constitutional end (i.e., preserving the Union) "even if it
be a President of the United States

But by the time

she finished her pamphlet, her rhetoric had become less

impassioned and more legalistic.

Since the war was being

waged to preserve the Constitution, she wrote, "the war
power itself must not trample that instrument in the
dust."71
The discussion of a second confiscation act had

begun with the promised introduction of a bill by Senator

Lyman Trumbull on December 2, 1861.

Carroll viewed such a
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bill as one of many "wild theories” being proposed and

argued that all acts that suggested the government could
confiscate all the property of the rebels, both private and
public, were inherently unconstitutional.

The United States

wanted to regard the war as an insurrection rather than a

war between two independent powers.

It could not,

therefore, abrogate the Constitution that it said was still
in place within the areas in rebellion.

In other words, to

keep the war a rebellion required a constitutional conduct

of the war.

The Constitution was still the law of the land

in the South, according to the North;

therefore, it should

not be trampled upon in order to preserve it.

The

Constitution forbade taking private property for public use
without just compensation.

Since "the Government can gain

no new powers, by putting down the rebellion," it had not,
by virtue of the war, gained the power to confiscate
property without due process of law.

If the government

proposed to confiscate property under the laws of war, it

would be admitting the Confederacy was a nation, the very

thing it wanted to avoid.

Carroll was willing to jettison

constitutional guarantees to such privileges as the writ of

habeas corpus to preserve the Union;
do so to free slaves.

she was not willing to

Although she had been able to

maintain an argument that acknowledged Lincoln could take
actions of war while acting as an executive in her earlier

pamphlet, she did not maintain that duality in her
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interpretation of any confiscation act.

Carroll saw beyond

the attempt's stated purpose of confiscation and included
its effect of freeing slaves as the basis of her
criticism.

One of Carroll's primary aims in The War Powers was
to convince her readers, especially those in Congress, of

the "utter impossibility" that the war could emancipate

slaves in the South.

The "fanatics " that desired it did not

understand that the policy of abolition "can never hope to
restore the Union, while it would be sheer suicide to the
Constitution.

Such a policy might create unity, which is a

very different thing from union;

but it would be the unity
73
of a frightful despotism over both the South and North."
For Carroll, the way to emancipate was not by force or

decree, but by "preservation of the Union, and with that
silent progress of intelligence and virtue which the Union

alone can guarantee."

The War Powers was printed and

distributed to all the members of Congress.

75

Carroll's pamphlet did not end the question as she
probably hoped it would.

despised slavery.

There can be no doubt that Carroll

Her work to buy her father's slaves prior

to the war, freeing her own slaves, her support for

colonization were evidence of her hatred for the
institution.

But she was keenly aware of the psychological,

sociological, and economic upheaval that would result in the

South if slaves were freed without compensation,
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colonization, or due process of law.

Events in the spring

of 1862, however, made it clear to Carroll that the push for

emancipation had not been stalled by her writings or by her

constitutional arguments.

On March 13, 1862, Congress

forbade the use of the military to return fugitive slaves
who had escaped into Union lines.

In April, a bill for the

abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia passed
Congress.

It provided for the compensation of owners, but

nevertheless prompted Carroll to write to the President.^

Unopposed to the "abstract question of abolition
with colonization," she still thought he should veto the
proposed bill.

She feared it was the wrong time;

the bill

would alienate all the Union men in the South, since they

would see "that the abolitionists have now the control of
the government," and that emancipation in the District was

"the first in the series for the destruction of slavery in
the South . . . ."

That series had been described by John

C. Calhoun in 1849:

once abolitionists obtained control of

the government, "they would proceed, first to abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia—secondly, in the

territories—Thirdly, in all the forts, magazines, arsenals,
dockyards, etc.—fourthly, to prohibit the internal slave

trade between the states—and finally to abolish it in all
the States."

Southern Unionists believed Calhoun had been

mistaken in his assumption that the abolitionists would one

day become ascendant.

The success of the Republican Party
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had not meant "the Abolition reign had commenced," Carroll

argued;

any change in the raison d'etre for the war now

would change that perception.

"Be not deceived,

Mr. President, because the Union men of the South sustain

you, in your efforts to suppress the rebellion and maintain
the integrity of the Constitution, that they will ever

submit to the abolition of slavery, by the [general]
government."

If the President signed the bill, the war

would be protracted "for months, it may be, for years," and

the rebels would gain "a reinforcement of at least fifty
thousand fighting men" from Border States opposed to any

form of emancipation.

"1500 Africans" might be freed as a

result of the measure, but "you consign to a bloody grave,

at least tan thousand patriot soldiers."

Even if Congress

passed the bill over his veto, at least Lincoln's hands
would be clean as far as abolition was concerned.

the important point for Carroll:

That was

the President must not be

the one to Change the nature of the war.
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Lincoln signed the bill and returned it to Congress
on April 16, never doubting "the constitutional authority of
congress to abolish slavery in this District" and having

"ever desired to see the national capital freed from the

institution in soma satisfactory way."

Since the bill

provided for compensated emancipation with the possibility
of colonization, Lincoln's only qualm was the expediency of

the matter.

Unlike Carroll, he believed the time was
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right.

Carroll must have been disappointed that she had
failed to stop Lincoln from signing the bill, but there was

a note on her copy of her letter to him that he had not

received it prior to signing the measure, which no doubt
comforted her.

However, she was destined to be disappointed

again over the issue of confiscation, which came up in May

in debates over a second confiscation act.

One version of

the bill came before the Senate in the spring of 1862.

On

May 19, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts rose to

argue for its passage "to suppress the insurrection, to
punish treason, and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the
property of the rebels . . .

Sumner's arguments in

support of the bill led to Carroll's pamphlet defining The
Relation of the National Government to the Revolted

Citizens.
Sumner argued that the peculiar nature of this civil

war had placed the South in a sort of double jeopardy.
were criminals, guilty of treason;

They

they were enemies

because they had made war against the United States.

Consequently, "we are at liberty to . . . treat the people
engaged against us as criminals or as enemies, or, if we
please, as both."

Criminals, as traitors, would be

subject to the constitutional provisions which ordered that
"Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of
Treason," which in this case Sumner argued should be the

149

forfeiture of property, as provided in Article III, Section
3 of the Constitution.

Enemies would be subject to the

"rights of war" which provided that the "private property of

an enemy on land may be taken as a penalty for the illegal
acts of individuals, or of the community to which they

belong."

If slaves were considered property, they could

be confiscated as the enemy's property had traditionally
been confiscated during time of war.

If slaves were humans,

they existed in a "constant state of war" with their masters

anyway, by virtue of the institution which enslaved them.
Thus, in freeing them, the United States was simply taking
e5
"advantage of the actual condition of things."

If Confederates were criminals, Sumner continued, it
was the duty of the North to "pursue and punish them";

if

they were enemies, it was the duty of the United States to
"blast them with that summary vengeance which is among the

dread agencies of war . . . ."

Freedom for slaves would

"take from the rebellion its mainspring of activity and

strength . . . its chief source of provisions and

supplies ... a motive and temptation to prolonged
resistance, and you will destroy forever that disturbing

influence which, so long as it is allowed to exist, will
keep this land a volcano aver ready to break forth
anew:

Sumner's speech horrified Carroll.

all she had been fighting against:

It encompassed

abolition, disunion, and
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revenge.

In a letter to Lincoln, she was even willing to

move away from her earlier position that the war was an

insurrection.

The "so called Southern Confederacy, is now

to this government, as a foreign power and people are as

much under the dominion of a foreign yoke as though the
States were held by France, or Great Britain, instead of
domestic foes," she wrote.

"Davis has coerced the obedience

and submission of the entire population," and recognition of
the United States as the supreme power by any Southerner

would be "at the peril of his life."

If the rebellion had

in fact succeeded in establishing a foreign government.
Carroll argued, the "the rules and regulations" of public
law "apply in all their force . .

. ."

Confiscated property

would return to its owners, under the rules of international

war.

But if slaves were adjudged persons, as Carroll

believed they were, they could not "under the Constitution

be deprived of their liberty."

Confiscation, because it

would lead to emancipation, meant trouble.

It also meant

expense, since the owners would have to be compensated for

their property that was not returned to them and yet had not
been "sold, transferred or lost by the war . .

. .

The major problem for Carroll—and for

Lincoln—regarding the Second Confiscation Act was the

definition of both the status and the property of the
offender, the Confederate.

If a domestic criminial, due

process regarding the seizure of property had to be
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observed;

if a traitor, punishment for treason could not

constitutionally extend beyond the life of the traitor

(i.e., could not extend to titled property).

Therefore, a

blanket declaration that all persons "in rebellion" against

the United States should lose their slaves posed problems

under either definition.

Either all traitors would have to

be tried individually, or slaves would have to be legally
defined as persons, not property—which they could not be,

since then they would not be liable to seizure.

Carroll saw "an express inhibition upon the power of
Congress to abolish slavery or confiscate the property of

rebels."

The Constitution specifically defined what treason

was and "absolutely inhibit[ed] the confiscation of the
estate of the traitor to the government, leaving it free to

pass to his heirs."

The Confiscation Act under

consideration by Congress would adjudge the Southerners

guilty without trial, decide their punishment (the loss of
property), and execute that punishment (by confiscating
their property).

A bill more directly in conflict with the

Constitution could not have been drawn, said Carroll.

37

Where Senator Sumner had argued that the "peculiar
circumstances" of the combination of public and private war

enabled Congress to treat the South as either criminal or

enemy or both, as it pleased, Carroll cited the same

authorities and even the same passages to argue that the
prohibition against confiscation "was inserted in the
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Constitution only to prevent the exercise of this arbitrary
go
power" during such a rebellion.
Sumner used the long

history of confiscation to justify its recurrence.

Carroll

used that same history to argue that the abuse of power

through confiscation had led to the inclusion of the

prohibitive clause in the Constitution.

The Bill of Rights

had further guaranteed the security of property, reinforcing

the Constitution5 s stand against confiscation.

The Second

Confiscation Act came not from a longstanding tradition, but

had originated "in the worst and most malignant passions of
the human heart . . . pressed in utter contempt " of those
Constitutional guarantees.

Carroll returned to her

definition of the war as a domestic rebellion—only
individually could those convicted of a crime of treason be

punished by holding their property liable for damages.
Before Congress can claim to exercise this power of
war over any portion of the American people;
it must
first recognize the rebellion as a success—their
revolution accomplished, and the Union dissolved. In
short, must concede to the rebellion—what no European
power has ventured to do—that they have achieved
their independence, and have established a firm and
stable government, against which it is no longer
proper to war with the view of suppressing it.
For Congress to take that position ... is to become
allies of the rebellion, and ourselves traitors, like
them, to the Constitution .

The war might be raging, Carroll argued, but the

Union remained.

Southerners were still citizens and had to

be treated as such with all the constitutional guarantees
that citizenship provided.

Possession of property might
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pass to the government during the war, but title to that
property remained, except in the case of "movable goods,"

with the owner or his heirs.

Further, since the

Southerners had been subjugated by a rebel force and the

federal government was unable to protect them from that
subjugation, "it cannot hold them responsible for any act
they may commit while under the pressure of a usurping

power."

It would be difficult enough to restore authority

and peace constitutionally;

"The Union of these States

cannot be restored under a mutilated Constitution, or under

a new and different one."
war "for the sake of power.

Confiscation would continue the

For the annals of the world

record no instances where the usurpers of power have ever,

voluntarily, laid it down."

Carroll called The Relation of the National
Government to the Revolted Citizens Defined her "Reply to
Sumner."

It too was printed and distributed in Congress,

where it came in for special notice by New York Republican
Representative Alexander Diven, in a speech on the

confiscation matter.

A specious argument in favor of what may be done under
the war power, by way of confiscation, has been
made . ... Any one who desires to sea it answered
will find that a clever woman has done it completely.
Any clever woman could answer it . ... She signs
herself in her pamphlet Anna Ella Carroll.
I commend
her answer on the doctrine of the war power to those
who have been following that phantom and misleading
the people. And I commend it to another individual, a
friend of mine, who gave a most learned disquisition
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on the writ of habeas corpus, and against the power of
the President to imprison men. He will find that
answered. I am not surprised at this. The French
Revolution discovered great political minds in some of
the French women, and I am happy to see in these
troublous times that there is a like development in
our women.
In addition to her arguments about the

unconstitutionality of confiscation, Carroll continued to
campaign against the policies she thought might lead to
forced emancipation.

She wrote Lincoln that "any abolition

programme, whether it be by Confiscation Act, Orders by

Military Generals [Frémont's August 1861 proclamation

freeing slaves in Missouri and David Hunter's May 9, 1862,
proclamation in North Carolina], or by arming the slaves as
allies of the Government" would strengthen Southern resolve

to defeat the Union until "a million of men" would be
94
required to defeat the South.
The expanse alone would
ruin the country and would destroy Lincoln.
exasperated:

Carroll grew

"I cannot allow myself to speak of men so

stupid, as to suppose they can change at once, the whole

social ideas, which have from the origin of our institutions
controlled the American people . . . [to lift] up four
millions of African slaves, upon a plane of political and

social equality."

It was absurd, it was dangerous, and it

must be stopped lest Lincoln become "the last President of
the United States of America."

95

Carroll suggested Lincoln find soma way to

antagonize the abolitionists in order to reassure the Border
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States and thought he should veto the final version of the
Second Confiscation Act.

"This bill will inaugurate a new

policy," she argued, "and change the whole morale of the

war."
It will no longer be regarded as a war for the
maintainance [sic] of the American Constitution, but
as one, for the subjugation of the Southern States,
and the destruction of their social system. And the
judgment of the civilized world will then decide that
the South is in a just struggle for Constitutional
liberty; against an arbitrary and revengeful
government.
Intervention by Europe was sure to follow if he signed the

bill, Carroll warned, and Jefferson Davis and his

"co-traitors" would became heroes while Lincoln and his

Cabinet would stand "in all the future, like George the
Third and the Ministry of Lord North."**

Lincoln did have objections to the Confiscation Act,
and in fact broke precedent by sending his proposed veto
along with the signed bill back to Congress on July 17.

One

of his objections was centered on the extinguishment of real
estate titles, which was an unconstitutional forfeiture of
property because it extended beyond the life of the guilty

party.

His second objection was also one Carroll had raised

in her pamphlet.

As provided for in the Act, proceedings of

property forfeiture in rem, rather than in personam, led to

a forfeiture of property "without a conviction of the
supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any

proceeding."

While in rem proceedings were used in
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admiralty cases, Lincoln thought the Second Confiscation Act
should provide "a reasonable time . . . for such parties to

appear and have personal hearings."

97

Unlike Carroll, Lincoln did not object to the

emancipation of slaves provided for in the Second
Confiscation Act.

He chose to interpret the Act's

provisions regarding property forfeiture as applicable to
slaves, as Carroll did.

This interpretation was apparently

not the one Congress made, since the Act provided separate
sections for confiscation and emancipation, and did not

mention slaves as property to be confiscated.

But Lincoln

reasoned that if property forfeited to the general

government under the Act included slaves, the government,
"so far as there can be ownership," owned those slaves.

He

then had "no objection to Congress deciding in advance that
they shall be free."

As for the specific provision which

declared slaves of rebels "captives of war,
and .

. . forever free," Lincoln suggested that Congress

make clear the conditions under which that provision could

be enforced.
The fact that Lincoln signed the Second Confiscation

Act, even with his reservations, made it quite clear to
Carroll that Lincoln or Congress was going to do something

about emancipation.

Lincoln's desired policy for

emancipation was the same as Carroll's:

gradual

emancipation to avoid sooial disruption, federal

L.
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compensation to prevent economic destruction, and voluntary
colonization to ensure peaceful race relations.

While

Carroll's concern was for the preservation of the South,

which made her hestitate to support any war-time

emancipation measures, she remembered well the days when the
slave traders came to buy those whom the plantation would no

longer support.
I shudder now at the sight of such horrors as came
before my own eyes—a daughter, clinging to her
parents & in the most delicate situation—with screams
that were frantic, the whole white family of females,
in tears, yet powerless to interpose . . . the most
tender and devoted of mothers too far bereft by the
sale of her first born boy to shed a
tear .... Scenes like this no years have ever^-Q
effaced—no time can ever make me forget ....

Her antipathy toward the institution had led her to work for
compensated emancipation in the 1850s.

In 1861 and 1862, at

the same time she fought against the Confiscation Acts
because of their emancipatory effects, she worked to promote
the colonization of freed slaves.

By April of 1861, Carroll had begun working for
Aaron Columbus Burr, a leading New York merchant, on a plan

to colonize freed blacks in British Honduras in Central
America.

Burr, in March of that year, had become the agent

for James Grant of Belize, British Honduras, to sell Grant's

150 square miles of land in "Stand" (Stann) Creek, to found

such a colony.

Aside from what he viewed as the

humanitarian motive of colonization, Grant had asked $65,000

for the land, which included considerable stands of

u
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mahogany, rubber trees, ”cocoa nut trees,” and a
brickworks.
Burr had originally made a land-lease agreement with

Grant for a mahogany-cutting company formed in 1860.

The

political unrest in the area scared off investors, but Grant

had received several offers for the land itself, which Burr
thought privately ought to be valued at $100,000.

Burr kept

Grant from selling by promising him that he would try to

sell it to the United States government.

In the spring of

1861, Burr proposed to Carroll, who was, he wrote, "known as

a practical advocate of colonization," that a company be
formed "for the purchase of this land for the benefit of the

free persons of color in the United States."
benefit Burr's pocket:

Also to

he offered the land at what he

called a "reduced price" of $75,000, but since he had never
actually purchased the land from Grant, he stood to make

$10,000 on the sale of the land to the government, some of
10?
which undoubtedly was to go to Carroll.
Burr apparently hired Carroll as a lobbyist to help

him present his case to the government.

How they met and

what their agreement was is unclear, but by the fall of

1861, Carroll was corresponding with Burr and apologizing
that a case of cholera in August and September had kept her

too ill to do much work.

At the same time, Grant was

warning Burr that poachers were stealing mahogany and that

the I860 mahogany-cutting company was so hopelessly
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insolvent that Burr and Grant would wind up suffering

financially if steps were not taken to sell the land.
Colonization of freed blacks on the land was the only way

out, Grant wrote to Burr.

Burr wrote to Carroll, and

Carroll wrote to the President, proposing a colony in

British Honduras, 103

Carroll presented the colony as attractively as
possible.

It was close to the United States, had a direct

trading track by sea, easy access, a friendly government, a

tropical climate, and fertile soil.
perhaps overstated attraction:

There was an added, and

"the desire of the

government" of British Honduras "to develop its vast
resources of wealth, by receiving upon a social and

political equality, the very class of persons which it is
the interest of this country to furnish."

It was also a way

for the United States, she wrote, "to remove the colored
race and make them useful to themselves," while still

retaining them "as friends of the whites."^*
The formal proposal was finally made by Burr himself
on May 6, 1862, to the Department of the Interior, which was

in charge of all colonization projects.

For $75,000, Burr

would transfer title, found a settlement colony named the
"Lincoln Colony," and "if the government desire my

services," he would "receive these freedmen as they are
transported, and superintend their location upon the land,
upon whatever principle may be determined by the
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government.11

On May 13, Carroll wrote to Secretary of the

Interior Smith with a full account of the improvements on

the land and included a map of Scotland Town, the main

settlement.

The matter was laid before Lincoln by the

19th.

At this point, there may have been a meeting between

Carroll and Lincoln regarding the colonization project.
Reminiscing late in life, Carroll recalled a touching scene

in which Lincoln asked her what he should do about the

matter of colonizaton.
I was perfectly charmed with his cordial and simple
remarks, free from every semblance of ambition. He,
in the most exalted office upon earth, deferring as
humbly to another, as if he had no power or aim! He
was patient and gentle as a woman could be, nothing
brusque about him. He got up and took a large map
which he hung in the room and sat down on a small low
stool by the fireplace, spread the map on his knees,
and asked me to point out the place I recommended for
the colonization of the freedmen. I pointed to
British Honduras, in Central America, and gave all the
reasons for this., as the than proper
locality ....

Such a domestic scene may have been fact, or fancy created

by the passage of time and presidential martyrdom.

At any

rate, Carroll did continue to contact Lincoln through

letters, writing to him again on May 19.

In that long

missive, she argued against Liberia as a colony:
transportation costs were too great, and the unwillingness

of freed blacks to leave the United States for Africa was
too strong.

Haiti, another suggested site, was just as

objectionable.

The island was too small for the "American
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element" (who were presumably used to the vastness of the

North American continent and who were now four million in

No doubt a "few, shrewd" colonists would succeed,

number),

but only by "sinking their Americanism and becoming

thoroughly European in their caste . . . the
majority .

.

. would be held only as laborers and

In addition, the "arbitrary" government

producers . . .

of the island would give colonists "no more chance for

elevating their social and political positions" than in the

United States.

British Honduras was the answer.

Large

enough to "found an empire for many millions," it was the
only country in Central America that would not require civil

and military support and protection from the United States
for its colonists.

Life, liberty, and property were secure

in British Honduras, and its government would "interpose no
3 07
barrier" to colonization.
It is difficult to tell exactly when Lincoln
rejected the choice of British Honduras as a possible
colonization site, if he did indeed consider it seriously.
Carroll had sent him a box of "Central American goods" to
convince him of the plenty that awaited colonists, and she

thought it was still alive as a choice on August 30.

She

wrote to Burr telling him she was sure that the Chiriqui

colonization project, another Central American site in
competition with her suggestion, was defunct.

She nay not

have known about Lincoln's recommendation to a delegation of
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free blacks on August 14 that they go and 1-ve at
Chiriqui.10® But Carroll was correct in her perception
that Lincoln was moving toward emancipation of slaves with

or without colonization.

Lincoln could see a way to

accomplish emancipation either way.

Much as she hated

slavery, Carroll could not wield such a two-edged sword.

In

her opinion, emancipation without colonization would mean

the loss of the Border States, and in the end, the death of
the Union itself.
After a September 13 meeting with Senator Samuel
C. Pomeroy, head of the still-lively Chiriqui project.

Carroll wrote Burr that their British Honduras colonization
project was dead.

Instead, the "Chiriqui property will be

bought & fortunes made for the white speculators through the
poor Africans who will hew the wood & draw the water."

The

Chiriqui site was not the final choice, but the

administration's two-pronged attack on slavery continued
with the issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation

Proclamation on September 22.

Although this proclamation

included provisions for compensation and colonization, the

deadline of January 1 was a setback for moderation that no

doubt angered Carroll.

On October 21, she made a last-ditch

effort as she asked for a meeting with Lincoln as "a sincere
friend of the colored" to argue once more for the British
Honduras site.

If she met with him, her arguments failed to

sway him, for the announced site was the Haitian island of

163

Ile A1 Vache.109
The extent to which Carroll had access to Lincoln as

well as the degree of attention he paid her ideas is
difficult to ascertain.

Certainly he knew who she was.

In

August, he had thanked her for an address she had made to

the people of Maryland, calling for more volunteers, which
he had read "with a great deal of pleasure."

Certainly his

Attorney General, Edward Bates, was on good terms with her
and wrote to her cordially during the war.^"^ While she

may have occasionally enjoyed Lincoln's attention, she was
only one of many trying to influence him.

Although she did

fail to convince him to follow her course of advice, Carroll

did articulate soundly the concerns of the Border States
regarding emancipation and colonization.

Lincoln recognized

and spoke to those concerns, if not in direct reply to her.

In September 1862, for example, he pointed out his fear to a

visiting interdenominational delegation of Christians from
Chicago that "fifty thousand bayonets" from the Border
States might be turned against the Union in consequence of a
proposed emancipation proclamation.

This was an argument

and a figure that Carroll had used in her letters to Lincoln
111
the preceding April and July.
Fragmentary evidence exists in Carroll's papers that

suggests a favorable attitude toward emancipation after the

war, and once it was a fait accompli she turned her

attention to other matters.

Between her writings which
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supported Maryland anti-secessionists and the President’s

war measures, and her work on behalf of Burr for the
proposed ”Lincoln Colony,” there was one other issue that
interested Carroll greatly.

In the fall of 1861, Anne

Carroll turned her eyes to the war in Tennessee and her hand
to military strategy, thus beginning the most legendary and
the most controversial action of her long career.
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Chapter 5

Carroll Stakes Her Claim

In the summer of 1862, Anna Ella Carroll met with
President Lincoln.

She presented him with a bill for the

pamphlets she had written.

He dismissed her proposal that

she travel to Europe to write for the Union with such vigor

that she did not discuss her second proposal:

her for her work as a military strategist.

that he pay

She had written

out the introduction of the idea to Lincoln—"Now,
Mr. President, there is another subject, which I desire to

bring to your attention"—but her audacity seems to have
deserted her.^ Not for long.

The legend of Carroll as a

military genius was about to spring forth.

Carroll claimed to have discovered a route to invade
the Confederacy that would bypass strong Confederate

fortifications on the Mississippi River.

Her account, as

she presented it in later years, is as follows:

In early October 1861, shortly after making her oral
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agreement with Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott to

write pamphlets for the War Department, Anna Ella Carrol1
left the comparative safety of Washington to discover for

herself the state of the Union in the western theatre of the
war.

She went first to Chicago, then to St. Louis, where

she met her old friend and close oompanion, Lemuel D. Evans,
who had been sent to St. Louis on a secret mission by
Secretary of State William Henry Seward.%

To her dismay, Carroll found St. Louis to be a

hotbed of Confederate sympathizers and discouraged
Unionists.

She decided to continue writing pamphlets

arguing for the Union cause and went to the Mercantile
Library in St. Louis to do research.

There she met the

librarian, who was the brother of the Confederate general,

Albert Sidney Johnston.

She engaged him in a warm

discussion, for he was a Confederate sympathizer and

expressed surprise that, as a Southern lady, she should be
so avid a supporter of the Union cause and should be using
her literary talents in such a losing cause.

Sensing his

disbelief that her convictions were firm, Carroll flattered

and charmed her way into Librarian Johnston's confidence and
took note of all he said.

She also took note of what all

those around her said and eventually decided to share the
information she had gathered with the Union authorities.
She went to see General John C. Frémont, who was in charge

of the Western Department, but he was absent and only "his
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wife was in command.1,3
Not deigning to share her information with Jessie

Frémont, Carroll kept all these things to herself and

pondered them in her heart.

She knew that President Lincoln

had decided that the Mississippi River must be controlled by

the Union in order for the North to win the war.

But all to

whom she spoke assured her of the strength of Confederate

fortifications down the river and of the impossibility of

opening it.

Furthermore, after witnessing the disheartening

effects on union sympathizers when they saw the injured and

dead federal soldiers after the Battle of Belmont on
November 7, she was determined to find a safer way for Union

troops to invade the South, a way that bypassed the

fortified Mississippi.*
There were two other rivers besides the Mississippi

that afforded possible invasion routes into the Confederacy:
the Tennessee and the Cumberland.

Carroll reasoned that if

she could talk to a riverboat pilot familiar with these
rivers, she might be able to learn if the rivers would be
navigable by Union gunboats.

Fortunately, in the same hotel

where Carroll was staying, there resided one Anna Scott.
Mrs. Scott's husband, Captain Charles M. Scott, was a
riverboat pilot and, in fact, had piloted the transport

Memphis at the recent Battle of Belmont.

Carroll asked

Mrs. Scott to let her know the moment her husband returned,

and accordingly, Carroll sent for him immediately upon his
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arrival in the city»5
When Captain Scott arrived, Carrol1 questioned him
intently on the characteristics of the Tennessee and

Cumberland Rivers.

She discovered that the Tennessee was

always deep enough for gunboats y

enough most of the time.
flash of inspiration.

the Cumberland was deep

At that moment, Carroll had a

She knew in an instant that an

invasion route that used these two rivers was the solution
to the strategic problem that had puzzled the military

leaders in the West and planners in the East and had kept
the army frozen in its tracks, fearful of another raid with
g
the death toll, disarray, and failure of Belmont.

Lemuel Evans called to see Carroll just then, and

Carroll turned to him with her idea that the federal troops
should be transferred from the Mississippi to the Tennessee

River and should use that route to invade the Confederacy.
Since Evans had been born near the Tennessee River and had

lived near Muscle Shoals in Alabama most of his life,
Carroll trusted his opinion as an insider.

He concurred

with the value of her plan of invasion, and Carroll and

Evans went to Captain Scott to glean as much information
from him as possible.

She then wrote immediately to

Attorney-General Edward Bates, who had first suggested using

gunboats, but on the Mississippi River,? then to Assistant
Secretary Thomas A. Scott, and then to President Lincoln

himself, detailing her plan and promising to return to
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Q
Washington to explain it in more detail.
Carroll then left St. Louis and traveled to Ohio,

Covington, Kentucky, and then on to Buffalo, New York, where
she met with her old friend Millard Fillmore.

Everywhere

she went, the talk was all about the necessity of
controlling the Mississippi by storming its defenses.

In

Buffalo, Fillmore listened to Carroll's new plan and agreed
that it was a wonderful discovery.

He urged her to waste no
g
time, but to present it to Lincoln at once.
She arrived in Washington in late November and began

work immediately.

On November 30, her maps drawn and her

papers finished, she called on Colonel Scott at the War
Department with a detailed plan of attack.
The civil and military authorities seem to be laboring
under a grave mistake in regard to the true key of the
war in the Southwest. It is not the Mississippi, but
the Tennessee River. It is well known that the
eastern part or the farming interests of Tennessee and
Kentucky are generally loyal, while the middle and
western parts, or what are known as the planting
districts, are in sympathy with the traitors, but
except in the extreme western part the Union sentiment
still lives.
Now, all the military preparations made in the West
indicate that the Mississippi River is the point to
which the authorities are directing their attention.
On that river many battles must be fought and heavy
risks must be incurred before any impression can be
made on the enemy, all of which could be avoided by
using the Tennessee River. This is navigable for
first-class boats to the Mississippi line, and is open
to navigation all the year, while the distance is only
two hundred and fifty miles by river from Paducah, on
the Ohio.
The Tennessee River offers many advantages over the
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Mississippi. We should avoid the most impregnable
batteries of the enemy which cannot be taken without
great danger and great risk of life to our forces,
from the fact that our boats, if crippled, would fall
a prey to the enemy by being swept by the current to
them and away from the relief of our friends. But
even should we succeed, still we will only have begun
the war, for we shall then have to fight to the
country from whence the enemy derives his supplies.
Now, to advance up the Tennessee River would avoid all
this danger, for if our boats were crippled they would
drop back with the current to their friends and escape
all damages. But an advantage still would be a
tendency to out the enemy's lines in two by reaching
the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, threatening
Memphis, which lies about one hundred and fifty miles
due west, and no defensible point between; also
Nashville, only ninety miles northeast, and Florence
and Tuscumbia, in North Alabama, forty miles east. A
movement in this direction would do more to relieve
our friends in Kentucky, and inspire the loyal hearts
in East Tennessee than the possession of the whole
Mississippi River. If well executed it would cause
the evacuation of all those formidable fortifications
on which the rebels ground their hopes of success;
and in the event of our fleet attacking Mobile, the
presence of our troops in the northern part of that
state would be of material benefit to the fleet.
Again, the aid our forces would receive from the loyal
men in Tennessee would enable them to crush the last
traitor in that region, and the separation of the two
extremes would do more than one hundred battles for
the Union cause.
The Tennessee River is crossed by the Memphis &
Louisville Railroad [the Memphis & Ohio] and the
Memphis & Nashville Railroad [probably the Nashville &
Decatur] at Hamburg, where the river makes the big
bend to the east and touches the northeast corner of
Mississippi, entering the northwest corner of Alabama,
forming the arc of a circle to the south, enters the
State of Tennessee at the northeast of Alabama, and if
it does not touch the northwest corner of Georgia
comes very near it.
It is but eight miles from Hamburg to the Memphis &
Charleston Railroad, which road goes through
Tuscumbia, and only two miles from the river, which it
crosses at Decatur, thirty miles above, intersecting
with the Nashville & Chattanooga road at Stephenson,
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Alabama.
The Tennessee River never has less than three feet to
Hamburg on the shoalest bar, and during the fall,
winter and spring months there is always water for the
largest boats that are used on the Mississippi River.

It follows from the above that in making the
Mississippi the key of the war in the West, or rather
in overlooking the Tennessee River, the-subject is not
understood by the superiors in command.

Carroll read the paper out loud to Scott, slowly and
carefully.

Greatly excited by the brilliant strategy

conceived by the lady from Maryland, Scott begged her to

allow him to take her plan to the President, who had already
read her earlier letter and who was eager to see her final
draft.

If it would be of aid to her country, Carroll would

leave it.

So assured, she left the plan with Colonel

Scott.11

Lincoln embraced the plan with enthusiasm.

He fired

Secretary of War Simon Cameron because he was too old to

carry out this new strategy and brought in the unpopular but
young and energetic Edwin Stanton.

Stanton sent orders

immediately to General Henry Halleck who had taken command
of the Western Department.

Halleck ordered General Ulysses

Grant up the Tennessee River to the Confederates' Fort Henry

and, carrying through Carroll's strategy, continued the

Union advance toward the rail junction of Corinth,
Mississippi.

Colonel Scott was sent west by Lincoln to

ensure that Halleck and Grant understood the overall
12
strategy and carried out the plan faithfully.
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Carroll’s Plan coved Union troop up the Tennessee River to
Muscle Shoals, Alabama, near Decatur, Such a move would cut the
Memphis 6 Ohio Railroad near Fort Henry and the Memphis S Charles
ton Railroad as it crossed at Decatur. This, she thought, would
drive the Confederates out of Bawling Green, Nashville, and eastern
Tennessee, and would give the Union control of the railroads in
that region.
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The importance of the successful campaign in

Tennessee cannot be overestimated.

With an all-encompassing

sweep of hindsight, Carroll1s supporters claimed that,

Because of her plan, the Confederacy was cut in two,

Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi were
evacuated, the enemy was driven inland from the outer
borders of the Confederacy, European intervention on behalf

of the South was prevented, the Northwest remained in the
Union, the national credit was revived, Unionist sentiment

in the Border States was reinforced, contact was made with
the slave population that turned them against the

Confederacy and toward support for the Union cause, Missouri

stayed in the Union, Vicksburg was captured, and the Union
. 13
was saved.
Shortly after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson,

legislators in both houses of Congress sought to reward the
brilliant general whose strategy had saved the union.

Major

General Halleok, Brigadier General Grant, Brigadier General

Don Carlos Buell, and Flag Officer Andrew Foote were all

mentioned.

Anne Carroll sat in the galleries, listening to

the debates with a secret smile on her face.

Lincoln,

Stanton, Scott and Evans all knew the secret, as did
Benjamin Wade, chairman of the recently-formed Committee on
the Conduct of the War.

But they all knew as well the

danger of allowing the identity of the author of the plan to

be known.

As Lincoln was poetically to have said, "The
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officers would throw off their epaulets if they knew they
were acting on the plan of a civilian;

and good God, if

they knew it was a woman, the whole army would disband 11,14
So silence reigned and those who searched for a hero
eventually gave up their search and resumed the business at

hand.

The woman whose work had saved the Union turned her

own hand to other matters, not the least of which was trying

to obtain payment for her pamphlets from the War Department.
Only years later did Carroll reluctantly allow herself to be

pulled forth from her feminine obscurity to be presented to
the American people as a true hero to be recognized and

liberally rewarded.
Thus had begun the fantastical legend of Anna Ella

Carroll, "Lincoln's Lady Strategist," the "Great

Unrecognized Member of Lincoln's Cabinet," "The Originator
of the Tennessee Campaign," and, at its fullest flight of
fancy, "The Woman Who Saved the Union."

And thus had begun

another instance of Carroll misperceiving and twisting
reality until it suited her purposes."^

Against this legend stands the more commonly
accepted version of events that culminated in the Tennessee

River Campaign.

The Union was in dire straits after the

Battle of Bull Run in July 1861 and months of inaction by
his generals had driven Lincoln to despair.

General in

Chief Winfield Scott had conceived of an overall strategy at

the beginning of the war that would surround the Confederacy
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with a land army and a naval blockade.

With a "powerful

movement down the Mississippi to the ocean” to cut off
interior trade added to the external pressure, the "Anaconda

Plan" would gradually squeeze the life out of the South.16
Control over the Mississippi was essential.

It would cut

the Confederacy in two, blocking food, supplies and contact
from the agricultural states of Texas and Arkansas, and

block importation of war materiel from the Northwest as
well.1? But Scott'= plan would take far too long to work.

The political situation demanded a quick end to the war.
East of the Mississippi River were the Tennessee and

Cumberland Rivers.

Part of their courses ran northward

through Tennessee, emptying into the Ohio River.

These

rivers were the natural highways of the region and the

Confederates were quick to fortify them.

Primary

fortifications were Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort

Donelson on the Cumberland.
By September 1861, General Grant, under command of
Major General John Frémont, head of the Western Department,

had established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois, on the

Mississippi.

He had seized and reinforced the cities of

Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, and Smithland, at

the mouth of the Cumberland.16 By mid-October, Union
gunboats were reported thirty miles below Fort Henry, and

the Confederates were fearful of a Union push up both

rivers.

The Cumberland was "in fine boating order and
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rising quite fast," and would stay deep enough for gunboats
through the fall and winter.

William W. MacKall,

Assistant-Adjutant General to General Albert Sidney

Johnston, urged Confederate General Leonidas Polk to hurry
"the necessity of

and finish reinforcing Fort Donelson:

interrupting the Cumberland is urgent."

If the Union forces

were to invade Tennessee by water, they would be able to

push on to the Memphis and Ohio Railroad which ran from

Memphis to Bowling Green, and cut this important rail
...
19
connection.
The Union forces under Grant were quite cognizant of

the Confederates' fear of their designs.

On November 8,

Brigadier General Charles F. Smith wrote Grant from Paducah
that confederates at Fort Eenry had "been under apprehension

of attack from here for the past two weeks."

Lieutenant

S. Ledyard Phelps of the Union Navy was "constantly moving

his vessel [the wooden gunboat Conestoga] up and down the
Tennessee and Cumberland" to ascertain Confederate positions

and strength.

On November 20, Colonel Charles Whittlesey of

the Corps of Engineers suggested to Halleck that a joint
land and water move up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers,

"the most passable route into Tennessee," would threaten
Confederates in Columbus, force Brigadier General Simon

Bolivar Buckner to retreat, and provide a water route

halfway to Nashville, all of which would serve to drive the
Confederates out of central Tennessee.

20
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If, contrary to Carroll’s assertations, the military

minds in the West were aware of the strategic importance of
the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers;

if, contrary to what

she reported, preparations were being made to invade the

South by these rivers rather than concentrating Union forces

solely on the Mississippi, then why was there no action in
the late fall and early winter of 1861?

Carroll would

always believe that it was her letter to the War Department

on November 30 that had informed the Western Department of

the value of the rivers and that her plan had prodded the
Union forces into action—the action that eventually led to

the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in February, 1862.

But Carroll, as a civilian and an outsider, did not have the
complete picture of the state of affairs in the Western

theatre.

It was not a lack of intelligence or strategic

understanding that kept the Union forces immobile.

Supply

shortages, battling commanders, a lack of cooperation

between army and navy, inexperienced troops and sailors, and

nominal support from Washington all contributed to the
Union’s failure to move rapidly on the western rivers.

At the time of President Lincoln’s proclamation of

the naval blockade of the South, the United States Navy
consisted of forty-two commissioned vessels.

These were

deep-water ships, totally unsuited for use on the inland
waters of the war’s western theatre.

Navy Commander John

Rodgers was sent west in May to establish naval forces on
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the river.

First under the command of Major General George

B. McClellan, head of the Department of the Ohio, in July
Rodgers fell under General Frémont1s command when the the

Western Department was organized.

Rodgers worked hard,

purchasing three river steamers in Cincinnati and pushing

for their conversion into armed gunboats.

Still, it was

August 12 before the alterations resulted in three low-lying

wooden gunboats.22 These gunboats, though usable, were not
armor-plated.

So in August as well, a contract was made

with James B. Eads of St. Louis to build seven armor-plated

gunboats to deliver downriver to Cairo.

Eads had

volunteered his knowledge of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and

Cumberland Rivers to the government in April 1861.

"Once

close them," he wrote, "... and starvation is inevitable

in six months."

The gunboats built by Eads' company were

promised for October 10.
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By September, Rodgers had been relieved by Captain

Andrew H. Foote for exceeding his authority in buying the

first gunboats and for being too busy to pay proper
obeisance to General Frémont.2^ General Grant, at Cairo by
September, employed the wooden gunboats provided by Rodgers

in taking Paducah and Smithland, but it not until October 12
that the first ironclad was launched and available for Union

use.26 Captain Foote was short of money and supplies for
both the wooden and the ironclad gunboats and pleaded with

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Quartermaster-General
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Montgomery Meigs, and Secretary of War Cameron for help.

"The officers and crews of the three gunboats already in

commission are clamorous for their pay," he wrote.

Tired of

being continually placed "in a most embarrassing position,"
Foote nevertheless performed miracles, drafting crew members
from steamboat men, Great Lakes' sailors, and even the army,
27
promising payment for supplies, hounding his superiors,

and occasionally fighting the Confederates with skirmishes
and raids on their positions along the rivers.
One of Captain Foote's problems was his rank.

As a

captain in the Navy, he was the equivalent of a colonel in
the army.

He finally requested Frémont to recommend that

the Navy Department appoint him Flag Officer of the Western

Flotilla, a rank designed to prevent a situation whereby
"the gunboats are liable to be diverted from the service

which I know you might wish, even by a volunteer colonel of
a single regiment, should he happen to be in command in the
vicinity of the gunboats."^ Welles gave him the
appointment he requested on November 13, 1861;

Frémont had

been removed and replaced by General Henry Halleck on

November 2.

30

Since the beginning of the war, there had been three

different army commanders, two different naval commanders, a
frantic dash to buy, convert, build, equip, and man as many

gunboats as possible, all while dealing with a short-sighted
and occasionally recalcitrant government incapable of paying
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its bills on time.

The wonder was not that the Union forces

had not moved by late November, when Carroll presented her
plan that had supposedly enlightened them as to the 11 true

key to the west."

The wonder was that they moved at

all—which they did with decisive victories after the
gunboats were available.

Grant and Foote both sent messages

to Halleck on January 28, 1862, that they wanted to move

upriver to take Fort Henry.
on January 30.

Halleok approved their request

On February 3, Foote led his seven gunboats

up the Tennessee, followed by Grant's troops on transport

ships.

Fort Henry fell on February 6.

Grant marched

overland to Fort Donelson, which fell on February 16.
Ironically, the gunboats for which the Union forces had

waited were almost superfluous.

Fort Henry had been

practically abandoned by the Confederates, but still, it was

so quickly reduced by Foote's fire that Grant's troops were

not needed.

Fort Donelson's batteries, on the other hand,

nearly destroyed Foote's squadron, and it had to retreat to
31
let the army have its day.
If the strategy of invading the Confederacy by way

of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers was well established
prior to Carroll's trip to St. Louis;

if actions had been

delayed due to logistics instead of strategic incompetence,

how did the legend of Carroll as "Lincoln's Secret Weapon"
begin, and how did it maintain itself in what has become one

of the most thoroughly studied and documented periods of
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Grant's forces captured Fort Henry on Feb. 6, and Fort
Boneloon on Feb. 16. Nashville surrendered on Feb. 25. By
March, Grant had noved up the Tennessee Hiver to Pittsburg
Landing, near Shiloh Church. He fought against Albert Sidney
Johnston's troops at Shiloh, April 6-7, 1862.
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American history?
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The legend began with Carroll herself.

As always,

whenever an event occurred in which she could legitimately
claim a small part, Carroll's ego soon enlarged her
contributions to monumental proportions.

Thus, she wrote

Lincoln in the summer of 1862, "I became satisfied that the

effort then making to open and hold the Mississippi by an
expedition downward could not succeed, and that the true

key, was the Tennessee river .... I impressed these views

upon military men, wherever I met them, until I returned to
this city, the latter part of November, when I gave the

result of my observation to the Government .

.

. ."

As far

as Carroll was concerned (and as a civilian untutored in

military matters it was not an unreasonable belief on her
part), that campaign in Tennessee in the winter of 1861-1862

had come from her ideas presented on November 30.

"If this

expedition was planned . . . upon any other suggestions,"
she wrote, or "if it originated with any one else, I am not

aware of it."

More important, "If the plan of the Western

campaign was based upon the facts, furnished by me, to the

Secretary of War ... I ought now to have a substantial and
liberal recognition of this service."

33

Herein lay the crux of the matter.
Carroll was trying to make a living.

As always,

The war had provided

her with an unprecedented opportunity as a writer, and

apparently her agreement with Colonel Scott had prompted her
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trip to St. Louis.

Since her military strategy had been

presented in written form, no doubt Carroll had decided that
any intellectual labor, particularly one with such

monumental results for the Union, would be compensable under

her agreement with Scott.4 in July, 1862, six months
after her second pamphlet supporting the President's
policies had been issued, Carroll had not yet been
compensated for her work.

The handsome Scott, whom

Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair had once characterized

as a "corrupt lobby-jobber from Philadelphia," may have
overstepped his authority when promising Carroll payment for
her approved pamphlets.35 Scott was gallant enough to
admit to the oral contract, saying that all his "interviews

with Miss Carroll were in my official capacity as Assistant
Secretary of War, and in that capacity I would have allowed,

and believed she should be paid, the amount of her
bill .

. . ."35 The bill had been partially paid, but that

payment was out of Scott's own pocket.

37

"Reply to

Breckinridge" had been circulated at a cost of $1,250, which
Scott had given Carroll*

The War powers and "Reply to

Sumner" would cost the government $5,000 more.

While a bit

steep, the bill for the pamphlets was not outrageously so,
and, moreover. Carroll had done the work.

What Scott could not have foreseen was the rapid
rise of inflation.

The War Powers, Carroll declared to

Lincoln, "was destined to Jtand, as long as the Declaration
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of Independence . . .

Accordingly, when she "considered

the time and labor the document had cost me ... I thought,
fifty thousand dollars a small sum."

Carroll had

mentioned this mind-boggling sum earlier in a letter to
Scott's replacement in the War Department, Assistant

Secretary John Tucker (Scott had been sent west early in
1862 to ascertain the condition of troops and railroads for
the new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton).

By July, when

she met with Lincoln and read a paper considering her claim
aloud to him, she had modified her bill somewhat by

including a proposal that she make a trip to Europe to
disseminate Union propaganda.

Lincoln, whose own salary was

but $25,000 per annum, told her he thought her proposition

ni the most outrageous one ever made to any government on

earth,'" to which Carroll had responded stiffly that "the
difference between us, was in our views, upon the value of
intellectual labor, in the administration of government."

The interview was closed, but the story got out and

Carroll was mortified to hear her proposition and Lincoln's
reply discussed "at a public dinner table in a Washington
Hotel . . .

."

It was clear, she thought, that the

President had misunderstood her proposition.

The sum was

vast, but considering the $5,000 already owed her, the cost
of journeying to Europe, finding a place to stay, keeping

herself (with no doubt at least one servant to keep house
while she wrote) and then arranging for the publication and
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"circulation of my documents among the millions" in Europe,

$50,000 was "a very reasonable sum."

She warned the

President, scattering her commas heedlessly:
. physical force, alone, however strong it may be, can
never bring this war, to a successful termination;

unless,

you avail yourself, of intellect, to make clear to the

popular mind, the issue, about which, the country, is now,

at war."

There was not any "fair minded man" alive who

would call her bill "absurd, or unjust."

If it was too

high, the error was not hers, "but that of the friends of
yourself, and of the country," who had approved it.

But, if

he could not bring himself to admit the value of her noble
service to the Union cause, she would continue with love of

country in her heart, "to labor for the salvation of our
liberties to the very extent of my ability, as heretofore

without any pecuniary reward, or the hope of any."*^

There is no indication in this letter to Lincoln
that Carroll had included in her proposition a bill for her

services as a strategist.

In truth, her conscience may have

been nagging at her, however briefly.

For the Tennessee

Campaign, the most long-lasting claim to fame Anne Carroll
ever possessed in her constant search for power and
recognition, was not solely her idea.

While denying

Carroll's claim as a military strategist in terms of

timeliness has been common among historians, few realized
that the plan's most salient features were most likely

L.
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plagiarized from the work of her contact in St. Louis,
Charles M. Scott.

41

Charles Scott was a Mississippi riverboat pilot.
Unlike the vast majority of his colleagues, Scott stayed

with the Union in 1861.

He had fled New Orleans at the

outbreak of the war and made it up the Mississippi to
Memphis, where he was captured by Brigadier General Gideon

Pillow.

Refusing to swear allegiance to the Confederacy, he

escaped from custody and made his way to Cairo, Illinois, by
June 19.

He described the Confederate batteries he had seen

in the Memphis area to union officials, then went on to
St. Louis to escort his family to Ohio for safety.^

Scott's version of the events that led to the

development of an organized plan to invade the South by
using the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers differed a bit
from Carroll's story.

When Scott heard Grant had been given

a command in Cairo, he returned to the area in late

September and volunteered his abilities as a pilot.

He knew

the topography of the area well, having been a keel-boatman

on the Tennessee and having hunted in the area around the

Cumberland as a boy.

He had often discussed the usefulness

of the rivers as invasion routes with loyalist friends, but
did not discuss the strategy with Grant because he thought

Grant would soon be removed from command.

He was, however,

willing to share information on the river defenses with the

General, and had served Grant as a pilot of one of the

L
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transports at the Battle of Belmont on November 7.

His

"front seat" at the raid had bothered him enough that,
suffering from insomnia, he betook himself to write a letter

to his wife, Anna, who had come back to St. Louis to be

nearer Scott.

Anna received the letter November 10 and

shared it with the other ladies at the hotel's dining room.

One of the ladies present was Anne Carroll.
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Why Carroll was in St. Louis is unclear.

She may

have gone there, as she claimed, to survey the territory and
report back to Colonel Scott in the War Department.

She did

have relatives in St. Louis, but clearly was not staying

with them (purportedly her sister-in-law's family, who were
first cousins of Carroll's, were secessionist).** She may

have merely come along with Lemuel Evans, who seems to have
been on a legitimate mission for Seward.

At any rate,

Carroll talked to Evans about the letter Mrs. Scott had

received, and Evans requested a meeting with the pilot.

The

following Sunday, Noveidber 17, Scott met both Carroll and
Evans.

One conversation led to another, and before long
Scott was telling Evans and Carroll (after assurances both

were "agents of the government"*^) that the "true key to

the West" was the Tennessee River and that the Mississippi
was too heavily fortified to allow an invasion downstream.

Evans knew enough about the topography of the area to
understand Scott's opinion and know its value.

L

He urged
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Scott to communicate it to the authorities, but Scott

protested that he "was not a good writer anyhow."

Carroll,

an almost silent partner to the conversation because of her
deafness, was leaving the next day "with dispatches" for

Washington.

Scott, said Evans, could write to her, and she

would place his plan before the War Department.^

Scott wrote to Carroll twice, sending the first
letter about November 23, the second about December 15.

By

mid-December his opinion of Grant's staying-power had

improved, and he decided to share the plan with him as well
in hopes "it might lead to something, perhaps to a command

[by Grant] of the expedition.By February 4, he wrote

his wife that the Union forces were "in sight of Fort
Henry .... I think that this move is the beginning of My
Plan that I wrote to Miss Carroll at least it looks so."*^

After the fall of Fort Henry on the 6th, he was convinced
that "we will continue on untill [sic] we reach the State of

Mississippi when I think we will end the War by taking the
Memphis and Charleston Rail Road."*^ Scott's optimism was

premature, but Union forces did continue to move south
toward the railroad center at Corinth, Mississippi.

Scott

continued to write to Carroll as wall as his wife.

Carroll

passed along ideas and strategy to Stanton.

Scott's

brother, E. A. Scott, also corresponded with Carroll.
Through him, she gained access to Charles's letters to his
wife Anna, with their descriptions of battles and army

L
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life/O
Charles Scott wrote vividly and well of his
experiences, in spite of what he saw as a "deficiency in
grammar, that causes him to smother his writings."

His

letters portray a man who loved hir country and sought to

serve its interests.

He sent a detailed account of the

navigability of the Illinois River to Representative Frank
P. Blair, along with the promise of more information on

western waterways if it was needed.

But, he wrote Blair, "I

wish you to distinctly understand that I am not an Applicant
for office direct or indirect but am only influenced by the

hope that I may do some good by giving the facts to

you."5* in fact, when Carroll proposed she use her

influence to get him a position, Scott told her he was
"unfit by Education for any office in . . . Government but
that of the Lowest," and he did not want to take jobs away

from those more competent, or from those more needy, such as
wounded Union soldiers.53 His job as pilot, while not as

lucrative as he could wish, nevertheless provided him with
what he needed.

Scott wrote to Carroll throughout 1862, sending her

his opinions of military strategy.

He thought delaying the

Union move up the Tennessee to take Fort Donelson had been
an error that delayed the capture of Vicksburg unnecessarily
(a view that failed to take into account the obvious threat

posed to Union forces by Confederate troops from the fort if
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left unreduced).54 He also thought that a Union victory in

the eastern theatre would send Confederates fleeing into
Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and eventually Mexico.

Gunboats

at the mouths of the Red and Arkansas Rivers, and in the
Yazoo River would help control the area.^ Carroll passed

along his comments to the War Department.

Sometimes she

credited him, as in one letter to Stanton in which she

praised Scott's "incalculable service" and requested Stanton
to promote him to the Surveyorship of New Orleans (a post
for which Scott may have been qualified but hardly would

have wanted).56 sometimes she did not credit him, as with
the November 30 letter that first set out the Tennessee

Plan, and in the letters to Lincoln in which she first wrote
of her skills as a strategist in developing that plan.

The cordial relationship Carroll and Scott enjoyed

may have been what kept Carroll from pushing herself too

strongly as sole author of the plan.

While the two letters

she wrote to Lincoln in late June and early July 1862 made

no mention of Scott as the the source of her information, a
safe assumption might also be that Lincoln was never read
the second half of the letter wherein Carroll's claim as

sole strategist was laid out.

A Lincoln angry at Carroll's

proposition to be paid $50,000 for her literary services was

not a man to be given an additional bill for strategic
services rendered.

Carroll quite possibly might have

stopped her reading at Lincoln's evaluation of her demand as
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11 outrageous11 and left his presence.

Hot-tempered as she

was, she was politically prudent enough to know when to
retreat temporarily from an unpopular cause.

As for Scott,

he made no mention of feeling slighted (if he knew of her
attempts) and expressed no desire to be paid for his

services as a strategist.

Carroll had also written to Colonel Scott and to
John Tucker in the War Department in the spring and summer

of 1862, seeking payment for her pamphlets, and none of the
letters that survive mention her military claim;

her

demands are for payment "for time, labor and means expended"
in producing her pamphlets.5? Given Lincoln's reaction to
her literary claims, Carroll probably simply decided she

would be pushing her luck to demand payment for a plan of
military strategy.

Being a civilian and a woman would

guarantee her little support should she choose to stake such
a claim, particularly without Lincoln's support, and

particularly if she chose to ignore Scott's role, since she

had already mentioned his work to the War Department.

Thus,

in a letter to Stanton in September, she made no mention of

her strategy of the previous year, but instead concentrated
on her past pamphlets and on future sales:

"I believe in my

work on the War Powers of this government I was the first

writer who succeeded in placing the power of the government

to make arrests for political offenses and to suspend the
writ of Habeas Corpus on its true foundation!"

This claim
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to premiership, Carroll argued, not only should be liberally
rewarded, but she would be pleased to expand the circulation

of The War Powers, or, "better still .

.

. write a new

paper, specially on the powers of the Executive to suspend

the Writ . . . and to arrest political offenders."^
Colonel Scott, responsible for Carroll's monetary

predicament, was still avoiding her in October of 1862.

"If

I had known where to find you," he wrote her after she had
tracked him down in Philadelphia, he would have called.

Ee

was "gratified" to learn that her pamphlets had been deemed

useful to the cause, and he "sincerely" hoped "that you will

be able through Mr. Tucker to finally arrange your matters
with the department. "5* Her financial status had also
worsened by this time with the collapse of her colonization
plans with A. C. Burr for the Lincoln Colony in British

Honduras.

But in spite of her tentative attempt to bill the

government for her military strategy, and in spite of her
straitened finances, Carroll seems to have thought better of

making her claim an issue.

By the end of the war, in fact,

she wrote a letter praising Captain Scott's work, deeming it
"a pleasant duty to make known to the American people how
much they are indebted to Captain Charles M. Scott for the
crowning victory which now thrills with joy every

patriot . . .
when the history shall be correctly written it will be
obliged to treat the campaign up the Tennessee River
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as the turning point which decided the triumph of the
Union over treason and rebellion, and that this
campaign was the result of the information herewith
submitted [by Scott] was fully confirmed
by . . . Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War,
to whom the country is incalculably indebted for
inaugurating the movement.”
This letter of Carroll's in the National

Intelligencer not only recognized Charles Scott's hand in
developing the plan, but also (mistakenly) credited Thomas

Scott with the plan's implementation because of his trip
west shortly after she sent the plan to the War Department.
A gracious gesture by Carroll, or so it seemed.

But in

1876, when Carroll and Charles Scott faced each other in a
Congressional hearing on her claim to be the sole author of

the Tennessee Campaign, Carroll's gracious attempt to give
credit where credit was assumed due began to acquire a

distinct odor of deviousness.

According to his testimony before the House
Committee on Military Affairs in 1876, Scott had appeared in

Washington a day or so before the letter praising him was
printed.

He had come to ask for help from General Grant or

anyone else with influence to help him obtain relief from a
25 per cent duty on 1,000 bales of cotton.

money in the war:

Scott had lost

he had worked for a lower salary to serve

the Union, and, when captured by General Pillow in the
summer of 1861, he had received a certificate of valuation
for his steamer that his partners had traded for cotton.

he could get the cotton through the lines and sell it

If
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duty-free, he decided, that would even things up.

He

wrote to Carroll and called on her and Lemuel Evans, two
persons who had no doubt given him the impression they had

considerable influence with various high-ranking officials

in Washington.

There with Carroll, Evans wrote out a

permit, Scott testified, that gave him permission to bring
in 10,000 bales duty-free.

Scott handed it back, but Evans

assured him that "everybody else was doing it and proposed
that I should give him an interest in it":

half of the

profit from the extra 9,000 bales would go to Evans—and
half of that to Carroll.

Scott refused the permit "in toto"

and left.63

A few days later, the letter signed by Carroll
praising Scott appeared in the National Intelligencer.

The

author's motivation might have been the highly noble one of

honest praise.

More likely, though, it was an attempt to

bribe Scott with recognition in hopes of getting him to
return for the 10,000-bale permit or, at the least, to keep

him from disclosing Evans's dishonesty.

Apparently the

article attracted Scott's attention, for the three met

again.

Carroll, Scott said, "began to soft soap me,"

telling him that she and Judge Evans had written the article
so they could garner public support for a claim to Congress.
They would "engineer it through" in Scott's name, and Scott

would divide the proceeds with them.

"I told them I had

only dona my duty and all I asked was the privilege of
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bringing in my cotton . . . .”64 The "thing dropped right
there" and Scott returned to the West.

lost in the shuffle of bureaucracy.

His cotton claim was

65

Carroll's version of the circumstances which had

prompted her generous letter was a bit different.

She

granted that Scott had come to Washington for help in

securing his cotton, worth about $30,000.

Scott, she said,

had offered her one-fourth of the $30,000 for her help,

which consisted of her going to the Treasury Department and
sending him the regulations.

She then wrote him that "when

he complied with them he could get his cotton without
tax."66 She asked for nothing and received nothing for her
aid.

As for the article in the National Intelligencer,

Carroll had not even written it;

Lemuel Evans had.

And

Scott had paid the paper $35.00 to guarantee its
insertion.67 Evans, for his part, testified that Scott had

asked him for a permit for the cotton (this in spite of
Carroll's assertion moments earlier that "no papers were

drawn;

none were needed," and in spite of her letter to

Scott in which she told him she had sent him the "authority"
he needed).

Evans admitted that he "may have suggested the

form for his application," but that would have been only to

Carroll and would be "in her handwriting."

As for the

article, it was written "not only to do Captain Scott
justice, but also to give him prominence and standing, as he
b

complained of injustice having been done him."

68
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Scott's sense of injustice had been building for a

long time.

Of 128 St. Louis and New Orleans pilots, he had

been one of only five union men.

He had had to take a pay

cut during the war from $300 to $250 per month.69 After
the war, when he tried to return to work as a pilot, he had

had trouble getting work:

"a steamboat agent in New Orleans

told me he would not ship freight on a boat that I was

connected with, and would use his best influence to prevent

others also."

*70

He had lost his steamer to the

Confederates, had lost his cotton that was the steamer's
exchange, and had lost his temper when he discovered in the
late 1860s that Carroll had begun promoting herself as

"claimant for remuneration for originating the Tennessee

campaign."
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By 1872, Carroll's claim had acquired newspaper

support, congressional support, and pamphlet support.
Apparently, Scott decided to try his luck before Congress as

well.

Carroll had failed him (he thanked her for trying to

find him a position—she did not succeed), but his overall
motive was not revenge.

As their mutual acquaintance

L. S. McCoy wrote Carroll, Scott was after money.

He had

"little faith in the generosity of Claim grants," or whether

his petition would work, but financial woes and a pushy

brother-in-law (a "Mr. Fish") had convinced him to take his
claim to the government.

He "would prefer to have your &

the Judge's [Evans] cooperation if it can be conveniently
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had,” wrote McCoy,73 and Scott reassured Carroll that "I

do not believe that I will injure your claim, but rather
strengthen it .... if you like the idea I think you can
make more out of it (my claim) than you can out of your

own,"7* presumably referring to the three-way split Evans
had allegedly offered in 1865.

Scott underestimated Carroll's ability to make
something momentous out of something miniscule, however.

By

1876, while Scott's claim had gone nowhere, Carroll had
turned her original $5,000 claim into a request for $250,000

"as compensation for originating the Tennessee
Campaign."75 Carroll faced an angry and embittered Scott

in that Congressional hearing and won hands down.

Both Carroll's and Scott's claims to be the authors
of the Tennessee Campaign rest primarily on circumstantial

evidence.

While Carroll would continue to build on her

shaky foundations until her elaborate tale hid its
questionable core, Scott retired from the fray.

Only in

1889 was he again driven to make public his part in the

Tennessee campaign, when he published a pamphlet regarding
Carroll's "Fradulent" [sic] claim.

He deemed it his duty,

he wrote in his introduction, "to prevent this raid on the

Treasury that I am sure is being prepared for during the
present administration."7^ Scott included selected

portions of the House Document that had been published after
the 1876 hearing, letters of endorsement for his "valuable
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information" from both Grant and Acting Rear Admiral
S. P. Lee in support of his contention that the strategy was
his rather than Carroll's, and a letter in which he had

promised Carroll that if she did not desist in her claim, he
would "take means to explode it."

To make his position

appear as disinterested as possible, Scott even included a
petition "gotten up by my steamboat friends" some years

earlier that had requested a pension for him for his
invention of a signal system used by passing boats, a

"BOILER IRON PROTECTOR" he had invented, and for his
"valuable information to those in charge of the Tennessee
Campaign."

The pension request had "died a natural death"

and Scott swore he had had no part in getting it up.

Moreover, he had only mentioned it before the hearing "to
show the standing in which I have been held."

In fact,

Scott had told the Rouse Committee that while he had not
come before them "expecting pay for doing my duty as a loyal

man," justice demanded that he should be given credit as the
the campaign's originator, "and if your honorable body think

that any compensation is due the author, I claim that that

compensation is due to your petitioner.
As far as Scott, Evans, Carroll and the cotton claim
were concerned, Scott printed only his version of events in
his pamphlet, but with Carroll's history of self-puffery,

pretensions to influence and the lingering aroma of
con-artistry that survived from her days in New York,
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Scott’s accusations ring true.

Given Carroll’s constant

need of money, if Scott’s offer of one-fourth the value of

the cotton ($7500) for her help had been made, as she
claimed it had, she would have taken it.

Since she swore

she did not, "nor did I ever think it worth while to

inquire," the greedier version of Scott’s claim that Evans
had offered to obtain a tax exemption for him in exchange
for a half share of the profits to split with Carroll
certainly seems more likely.

BO

There is no question that both Scott and Carroll had
an equal share in developing what they call ed their

"Tennessee Campaign."

Scott was an experienced pilot and a

strong Unionist who took every opportunity to help the war

effort.

No doubt he did discuss the western waterways with

Grant or other Union men.

And Carroll did have enough

access to Colonel Scott in the War Department to present the
well-written and strategically sound plan she, Scott, and

Evans had developed, as well as enough initiative to write
to Stanton and Lincoln to pass along Scott’s information and
tell them how to run the war.

But as far as either one of

them materially affecting the outcome of the war by the

submission of the "Tennessee Campaign Plan," both

strategists were too late in their actions.

General Grant

made that clear in a latter to his friend, Representative

Elihu B. Washburne:
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I see the credit of attacking the enemy by the way of
the Tennessee and Cumberland is variously attributed!
It is little to talk about it being the great wisdom
of any Gen. that first brought forth this plan of
attack.

Our gunboats were running up the Ten. and Cumberland
rivers all fall and winter watching the progress of
the rebels on these works. Gen. Halleck no doubt
thought of this route long ago and I am share [sic] I
did.^
The Union leaders knew of the importance of the
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

The Confederates had built

Forts Henry and Donelson because of the strategic importance
of those rivers.

The army knew their importance, the navy

knew their importance, even the New York Times had printed a
letter that not only detailed the importance of the rivers
as alternate routes to the Mississippi, but mentioned the
possibility of cutting the Charleston and Memphis Railroad

by going up those rivers.

That letter was published before

Carroll had even returned to Washington in late November
1861.

As for her comments regarding the importance of

relieving loyalists in Tennessee and Kentucky, they were

hardly original either.

Lincoln was well aware of the

importance of those areas to the Union cause by September
1861.

Simply put, given the time constraints within which

Carroll and Scott both placed their actions, neither one can
be taken seriously by military historians as unsung heroes
who had saved the Union by their brilliant strategy.

But Carroll took herself very seriously as precisely
such a figure.

Obssessed with a desire for recognition and
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payment, once again twisting and turning the truth till it

bent to fit her perception of it, Carroll sought the

recognition by the world of her claim.

From the fall of

Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862 until her death

thirty-two years later, Carroll's other interests gradually

faded away until her desire for recognition became her

consuming passion.

212

Notes

^Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862,
2 July 1862, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical
Society, Baltimore, Maryland. These are drafts of the same
letter with two different dates on it. There is no
corroborative evidence that Carroll and Lincoln met, but
since Carroll later quoted Lincoln's remark in a letter, no
doubt the meeting took place. See n.
40 below.

2Lemuel D. Evans to William Henry Seward, 7 September
1861, Carroll Papers.
3Anna Ella Carroll, "Plan of the Tennessee Campaign,"
North American Review 42 (April 1886):344.

*Ibid., pp.
^Ibid., p.

343-344.

344.

^H. R. Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll; The Originator
of the Tennessee Campaign," Outing 6 (July 1885):407.
^Marvin R. Cain, Lincoln's Attorney General: Edward
Bates of Missouri (Columbia, Missouri: University of
Missouri Press, 1965), pp.
137-138.

Carroll, "Plan," p.

345.

^Ibid.

^^carroll was mistaken when she talked of a Memphis &
Nashville railroad at Hamburg. No such railroad existed.
She was most likely referring to the Nashville & Decatur
Railroad, futher to the east. The original text of
Carroll's plan was reprinted a number of times. Each
version has minor changes in the text, but they are all
virtually identical. There is one version, in what is
presumably the hand of a professional amanuensis, in
Carroll's papers. See Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas A. Scott,
10 January 1862, Carroll Papers.
The version cited here is
from Charles M. Scott, The Origin of the Tennessee Campaign,
by Capt. Charles M. Scott, As a Refutation of the Fradulent
Claim of Miss Anna Ella Carroll [sic] (Terre Haute, Indiana:
Moore S Langen, 1889), pp.
12-14.

213

^Carroll, "Plan," p.

345.

12Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp.
Carroll, "Plan," p. 347.

406, 407;

13[Lemuel D. Evans], The Material Bearing of the
Tennessee Campaign in 1862 upon the Destinies of Our Civil
War (Washington, DC: W. H. Moore, n.d.
[circa 1872]) lists
the effects of the plan's strategy most comprehensively.
See also Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll" and Carroll, "Plan, "
as well as the entry for Carroll in the National Cyclopedia
of American Biography 62 vols. (New York: Jamas T. White &
Co., 1893-1984), 5(1984):193.
^Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," p.
409. Lincoln's
reaction is given in various words. This is the most
dramatic, and was taken from an interview conducted with
Carroll late in her life. Since Carroll did not meet with
Lincoln regarding the plan, and no direct evidence of
Lincoln's reaction survives, all quotations of this kind can
be regarded as poetical in nature.

^"Lincoln's Lady Strategist," Life 25 (26 July
1948):101-102; Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, My Dear Lady;
The Story of Anna Ella Carroll, the "Great Unrecognized
Member of Lincoln's Cabinet" (New York: McGrawHill, 1940),
Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 403; Mark E. Neely, Jr.,
The Lincoln Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp.
48-49.
l^The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70
vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1880-1902), Series I, 51(1897),
pt. 1, pp. 369-370; 386-387.
(Hereafter cited as OR.)

l?Virgil Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea, 3
vols. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960), 1:184,
216; Richard S. West, Jr., Mr. Lincoln's Navy (New York:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), pp. 158-161.
18pR, Series I, 4(1882):457-458, 408; Ulysses
8. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U .S. Grant, 2 vols. (New
York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885), 1:264-267.
^OR, Series I, 4:456, 457-458, 456, 459-462.

20lbid., pp. 345-346; Bem Anderson, By Sea and By
River: The Naval History of the Civil War (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962; reprint edition, Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), p.
88. Whittlesey's

214

letter to Halleck suggested that a joint land and water move
up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, "the most passable
route into Tennessee, " would threaten Confederates at
Columbus, force Confederate General Buckner to retreat, and
provide a water route halfway to Nashville, thus pushing the
Confederates out of Tennessee.
The letter was dated 20
November 1861. OR, Series 1, 7:440.
21#est, Mr. Lincoln's Navy, p.

45.

22çivil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865, compiled by
the U. 8. Naval Department, Naval History Division
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), p. 14 y Alfred T. Mahan, The
Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1883), p. 12. Missouri was added to the Department of the
Ohio 6 June 1861; the Western Department was constituted 3
July 1861, made up of Illinois and all states west of the
Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains. See Mark
M. Boatner, III, Civil War Dictionary (New York: McKay Co.,
1959), pp.
606, 903.
^Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 27 vols. (Washington,
DC:
GPO, 1894-1917), Series I, 22(1908):279.
(Hereafter
cited as ORN. )
^4

Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, p.

13.

25gRN, Series I, 22:284-285, 195, 277, 307-308.

a^Grant, Memoirs, 1:264;
Waters, p.
16.

Mahan, Gulf and Inland

2?ORN, Series I, 22:355-356, 369, 375, 378;
Gulf and Inland Waters, p. 16.

Mahan,

28pRN, Series I, 22:379-384 discusses the raid on
Eddyville on the Cumberland River, 26-28 October 1861. The
raid on Belmont 7 November 1861 on the Mississippi River.
Ibid., pp.
398-406.
29lbid., p.

388-389.

3°j. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and
Reconstruction, 2d ed. (Lexington, Massachusetts:
D .C. Heath & CO., 1969), pp.
371-372.
S^Eads had had to threaten a work stoppage on the
iron-clads "for want of funds" in late October. See ORN,
Series I, 22:378. E. B. Long pointed out the difficulties

215

in the Western Department in 11Anna Ella Carroll:
Exaggerated Heroine?” Civil War Times Illustrated 14(July
1975):33-35. For correspondence of Grant and Foote with
Halleck and the reports on the capture of Fort Henry, see
OR, Series 1, 7:119-416. See also Bruce Catton, Terrible
Swift Sword (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp.
141-142,
146-147.
S^This denomination of Carroll is from a juvenile
biography: Winifred E. Wise, Lincoln's Secret Weapon (New
York: Chilton Co., 1961).

33Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862,
Carroll Papers.

3*see Anna Ella Carroll, Claim against Government,
October-November 1861, MDBS 3650-176, Carroll Papers.
3^Howard K. Beale, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles:
Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 3
vols. (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1960), 1:127. While
adequate as an employee in the War Department, Scott had
also continued his position, unpaid, as the Vice-President
of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The railroad obtained a
number of lucrative contracts from the government during
Scott's tenure. See Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War
Cabinet (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1946), pp.
220-221.
3^Thomas A. Scott, statement dated 28 January 1863,
cited in Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius;
Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Washington, DC: Judd &
Detweiler, 1891), p. 125. See also Thomas A. Scott to Anna
Ella Carroll [?], 2-28 January 1863, Carroll Papers.

3?Anna Ella Carroll, Claim against Government, 2
January 1863, MDHS 3650-183, Carroll Papers.

3®Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June and 2
July 1862, Carroll Papers. The first of these two letters
is obviously a draft; the second is an incomplete copy of
the first, but does contain a notation by Carroll that it
was read to Lincoln, presumably about July 2.
39Anna Ella Carroll to John Tucker, 26 March 1862,
Carroll Papers; Samuel Richey Kamm, The Civil War Career of
Thomas A. Scott (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania,
1940), pp. 85-86.

40p. Lauriston Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and Her
'Modest' Claim," Lincoln Herald 50 (October 1948):5; Anna

216

Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 14 August 1862, Abraham
Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC
(microfilm).

41See, for example, Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and
Her •Modest1 Claim"; B .B. Long, "Anna Ella Carrol 1:
Exaggerated Heroine?" pp. 28-35; Kenneth P. Williams,
"The Tennessee River Campaign and Anna Ella Carroll, "
Indiana Magazine of History 46 (September 1950)$221-248.

4^Scott, Origin, pp.

6-7.

S. Grant to Captain Scott, 18 March 1865 and
U. S. Grant to Board of Inspectors, 15 April 1862, both
cited in Scott, Origin, p. 29. Neither of these letters
appears in Grant's papers. See also Scott, Origin, p. 7.

44Elias Jones, Revised History of Dorchester County,
Maryland (Baltimore: Read-Taylor Press, 1925), p. 297;
Greenbie, My Dear Lady, p. 132.

45scott, Origin, p.
46lbid., p.

8.

9.

4?Ibid.
4^Charles M. Scott to Anna Scott, 4 February 1862,
Carroll Papers.
4^Charles M. Scott to Anna Scott, 7 February, 1862,
Carroll Papers.

5@E. A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 24 March 1862,
Carroll Papers.
S^E. A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 25 May 1862,
Carroll Papers.

^Charles M. Scott to Frank P. Blair, 31 May 1862,
Carrol1 Papers.
^Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 July 1862,
Carrol1 Papers.

54Charles M. Saott to Anna Ella Carroll, 2 May 1862,
Carroll Papers; Williams, "The Tennessee River Campaign,"
p. 245.
B^Ibid.

See also Charles M.

Scott, Extracts, 23

217

March 1862 through 7 June 1863, MDHS 3650-202, Carroll
Papers.

56Anna Ella Carrol1 to Edwin Stanton, 14 May 1862,
Carroll Papers and Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll,
Craddock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society,
Baltimore, Maryland.
(Hereafter cited as CCJ Collection. )
57Anna Ella Carroll to John Tucker, 26 March 1862,
Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas A. Scott, 7
June 1862, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to John
Tucker, 30 June 1862, Carroll Papers.
B^Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin Stanton, 9 September
1862, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

^Thomas A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 27 October
1862, Carroll Papers.

*°Anna Ella Carroll, (Washington) National
Intelligencer, 12 April 1865.
ë^The hearing before the House Committee on Military
Affairs was held 11 July 1876. The proceedings were the
following August. U.S., Congress, House, Committe on
Military Affairs, Petition of Anna Ella Carroll for
Compensation for Services Rendered to the War Department
during the Late War, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1876,
H. Mis. Doc. 179.
(Hereafter cited as HR Dec. 179.)
^^Scott, Origin, p.
10. Ludwell H. Johnson,
"Northern Profits and Profiteers: The Cotton Rings of
1864-1865," Civil War History 12 (June 1966) cites one
instance in October 1864 where 1500 bales of cotton was
worth $1 million. If so, Scott's cotton could have been
worth about $650,000. Of course the price of cotton, as
with all commodities, varied greatly year to year.
Presumably that figure would be a gross rather than net
worth, without accounting for the costs of transportation,
taxes and bribery of army and government officials for
expediting its way through Union lines. See pp.
101, 102,
106, 114.

63Scott, origin, p.

19.

6*Ibid.
G^Scott claimed he left Carroll's and found General
Grant, who took him to see Lincoln on "the very day" of his
death. Lincoln took his papers and promised him a permit if

218

they were in order. Scott had run out of money and had to
leave Washington that evening. He heard of the President's
death at Harrisburg the next day. His papers were never
found. See Scott, Origin, pp.
19-20. There is no
corroborative evidence for Scott's statements. Lincoln did
see Grant that day, but there is no mention of Scott then,
or at any time in the previous few weeks. Earl Schenck
Miers, ed.
Lincoln Day By Day, A Chronology 1809-1865, 3
vols. (Washington, DC: Lincoln Sesquecentennial Commission,
1960), 3:320-330.
6@HR Doc. 179, p.

11.

^Ibid., p.
12. Carroll's claim that Scott paid to
have the letter Inserted was probably false. The letter was
printed under the heading "Voluntary Communication." Such
items were solicited and paid for by the National
Intelligencer. See front page, National Intelligencer, 12
April 1865 and any issue.
^HR Doo. 179, pp.
6*Ibid., p.

115.

7°Ibid., p.

117.

71lbid., p.

122.

11, 30, 31.

72[Evans], Material Bearing; letter to editor cited
by Scott, HR Doc. 179, p.
122; lettters from Samuel Hunt
to Anna Ella Carroll throughout 1871 and 1872 in the Carroll
Papers, CCJ Collection. Scott wished Carroll good luck on
her claim and expressed his gratitude for her patronage
search on his behalf in Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella
Carroll, 14 January 1870, Carroll Papers.
S. McCoy to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 March 1872,
Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.
7*charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 March
1872, cited in HR Doc. 179, p.
116.
7^ibid., p.

121.

7^scott, Origin, p.

3.

77g. s. Grant to Captain Scott, 18 March 1865,
U. S. Grant to Board of Inspectors, 15 April 1862, S. P. Lee
to Captain Scott, 1 March 1865, all cited in Scott, Origin,
pp. 29, 30, 31.

219

78Ibid., p.

37.

79HR Doc. 179, p.

122.

8^Carroll had warned Scott not to breathe a word of
his business in cotton, "for the reason that the Treasury
Department gives all its instructions secretly and they do
this to cut off all illicit trade." Anna Ella Carroll to
Charles K. Scott, n.d., reprinted in HR Doc. 179, p.
30.
See also Scott, Origin, p. 26.
*4}. S. Grant to Elihu B. Washbume, 22 March 1862,
The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 14 vols. (Carbondale,
Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967- ),
4:409; see also Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., I960), pp.
123-126.

B^Two letters in the New York Times detail the same
strategic importance of the rivers, including mention of
their navigability and their closeness to the Memphis &
Charleston Railroad. See Correspondence signed
"Tennessean," New York Times, 17 November 1861 [the most
complete of the two of the strategy and remarkably similar
in information content to Carroll's Plan] and 21 December
1861. The author of the articles reported giving the
information to a "loyal gentleman of some military
experience in June 1861.
For Lincoln's views on the
importance of relieving Unionists in the Border States, see
Roy P. Basler, ed. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,
9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953), 4:532; OR,
Series I, 52: pt. 1, pp. 191-192 contains Lincoln's
overall plan regarding the Western Theatre. It is not
dated, but was written prior to 5 October 1861. See Chapter
7 below for the conclusions of Civil War historians such as
Kenneth Williams and E. B. Long regarding Carroll's claim.

220

Chapter 6
The Search for Vindication

Gratified by the success of the federal armies In
the western theatre moving in apparent response to her plan,
Anne Carroll continued to make suggestions of military

strategy to the War Department in the spring of 1862.

On

May 2, she gave the government information Charles Scott had
sent her that skiffs and canoes were being sent to the Yazoo

River.

Fearing that Confederates would flee down the Yazoo

to the Mississippi and thence to Texas and Mexico, Scott
suggested the Yazoo be watched with federal gunboats,

on

May 14, Carroll wrote again, reiterating Scott's comments on

the necessity of guarding the Yazoo and recommending the
occupation of Vicksburg.

General Henry Halleck was creeping

toward Corinth, and the "impending battle in North

Mississippi" would force the enemy to retreat to Vicksburg,

she reasoned, so they could take the railroad from there to
escape into Texas.
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Carroll's continued assumption that the Confederates

would be driven west of the Mississippi rather than
retreating south from Corinth by either the Tombigbee River

or the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, might have been due to the

influence of her Texan friend, Lemuel Evans.

Evans is an

important but shadowy figure in Carroll's history.

They had

met when he took office as an American Party Congressman in
1855;

they had travelled together to St. Louis in October

1861.

They corresponded frequently when separated from each

other.

Unfortunately, only a few of Evans' letters survive

in Carroll's papers.

Though she remained "Miss Carroll" to

him until his death in 1877, the nineteenth-century
formality did not hide the intimacy of their friendship.

Whether there was an additional tie is difficult to judge.

Carroll had once told Thurlow Weed that she would go to
Mexico with Evans if he was appointed Minister.

Eer

journey with him to St. Louis was apparently with no other

companion or chaperone, but that was not unheard of even in
the early days of the war.^ She travelled with him to
Texas and cared for him during an illness.

Their

relationship, although very close, was public enough for her
to discuss him with her family, including her father, and
for former senator from Connecticut Truman Smith to tease
Evans to "give my love to Miss Carroll if you dare! f

Either Carroll presumed her age and her known political
activities would protect her from gossip regarding Evans, or
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she did not care what rumors flew.

She had found a man who

shared her political views, who championed her cause, and
who probably helped assuage her pain at the death of John
Cansin.

By March 1862, Evans returned to Washington where he
remained near Carroll for most of the rest of the war.

He

had discovered that the Union had no plans to attack Texas,
and being thus "satisfied that I can no longer render

adequate service," he had resigned his State Department
commission of the previous August.Carroll continued to
write for the war effort, but her attempts to contribute

were soon rejected.

Although Evans told the new Secretary

of War Stanton that an agreement had existed between Carroll
and the War Department, Thomas Scott had left June 1, 1862,
and Carroll now dealt with Assistant Secretary Peter

H. Watson, who proved less than amiable regarding her

ideas.6 in July and August she resubmitted her bill for

$5,000 for work already done;

on September 9, she suggested

another pamphlet for the Department's consideration.

In

January 1863, she submitted her bill again, this time
adjusted upward to $6,250, noting that Thomas Scott had

"directed me not to credit" $1,250 she had received from him
since he had paid that out of his pocket and when the whole
bill was paid, that amount "will be returned to
7
Col. Scott."

By September 1862, Watson decided to pay Carroll off
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by giving her $750 as “reasonable compensation . . . for the
public service” she had rendered.

Carroll took the money

and signed a receipt as a payment "in full for the above

account and of all demands against the United States

government."* Watson no doubt considered the case closed,
but Carroll, having found a source of income that enabled
her to pursue her favorite activities of writing and

politicking, interpreted Watson's payment not as a way to
end her importunities but as a confirmation that the oral

agreement she had made with Scott was still in force.
Accordingly, whan Carroll wrote another pamphlet on the

rights of the seceded states and submitted it to the
department, she no doubt expected a continuation of the

account.*
When Carroll followed up her pamphlet with another

letter that, hand-delivered, suggested a paper on

emancipation, Watson had had enough.

While he had been

willing to pay at least a part of Carroll's bill, she was

" ' entirely mistaken in assuming that I have undertaken to

employ you to write for this Department or to compensate you
for writing.'" Carroll was greatly surprised at his refusal.
Watson, she insisted, had asked her to call.

Now, she

wrote, if he would simply do his duty and lay her ideas
before Hr. Stanton, "I cannot doubt that, could the
Sec. give his attention to the proposition, he would at once
concur in the utility of such a production as mine would
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be."10 In a frigid reply to her request, and "to avoid all

misunderstanding and all necessity for further
correspondence on this topic," Watson wrote, he was

"authorized to state that the Secretary of War has never
employed a public writer, on any subject whatever, and the

department accordingly cannot avail itself of your

services."Il Carroll was only momentarily dissuaded by
this icy dismissal;
that year.

she would take up her cause again late

In the meantime, though, the presidential

election captured her attention.

Carroll did not care much for Lincoln's policies as

president.

His failure, in her eyes, to follow her counsel

regarding emancipation and colonization was a particular
sore point.

As early as the off-year elections of 1862 she

had become certain that it had "ever been the purpose of the
President and the faction, with whom he acts, to abolish

slavery, in the entire South, and to restore the States upon
no other condition."

Lincoln's removal of General George

McClellan from the command of the Army of the Potomac in the
fall of 1862, after McClellan failed to capitalize on the

Union victory at Antietam by pursuing the Confederates, was,

according to Carroll, Lincoln's way "to get the absolute

control of the Army, for this express purpose" of
emancipation by force.Although Carroll had maintained a

cordial relationship with Lincoln's Attorney General Bates
and had included a pipe for Lincoln in a gift of tobacco
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pipes she sent to Bates, by 1864 she was convinced that
Lincoln had to be defeated to save the country from a

military despotism.

13

In June, Carroll attended the Republican nominating

convention in Baltimore;

in August she went to the

Democratic convention in Chicago.While she would later
write Salmon Chase that she believed "an irreparable mistake
was committed" when Chase was passed over for the Republican

nomination, for Carroll, the Republican party was a lost
cause regardless of the nominee.

The President, the

Radicals, the momentary candidacy of John Charles Frémont,

all required the acceptance of the emancipation of slaves.
Carroll was convinced that the Republicans were too
intransigent to compromise on the question of slavery.

That

intransigence would destroy the Union if it prevailed in the

upcoming election.^
Even though Carroll had perhaps begun to sense the
inevitability of forced emancipation, telling Chase she had

"no sympathy with a dominant race, insolent & oppressive,
who violate all the conditions of liberty and then claim to

be the authors of freedom," it is most likely she supported

Democratic nominee George B. McClellan on his platform
calling for the restoration of the Union without regard to

slavery.The Washington National Intelligencer, to which

Carroll had contributed over the years, supported McClellan
for reasons of which Carroll could approve.

Lincoln's
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11 despotic assumptions under the specious plea of 'military
necessity'" made clear Lincoln's intention "to change the

character of the war from the single object of upholding the
Government to that of a direct interference with the
domestic institutions of the States."

McClellan, on the

other hand, was a candidate "who promised to look with a

single eye to the restoration of the Union under the

Constitution," and would not "be jostled from his purpose by
]g
extraneous influences."

The National Intelligencer reflected Carroll's
opinions throughout the Civil War, and in November 1864 she
wrote Thurlow Weed, Edward Bates, and Lemuel Evans that its

editor, Colonel William W. Seaton, had asked her to assume
the editorship of the paper.

To Weed she explained that

Seaton would be forced to shut down if Lincoln were

re-elected, apparently because of Seaton's opposition to the
administration.

"Even if Mr.

have to sell it all the same .

L-- is not elected, he will

. . ."

She invited Weed to

take part of the paper in a joint stock company to raise the

necessary $100,000 purchase price.

Seaton would give

Carroll $20,000 of that "to carry on the paper."

"I have no

earthly doubt," she wrote, "about my power to conduct the
editorial department .... I could make it a great lever &

I think, with due modesty, you will not dissent from this
opinion."Ï9

If Weed replied, his answer did not survive, but
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since he owned no part of the paper after Seaton left, he

obviously turned her down.

Edward Bates appreciated her

11 talents and acquirements" but cautioned that she might not
understand "as fully as I do, the arduous labor required" to

run the paper.
to accept.

"I have thought for some time that your vocation

is editorial. "
results.

Evans, on the other hand, urged Carroll

He wrote from Chicago with the election

Lincoln's re-election, he thought, meant a

"consolidated centralized Despotism," in which Washington
City would become like the Rome of old.

"Henceforth, " he

warned, "all success depends on the ability to be .

.

.a

part of the governing power . . . or a flatterer of the

governing power."

Carroll could achieve that status more

easily, Evans thought, if she ware editor of the
22
Intelligencer.
As is true of many events in Carroll's life, there
is no corroborative evidence to support Carroll's claim that

Seaton offered her the paper.

It is possible.

Josephine

Seaton, the Colonel's surviving daughter, thought enough of
Carroll's talents as a writer to consider carefully her

offer to write his biography and to suggest that Carroll

edit a collection of her father's letters or a "political
history of my Father .... or leaders of the

Intelligencer, which would no doubt be valuable, and
take."23 The editorship seems a bit of a far-fetched

proposition for Carroll to have invented out of thin air.
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But if it was offered to her, it came to naught by December

1864.

Seaton retired, a new editor took over, and Carroll

began to dun the War Department again to pay her claim.24

Times were hard for Carroll after the war, and she
scratched around trying to make a living.

Keeping constant

pressure on the War Department to pay her the rest of the
money she believed it owed her, she cut expenses by moving
in with her brother Eenry in Baltimore and searched for

other sources of income.

She asked Secretary of State

Seward to send her on a tour of the Southern states "in some
confidential capacity for the Govt." in order to ascertain

"their feelings, sentiments and aims" as the country moved
toward reconciliation.

She moved back home with her

father for a short time and worked on a history of the war,

asking for reports from such primary sources as Seward and

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles.2^ She filed a formal
claim with the War Department's Board of Claims, still

making no mention of any work but her pamphlets, and
convinced Thomas Scott to endorse her bill again.

Ee

thought since "all she asks is but a small matter ... if

under my control I should have no hesitation in allowing
it."2? She briefly looked for work as a teacher in New

York City and, pen ever at the ready, continued her pre-war

activities of seeking patronage positions for friends.
Her fortune had changed little in the interim:

28

though she

told Aaron Columbus Burr, for whom she lobbied nearly two
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years for a post in Tripoli, that the senator she lobbied
would "do anything" for her, "and he has," no appointment

was forthcoming.2 9 She also continued to write on the

political questions of the day and revised old articles for

, 30
resale.

In the winter of 1868-1869, Carroll travelled to
Texas with Lemuel Evans to report on the Texas

Constitutional Convention, in which Evans took part.

She

met the famous ex-spy Belle Boyd on the boat from New

Orleans to Galveston and found her "just the bold forward
creature you may suppose . . . disgusted every
one .... talks of nothing but herself—what great men she

met . . . &C"

She wrote a long report on the Texas

convention to President-elect Grant, suggesting Texas be

divided into several new states to "destroy the power of
these old secessionists forever."

Although Carroll

originally planned to come bad: home as soon as the

convention ended, Evans became seriously ill, so she stayed
to care for him.

"When he got alarmed," she wrote her

sister, "he proposed to turn over all his effects & money to
me at once," another indication of the intimacy of their
long relationship.

Fortunately, Evans recovered.

In the

meantime, Carroll amused herself during his recuperation
with a visit to a lunatic asylum ("almost all the females
are so from the War—loss of friends or property or both")

and enjoying a "glorious country."

33
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But always in Carroll's life there was her claim.

On May 10, 1869, Carroll withdrew all her papers from the
War Department's files.

On March 31, 1870, she petitioned

the United States Senate to award her "compensation

commensurate with the service" she had provided the
government with her pamphlets which "communicated throughout
the struggle important facts and suggestions," and her

military observations which induced the government "to adopt
the Tennessee River instead of the Mississippi . . . . "34

There are several possible reasons why Carroll chose

to enter the public forum with her claim instead of
continuing her pleas and petitions to the War Department.

Edwin Stanton, whom she believed had been kept uninformed of
her claim and therefore had been unable to aid her, left

office in 1868 and died in December of 1869.35
Recently-elected President Grant, whom she may have believed

would support her claim in order not to appear unchivalrous
before his public, was in a position to wield considerable

power in her favor.

And Benjamin Wade, retiring from the

Senate to Ohio, had written her a letter.

I cannot take leave of public life without expressing
my deep sense of your services to the country during
the whole period of our national troubles. Although a
citizen of a state almost unanimously disloyal and
deeply sympathizing with secession, especially the
wealthy and aristocratiaal class of her people, to
which you belonged, yet, in the midst of such
surroundings, you emancipated your own slaves at a
great sacrifice of personal interest, and with your
powerful pen defended the causa of the Union and

231

loyalty as ably and effectively as it has ever yet
been defended.
From my position on the Committee of the Conduct of
the War I know that some of the most successful
expeditions of the war were suggested by you, among
which I might instance the expedition up the Tennessee
River .... I also know in what high estimation your
services were held by President Lincoln; and I cannot
leave this subject without sincerely hoping that the
Government may yet confer on you some token of
acknowledgment for all these services and
sacrifices.
Wade would continue to write letters in favor of

Carroll's claim.

In February 1872, he wrote the Committee

on Military Affairs considering Carroll's claim that

President Lincoln "informed me that the merit of this plan
was due to Miss Carroll" and that "both Mr. Lincoln and

Mr. Stanton . . . expressed to me their high appreciation of
this service . . . and they both expressed the wish that the

Government would reward her liberally for the
same .

. . ."

He repeated his praise of Carroll's

accomplishments and worth throughout the 1870s.
Wade's most supportive letter in Carroll's behalf,
however, was not published until 1881, three years after his

death.

In that letter, dated April 4, 1876, Wade claimed

credit for convincing Lincoln to use Carroll's plan in spite

of its origin.

started;

"It was a great work to get the matter

you have no idea of it.

We almost fought for it."

The need for "absolute secrecy" at the time had precluded
recognition of Carroll then, but "if ever there was a

righteous claim on earth, you have ©ne*

38
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At first glance, Wade's letters might seem to remove
all doubt regarding the legitimacy of Carroll's claim.

As

the chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War,
Wade's approval of her claim would be powerful support.

But

there is no evidence that the Committee ever discussed the
movement up the Tennessee River.

Most of their published

hearings concerning the Western Theatre during the time

Carroll set her claim (the winter of 1861-1862) dealt with

Frémont"s difficulties in supplying his men and with the
confusion in command at the Battle of Fort Donelson.^ No

evidence exists to suggest that Wade and his committee ever

dealt with the strategy of the Tennessee campaign.
Moreover, Caroline Wade, the Senator's wife, was on

close terms with Carroll,

it was through Caroline that Anne

Carroll corresponded with Benjamin Wade.

Considering her

penchant for bypassing middlemen, it would hardly seem

likely she would use a intermediary to approach Wade on such
a vital matter as establishing her claim.

It would seem

logical, therefore, to assume that Wade had at first simply

written a nice letter of thanks to a loyal citizen who had
told his wife and him what she deserved credit for.

And, as

the years went by. Carroll no doubt convinced the aging

Senator she deserved more than thanks for her work.

Wade,

who like many others responded favorably to the idea of
Carroll as a heroine, saw in her claim a chance to thank all

the women of the war.

He continued to support her with
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But the strongest

letters of increasing fulsomeness.

letter, that of 1876, that claimed he had fought for her

plan was almost certainly a forgery.

However, Wade’s

endorsement of her claim in 1869 had clearly, for Anne

Carroll, provided enough evidence to bring her claim to the

public forum and pursue it through Congress.*0

She began slowly enough, couching her petition for
payment with feminine delicacy and in the mildest of terms,

and reassuring Republicans such as Robert G. Schenck that
"in pressing my claim ... I cannot by any possibility
detract from our brave and heroic commanders ...

.As

her petition failed to attract notice, she determined to
strengthen it with more favorable testimonies.

She wrote to

John Tucker, former Assistant Secretary of War and still

associated with Thomas Scott, to see if Scott, who was out
of town, would support her claim.

He was sure the colonel

would. Tucker wrote, and would give him the papers when her
returned.

As for himself, while he was "much obliged for

your offer of a R.

Road charter in Texas" (where Lemuel

Evans was Chief Justice of the state's Supreme Court and
where Scott was hoping to develop the Texas and Pacific

Railroad), it did not suit him, "at this time, to avail of

it.

Sure enough, when Scott returned, he wrote a letter
of support for Carroll's claim to Senator Jacob K. Howard,
Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.^^ But since
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Scott’s letter referred only to Carroll’s pamphlets, which
Scott thought "were valuable at that time and served a good

purpose,11 Howard apparently questioned Carroll as to why

Scott had not mentioned her military strategy.

Scott had

told her she "had better not," Carroll explained, "because
44
military men were very tenacious & jealous."
A few days

later, Scott wrote a second letter of support, this time,

and for the first time, including a specific mention of

Carroll’s Tennessee Plan, "which plan I submitted to the
Secretary of War, and its general ideas were adopted."

"Through the adoption of this plan the country had been

saved millions," Scott wrote, " and that .

. . entitled her

to the kind consideration of Congress.

with additional proof of her service provided by
Scott along with the support of Ben Wade, Carroll thought
victory was at hand.

"I have wonderful friends," she wrote

her father from Washington in January 1871.
here brought me friends."

"All my labours

The Committee on Military Affairs

reported favorably on her claim and recommended she be paid

for her "highly meritorious services."^®
There the matter rested.

Read, passed to a second

reading and printed, the bill never moved out of
Congress.47 Maryland senator George Vickers thought it

might be due to Carroll’s anti-Republican sentiments.
Perhaps if she "had pressed it in 1865 & 1866 before the
loyalty of some had cooled," he wrote, her "prospects for
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success would have been greater."48 Carroll blamed
inaction on the bill on Senator Henry Wilson for failing to
"take care of" her in the Senate, and on Chairman Howard
himself, who had "proved a traitor & would have done me
49
injustice. . . .You have no idea how false he played."

Defeated but momentarily, Carroll worked to gather
more letters of support and to increase her visibility as
claimant.

She made friends with Samuel Hunt, secretary to

Henry Wilson, the new Chairman of the Committee on Military
Affairs, and did all she could to curry Hunt's confidence.

As an insider, Hunt suggested she use publicity to help her
claim and obtain as many supportive letters as she

could.88 Carroll wrote to Millard Fillmore, who remembered
their meeting in November 1861 on her way back from

Tennessee, but could remember none of the specifics of the
conversation.

Besides, he wrote, he was sure that with the

favorable report by Howard she would prevail in Congress
regardless of his faulty memory.8^ Carroll did add support

to her claim in the form of letters received in the 1860s
which had complimented her on her pamphlets and justified

their price from such men as Edward Bates, Edward Everett,
Reverdy Johnson, and Horace Binney.

She included as well a

statement on the value of the Tennessee strategy from Chief
Justice Lemuel Evans, by now possessed of his more

impressive title.88
Pressing Hunt to use his influence on Wilson that
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winter, however, Carroll confronted two immovable

individuals.

Hunt was not willing to jeopardize his future.

He had to be cautious, he later wrote Carroll, and not
appear to be her advocate or his usefulness would diminish.
Wilson would not place the bill on the calendar and would

not discuss it with Hunt at all.

Apparently he wanted more

proof.83

Wilson received additional proof of a sort in the
form of a pamphlet published to support Carroll's claim.

Although issued anonymously, the author was Lemuel

Evans.8* Miss Carroll, he wrote, "had the genius to grasp
the situation and perceive that the fall of Richmond could
not destroy the rebellion, and the Mississippi river could
not be opened on its waters;

that the Government must seize

a strategic position within the cotton States, and if a

fatal blow could be inflicted, it must fall there."

To

Carroll, alone, "therefore, must be given the credit of
having solved the problem the military destruction of the
Kg
"Southern Confederacy.'"
In his pamphlet, published in the winter of

1871-1872, Evans added an additional laurel to Carroll's
wreath by including a letter which she was said to have

written regarding Vicksburg (later dated in testimony as

having been written in October 1862), pointing out that
Vicksburg was too heavily fortified to take from the river
(which the fédérais had discovered as early as the previous
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Carroll's plan to reduce Vicksburg, which she later claimed oho hod
cent the War Department in October 1862, suggested a move down the Central
Mississippi Railroad and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to control the cities
of Jackson and Meridian. Control of these two towns would force the
Confederates to move east of the Tombigbea and to evacuate Vicksburg.

After five futile attempts, one of them down the Mississippi Central
Railroad, Grant moved bin forces down the western bank of the Mississippi,
thus avoiding the Yazoo Delta cast of the river. Dy May, Grant had crossed
the Mississippi below Grand Gulf and was headed for Jackson. From that town
he would move to take Vicksburg from the east by siege. The city surrendered
on July 6, 1863.
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spring when Admiral David G. Farragut had failed to take the
town) and recommended that the town be taken by a land
route.56 in her letter, almost certainly a post facto

creation since no evidence exists of its fortuitous receipt
by anyone connected with the Vicksburg Campaign, Carroll

argued for a trip down the Mississippi Central Railroad from
Memphis to capture Jackson, Mississippi, and cut off

Vicksburg from the east as the most " ' economical ' " plan.

Grant had in fact made such a move, but was driven back in
December 1862.

Saving the government money had become part of

Carroll's claim to fame in this pamphlet.

After all, she

had saved the government "three thousand millions" of
dollars, Evans estimated, by her work in the war.

Surely

Congress would not begrudge her what he suggested she ask
for:

"the pay of a Major Gene'l from November 30 or

December 1st 1861" since he thought she "could get through a
large sum in this form" that might be more appealing than a

specific dollar amount would be.
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Hunt agreed with Evans' idea.

He later wrote

Carroll that he thought her method of asking for money was

"rather pretty and practical" and no doubt befitting her
womanly nature.

Her claim, he thought, was more valuable

because she was a "woman" and thus a symbol of all the women

of the war.55 It was becoming painfully apparent to
Carroll, however, that her continued push for recognition
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and payment of her claim was meeting with considerable

disapproval , particularly among her female acquaintances.
She dismissed it, however, reasoning that "women . . . are

as a class jealous & envious of their sex.

None are allowed

to come around me, except that Miss Munroe who is a great
bore & I have no doubt would at heart rejoice, if she could

have seen me defeated.
By May 1872, Carroll was convinced once again that
she was winning the battle.

"My enemies have fought me

desperately to defeat me or rather my claim," she wrote her
father.

"We fought them and contested every inch on the

battle field and the Lord being my Helper in His own good
time has given me great extraordinary victory!"

spoke too soon.

But Carroll

The bill for her relief was read and

referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, where it

died.

"You can't trust a professional politician," Carroll

told her sister.

But she had hope nonetheless.

"It is

wonderful with what strength & energy Our Father in Heaven

endows us in such peculiar trying times . .

. ."@1

By August, Carroll was ready to do battle again.
She went to New York City to work for the Republicans in the
presidential election, though she was less interested in

getting Grant elected, "so narrow and selfish his nature,"
than in working for Henry Wilson as his vice-president, no

doubt deciding Wilson's gratitude for her support would help
her cause in Cngress.

The vice-president, "a respectable
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man,11 she wrote, "will carry the ticket."
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In November,

anxious over a new round of hearings on her claim, she

contacted Hunt, who remained with Wilson after the election.

She asked if he could "think of any one in this city who has
more than ordinary influence with Wilson?

One whom I could

approach by an offer of money if successful.

I would allow

any per centage at all could I find the party of the right
status . . .

With Grant returned to office, Carroll

thought, the Republicans "can surely now be
magnanimous ... in conceding my rights" since Grant, after

all, "has never claimed to have done the service" to the

country of planning the Tennessee Campaign.

63

Carroll finally appealed to Wilson himself, telling
him that "President Grant as long ago as 67, advised me to

claim the service in history," and "Judge Wade says, that
the President desires to see me rewarded and will stand by

me."

Give justice now, she pleaded, for "if I am not

successful now after all, I shall not live I fear ever to

be."6* Wilson's access to Grant's ideas being considerably
greater than Carroll's, certainly had Grant desired her to

have been recognized, she would have been.

But Congress

adjourned with no action taken on her claim.

Immediately after the new year, Carroll reached out
for public support again with a new pamphlet which restated

her claim and added the argument that, since historians
could not agree on whose idea the campaign was (they

240

credited Halleck, Grant, Foote, Buell, McClellan and

Frémont), it was clear that the idea "had no part in the
plan of any of our generals and was at the time Miss Carroll

submitted her plan to the Department unknown to the

Government.1,65 Ben Wade had written another letter of
support for her, telling the Committee that Lincoln had

informed him "that the merit of this plan was due to Miss
Carroll."

Secretary Stanton had agreed, and "fully

recognized" (on his deathbed, according to Wada)

"Miss

Carroll's service to the Union in the organization of this
.
_66
campaign."
Throughout 1873, Carroll gathered letters of support

for her next assault on Congress.

Cassius M. Clay, united

States Minister to Russia in 1861, endorsed her claim,

telling her he saw "no reason why officers and soldiers who
fought in the field should be more entitled to honor and

emoluments, than the many eminient women, who showed great
patriotism and rendered essential aid. .

.

George

Vickers promised his vote the next time around, but advised

her she should condense her claim to make it easier reading
for busy politicians.^ Carroll also wrote to civil war

historians J. T. Headley and Dr. D. W. Draper, correcting

their histories of the war.^® Lemuel Evans supported her
still in this new round, warning her to keep her claim above
politics if she could, "by extreme circumspection—remaining

wholly in the background."

Get the appropriation first;
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then she could "write or visit or mix in any
movement . . . ."

70

In September, everything stopped for Carroll as her
beloved father fell ill.

devastated.

He died on October 3.

Carroll was

"I have lost the best Father, the most perfect

of all the race, not in my judgment only, but in that of all

who had the fortune to know him."

Her deep grief did not

blind her to practicalities, however;

shortly after her

father's death she questioned his former lawyer in Somerset

County to see if the sale of her father's home back in the

1830s had been proper or not.

If the estate was entailed,

for instance, she might be able to get it back for her
brother Henry.

No, wrote Isaac Jones, "I have never heard

any question of the absolute title in the grantee of your

father.Ali Carroll would inherit was her father's good
name.

Her uncle comforted her:

his brother might have had

"the usual Carroll-infirmity of great lack of the faculty of

making money," he wrote, but "he had all their nobility of
character, kindness of heart and sympathy of nature," laving
"his family and children with almost feminine
fondness . . . ."
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By 1874, Carroll was back at work.

Her publication

of another pamphlet had attracted the notice of Charles

M. Scott, who defended himself as true author of the
Tennessee Plan in a letter to the New York Daily

Tribune.Questioned once again by the Committee on War
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claims about her lack of contemporaneous proof regarding the

official nature of her mission to Tennessee, Carroll had

"omitted" any statement in her early claims, she replied,
"that to render my services more effective ” she had told

Colonel Scott she would visit the West.

While she had

written to Scott when she was there and at his official
request, regarding "any thing that I might deem important to

the cause," she stated, he had not written to her because he
was afraid his letters would not arrive in time and because
he knew she would be returning to Washington soon.?^

Another pamphlet came out in December 1874.

In that one,

Carroll at last responded to the resistance to her military

claims and made her literary services a "distinct and
separate claim" from the more controversial military

.
76
service.
Charles Scott's attack in the press had had an
effect.

The New York Times wondered if Carroll had bothered

to press her claim while Halleck was still alive, since he
77
was the obvious author of the plan.
Carroll's defense of
her claim and her assertion that she had started her

petitions prior to his demise was not printed in the Times,
but she was given the chance to respond in public at

last.On a hot July day in 1876, the two claimants faced
each other in the Military Affairs Committee hearing in

Washington, and Carroll, with Evans by her side, wore down
her accuser, who retired from the fray.

The field was hers,

243

and with Scott more or less consigned to the oblivion of the

Midwest once again, she renewed her battle.

79

But the battle would soon be hers alone.
Evans died in Washington July 1, 1877.

Lemuel

The Galveston Daily

News took note of his passing, surprised that it seemed "to

have been an event less noted by the press of the State than
©A
would have been anticipated . . .
Carroll went on
without her close friend.

Another memorial was introduced

in October, shortened to eleven pages and asking for

compensation for her work "somewhat in proportion to its

value to the country."

In 1878, a poetical version was

filed in the 45th Congress that confronted public reluctance

to accept the validity of Carroll's claim.

This massive

memorial, which reprinted all the petitions, documents,
memorials, reports and pamphlets that had previously issued
in the case, praised the intelligence and discernment of the

American public and asked Congress to put the matter before
them.

"Let the people grasp the merits of this case, and

understand what results followed the adoption of this plan,

by which the unity of the United States stands to-day, and
we can trust them to . . . place the reward . . . so as to

connect it fairly with the benefits the nation itself
received."82 After all, "the transfer of the national

armies" from the Mississippi to the Tennessee River, for
which Carroll was responsible, "was the greatest military
event in the interest of the human race known to modern
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It was nothing less than the beginning of a new and
S3
higher civilization . ...11
Perhaps, but the memorial
ages.

was still referred to the House Committee on Military
84
Affairs where it languished unto death.

At long last, on February 18, 1879, came an answer
to a congressional petition.

The Senate Committee on

Military Affairs, in reply to Carroll's Memorial of 1877,
issued its report.

The committee decided against Carroll.

Every congress since the civil war, the committee argued,

had had a chance to reward her and none had.

"There must

have been," therefore, "some very grave and important

reasons underlying the non-action of these Congresses in

these premises .

. . ."

She had been paid $1,250 by Thomas

Scott and another $750 by Assistant Secretary Watson.

thousand dollars for her pamphlets was plenty.

Two

As for her

military strategy, all civilized nations honored the names

and deeds of women like Florence Nightingale and Clara
Barton "because they are heroines who have risked their

lives in the cause of humanity."

But if they, like Carroll,

applied for a monetary reward, why "it would destroy much of

the poetry and grandeur of noble deeds" and smack of
"hucksterism" and barter.

Carroll should be satisfied with

the monies received and, should she want more, "the deficit

should be supplied from the large store of gratitude

which .

. . republics should bestow upon their

citizens."85
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Carroll must have been crushed or, more likely,

infuriated.

Perhaps it was the condescending and

patronizing tone of the committee that implied womanly deeds
ought to be self-sacrificing enough to pay the printer that

brought Carroll's case to the interest of the woman's

suffrage movement.

Carroll had notified the suffragists

herself in 1873, when she sent copies of her early petitions
and memorials to Matilda Joslyn Gage at the National Woman's

Suffrage Association's annual convention in Washington.

She

thought, perhaps, it might interest Mrs. Gage, "inasmuch as

it may serve in some degree to furnish evidence in behalf of
the cause you so ably represent."^
Gage took up the cause, about which she published a
pamphlet with the combative title, "Who Planned the

Tennessee Campaign of 1862?

or Anna Ella Carroll

vs. Ulysses S. Grant," giving a brief synopsis of the case,
painting Carroll's claim in the light of injustice of "man

toward woman."

Carroll, a "young girl of Maryland, full of

a patriotic spirit," had developed a plan which had saved
the Union.

Nowhere in the world had there ever existed "a

person possessed of the transcendant [sic] military genius

of Anna Ella Carroll."

Yet Grant was fêtad and honored and

re-elected, while Carroll, the plan's true author, "in

unregarded solitude," sought from Congress but a simple

pension to support her in her sunset years.

"Had she not

been a woman would she have met this injustice?"

Gage
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thundered rhetorically.

Actually, if Charles Scott1s

experience were taken into cons ideration, the answer might
well have been yes.

But no matter.

Here was a cause worth

fighting for.
Carroll's choice to seek support from the National

Woman Suffrage Association instead of the state-based and
more conservative American Woman's Suffrage Association made

sense considering their respective constituencies.
Unfortunately for Carroll, however, in 1873 the NWSA was

still suffering public censure for the radical free-love

ideas publicized by NWSA member Victoria Woodhull in 1871
and 1872.

The outcry against Woodhull had cost the

four-year old organization much of its support and public
approval.

It was not an effective organization to mount

such a campaign as Carroll required, especially considering
eg
the controversial nature of Carroll's military claim.
By

the 1880s, however, when the suffragists began to champion
Carroll's cause, members from both the NWSA and the AWSA

would write on Carroll's behalf.
Gage's article was printed first in the National
Citizen, the NWSA's monthly newspaper, and then brought out

as a pamphlet.

followed.

One more petition by Carroll to Congress

Carroll asked Thomas Scott for help once again,

but Scott had suffered a stroke two years previously, and
though his mind was clear and he continued his presidency of
the Pennsylvania Railroad, he was, his assistant wrote
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Carroll, "too broken down by overwork" to be of any help.
QA
Ben Wade, her other constant support, had died in 1878.
Carroll was on her own this time.

Called before the Committee on Military Affairs in
January, 1881, she was momentarily at a loss when she was

asked to talk about her claim rather than read it.
g]
spoke for an hour and a half.
As had been true

But she

throughout her life, her forceful personality and speech
seemed to impress those whom she dealt with much more than

did her written work.

On March 3, 1881, former Union

general and Representative Edward S. Bragg, chairman of the
Committee, reported a bill for her relief, finding that "the

evidence . . . completely establishes that Miss Anna Ella

Carroll was the author" of the Tennessee Campaign Plan that
gave "mastery of the conf Hot to the national arms . . . ."
The "thanks of the nation" were due Miss Carroll, and it was

the recommendation of the committee that she be given a

pension "as a partial measure of recognition for her public

service . . . ."

The pension, Carroll hoped, would date

from November 30, 1861, but she would "take whatever I can
get as time is important . . .

."

Time was very important.
66 years old.

dead and gone.

93

in 1881, Anne Carroll was

Her contemporaries who had supported her were

She was forced to rely on new sources for

support and those took time to cultivate.

She had contacted

James Abram Garfield after his Republican presidential
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nomination in 1880, offering a manuscript on Maryland's
colonial history for his perusal, warning him about an
alliance between Democrats and the Pope, and asking for five

hundred dollars or so to publish an anti-catholic pamphlet;

in short, repeating all the activities which thirty years
previously had established her relationship with Millard
QA
Fillmore and the Know-Nothing Party.
She congratulated
Garfield on his election, finding it "so remarkable that I

do not see how any true Christian can doubt that God rules
and controls the governments of men.

When she came to

Washington, she would call on him, she promised, but in the
meantime, she enclosed the March 1881 report on her claim,

"sure it will be gratifying to you, that this measure of

success has been attained . .

.

But success was short-lived.

Garfield, whose brief,

polite answers to Carroll's letters no doubt encouraged her
into considering him a good friend and ardent supporter, was

assassinated in the summer of 1881.

Carroll suffered a

paralytic stroke in early September, and Congress adjourned

without passing the bill for her relief.
A woman suffering from injustice at the hands of the

male-dominant national government provided the suffragists
with a cause.

The cause could be made only more glorious by

that woman's frailty, illness, and poverty.

Matilda Gage

had included Carroll's story in detail in the massive
History of Woman Suffrage, published in 1881.@@ By the
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following year, Phoebe Couzins was able to portray a woman
"unhonored, unsung and paralyzed," who lay dying "within the
shadow of the capitol," where the Military Affairs Committee
did its work, awarding pensions to the far less deserving.

The "silence and selfishness of men" were permitting

Carroll's great deeds to "pass into oblivion," wrote
Couzins.** In truth, one man did seem to be all that stood

between Carroll and her pension, which, if the War
Department refused to pay the bill for her pamphlets was the

least she deserved.

Former Confederate Brigadier General,

now Missouri Democratic Senator Francis Cockrell's

"determined opposition" to Carroll's claim kept the bill
from a final vote.^** Added to his opposition, wrote

Democratic Representative Edward S. Bragg, was that of the
War Department as a whole.

It stood firmly against the

claim, considering it "absurd .

. . that a woman's knowledge

of topography and strategic lines led the advance of the
warriors . . . ."1*1

The support from suffragists was a double-edged
sword.

While Carroll gained organized and wide-spread

publicity, members of the Committee on Military Affairs

manifested "very strong opposition to woman's rights,
suffrage, etc. which was made to prejudice [the] claim,
though having no direct connection with the case, of

course."1*2 But Carroll's invitation in 1873 to the

suffragists to take up her cause did form a connection and,
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for better or worse, she was inextricably linked with the
political movement for woman's suffrage.

Republican

Representative John D. White of Kentucky pointed out the

connections in his speech on February 7, 1884, comparing

Carroll's claim with that of Fitz John Porter.
Union Major General Porter had been cashiered from

the Army for disobeying an order in 1863 and had spent many

of the ensuing years petitioning Congress to clear his name.
He had, according to White, suffered wrongs which Congress
had taken weeks to consider.

Carroll, on the other hand,

had suffered far greater wrongs, but, White argued, "because

she is a woman and can not help herself, and because she has
no political power to bear .... for twenty years her

claim has been dishonored."

"Does any one doubt for one

moment," White asked, "that had Miss Carroll possessed the

powerful political influence of Fitz John Porter . . . she
long ago [would have] received every dollar" of her
claim?1°3
That was the question asked again and again by the

suffragists.

Where Congress had failed, perhaps public

opinion could succeed in gaining Carroll justice.

While the

suffragists prepared the matter for the public, Carroll
worked within the system one more time.

On January 29,

1885, William W. Warden, a Washington attorney, filed a

claim for Carroll in the United States Court of claims.104
Anna Ella Carroll v. The United States was decided

L
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by June 1, 1885.

Time was of the essence, her attorney

argued, for although Carroll's health had improved, she was
still ill and had no income save a pension from the

"National Woman's Aid Association."105 Carroll's sister
Mary had placed her in a private boarding home in Baltimore,

and expenses were high.105 Using his son Clifford's
position as editor of a newspaper to drum up support for

Carroll and thoroughly embarassing her sister and the rest
of her family with the publicity, Warden succeeded in
gaining a favorable decision, or so he claimed,

"The Court

of Claims today decided the Carroll Cass in your sister's
favor," he wrote to Mary.

"Receive my congratulations

accordingly."10?

But Carroll had not won.

The Court decided that

there was simply no legal evidence to support her claim of
military services.

"Until that fact be shown (for it is

certainly susceptible of proof)" Justice J. Nott wrote, "no

court would be authorized in deciding that the strategy was

not original with the military authorities who apparently
planned that advance, and who were morally and officially
I
responsible for its success."
As for her claim for

literary services, while the documents she used for proof
might "morally satisfy the judgment of the individual," they

were not evidence "which can be received or considered by a

court."

As impressive as her letters from notables were,

"as a court we must pronounce these certificates as

L
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valueless as blank paper . .

. they establish no judicial

fact.1,109 There was no legal support for Carroll1 s claim.
All the Court could do was transmit its opinion as such to

the House Committee.

The only "victory" of which Warden

wrote might be considered the Court's remark that Congress

was not circumscribed by legal evidence to justify its
actions.

It could, if it desired, base its reward to

Carroll on the morality of the claim.110 It did not so

desire.

Another bill would be introduced in 1890 for

$10,000 for Carroll and once again would meet its fate in a
referral to the Committee on Military Affairs.111

As Carroll went before the Courts, the suffragists
continued their literary campaign of support.

Carroll had

recovered enough for a personal interview with journalist

Mr. H. R. Shattuck.

Carroll's appearance, blue-eyed,

bespectacled, white-haired, short and stout but still

animated, impressed Shattuck.

"Taking both my hands in

hers, she held them tightly, while she looked into my eyes
with an expression of such ingenuous truth and honesty, that

if I had ever any doubts of her story they could exist for
me no longer."

Until she began to speak, though, one might

suppose she was a "simple old lady."

But relating her tale

(which had grown grander as the years had passed), he wrote,
"she became the wonderful woman to whom some day our country

will do honor.w11^

Carroll told her story of planning the campaign with
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appropriate gestures and "eyes as bright as stars."

113

explained how she had talked to Grant after the war:

was like a child,'" she said.
and how I came to think of it;

She
”'He

'He asked me all about it,

and until I described my

plan to him, and showed how success came from its

consummation, I am convinced that he had no conception that
it was this that brought us victory."' Carroll, wrote

Shattuck, "was God's agent in the nation's day of peril."
And now, "because Anna Ella Carroll is a woman" she could
get no recognition or reward, "another instance of the

ingratitude of republics. "H*

Shattuck's article was followed a few months later
by one written by suffragist Mrs. C. C. Hussey, and in 1886,
Carroll herself took pen in still-crippled hand to rewrite
her story for the North American Review.

Mary Livermore

included Carroll's story in her popular history, My Story of

the War in 1889.

Again, as did the other suffragists, she

emphasized that it was Carroll's sex, "a fact for which she

is not responsible," which had led men to ignore her

claim.US in 1891, the first volume of a short biography
appeared, written by suffragist Sarah Ellen Blackwell and
titled Life of a Military Genius.

'

Blackwell had been corresponding with the Carrolls

since the mid-1880s.

She saw Carroll's case as a "brilliant

exemplification of the treatment of women all the world

over."

Publicity would help Carroll's case, she wrote, so
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Blackwell placed letters that asked for a subscription drive

for Carroll’s benefit in the pages of the Woman’s Journal,
Woman’s Column, Century Magazine, and other periodicals.
She was joined in her letters on behalf of the "Carroll
2 IQ

Fund" by Mrs. Hussey, Abbie M. Gannett, and Lucy Stone.

Susan B. Anthony wrote a note to Mary Carroll, urging her to
trust the suffragists’ support.

"No man ever has—or ever

will put heart and soul & brain into the work of getting

this justice done for Anna," she told her, adding, "only an
j ia
earnest & true woman can succeed."
The 1890 bill for $10,000 failed, beaten by Senator

Cockrell again.

Carroll, oared for in Washington by her

youngest sister, Mary, was at times nearly destitute, in
spite of contributions from the suffragists.

Mary had taken

an appointment in the Treasury Department in 1886 thanks to
the intercession of President Cleveland’s sister Rose and,
possibly, her sister’s letters to the President on her
behalf.she suffered a pay cut in 1888 and again in

1892, along with a year’s absence from work due to "nervous
prostration," followed by a dismissal for absenteeism.

Her

troubles prompted frantic letters from Mary to the

Clevelands on behalf of her own position and her sister’s
needs.

"Today I have not marketing for tomorrow," she

wrote, and, "I have no means even for required medicine from
1 99
day to day and am well nigh desperate."
Her sister was

ill, her own health was failing, and her family was of no
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help.

The Catholic Carrolls had long memories and did not

forgive Anne for her early anti-Catholic writings;

the

secessionist Carrolls did not forgive her for her Unionism;
the rest of the family were angry at having family matters

continually put on public display and were too poor to help
the sisters even if they had wanted to.

The sisters

clung to each other in their small Washington home on 21st
Street, buoyed by visits from supporters, but financially

"in great distress."1%*

Rallying for a short while after a case of pneumonia

and what was probably a second stroke in the summer of 1893,
Anna Ella Carroll declined gradually in the fall and winter

and finally died on February 19, 1894.

Partially paralyzed

for thirteen years, she had succumbed in the end to old age

and Bright's disease, a failure of the kidneys that was
probably due to circulatory problem common in the
chronically bedridden.

Her death certificate listed her

occupation as "authoress," and she did write until the end
of her life, scratching out questions and answers when she
could not speak, reading her visitor's answers and questions
when she could not hear.135 Her body was taken by her

sister to Dorchester County, Maryland, where she was buried
near her beloved father in the Old Trinity Church yard.

Her

stone bears the true inscription, "A Woman Rarely Gifted—An
Able and Accomplished Writer."

But below that inscription,

her death is misdated as 1893, in fitting irony for a woman

256

who spent much of her life trying to set her historical

record straight.
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Chapter 7

Carroll as Cause

Anna Ella Carroll's story did not end with her death
in Washington in 1894.

The suffragists' campaign had

portrayed Carroll as a woman denied recognition because of

Because of her paralysis and then her death,

her sex.

Carroll's campaign for recognition took on an added
poignancy.

Her story took on added details.

Over the next

hundred years, the legend grew of the woman who had saved

the Union through her brilliant military strategy.

The

shaky foundation upon which it rested collapsed only under
the force of scholarly investigation of her claim.
In the beginning, it seemed as if the suffragists
would win their cause.

Carroll's story did not die, a fact

that was by itself remarkable.

She was included in the

National Cyclopedia of American Biography the year of her

death and listed as a strategist.

President Lincoln was

quoted in the entry as supporting her claim, though no
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source for the quotation was given.1 A year later, in

1895, former Representative Albert Gallatin Riddle mentioned

her case in his Recollections of War Times, again quoting
Lincoln as her supporter.

Riddle's portrayal of a "short,

stout, middle-aged maiden lady, intently listening through

an ear trumpet" to debates in Congress, continued the

suffragist drive to have CarrolI recognized in spite of her
sex.

Riddle had been informed of Carroll's plight by

suffragists, or the "strong-minded" as he jocularly referred

to them, but he failed in his attempt to persuade Congress
to reward her.

His interest seems to have been momentary

and may have been purely political in spite of his inclusion
of Carroll ' s claim in his book;
?
as 1893.

he too misdated her death

The "strong-minded" continued to fight for Carroll.
Sarah Ellen Blackwell published her second volume on Carroll

in 1895.

The small book, which sold for one dollar,

contained reprints of Carroll's pamphlets and a touching
rendition of her deathbed scene.

Subscriptions to the

volume were sold through advertisements in the Woman1s

Journal.3 The September 1896 issue of Godey's Magazine put
Carroll on the cover as "The Woman that Saved the Union."
Lucinda Chandler retold much of what was included in

Blackwell's biography, but included a hint of skulduggery by
those determined to block Carroll's claim by disclosing the
alleged theft of Carroll's papers twice from the Committee
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on Military Affairs.4 The current Congress, she suggested,
could "redeem their sex" from the "amazing cowardice" of

preceding Congresses by placing Carroll's portrait and a

plaque commemorating her deeds in the Capitol.

Since she

was dead, there was little sense in pursuing a monetary

reward, but Chandler proposed recognition at the very
5
least.
A monetary reward was not considered impossible,

though, at least not by those who survived Carroll.

Someone, most likely Mary H. Carroll, persuaded Maryland
Senator Arthur P. Gorman to introduce a measure for the

relief of the "legal representatives of Miss Anna Ella
Carroll, deceased" in July 1897.6

with the

suffragists' support and the added pathos of her death in
poverty, however, Carroll's claim continued to be referred

to committees for proper burial.

7

It was not until 1910 that a defense of
congressional inaction was published.

The suffragists had

argued for years that Carroll had not been fully recognized

because she was a woman operating in the male sphere of
politics and war.

But Ida M. Tarbell saw the supporters of

Carroll and her claim as an example of the unreasonable
demands of suffragists.

In an article on how American women

were changed by the Civil War, Tarbell argued that Carroll's

work had been duly recognized by the $2,000 payment she had
received for her pamphlets and by the notice Congress had
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taken of her military claims.

The failure to compensate

Carroll for her role as strategist, a role which Tarbell

accepted unquestioningly, was due to the plan having come
from a civilian instead of a military person.

had nothing to do with it.

Carroll's sex

Her claim had never passed

simply because those things happened, Tarbell stated.

Carroll was recognized "emphatically and generously" for her
military labors;

she was just never paid.

Tarbell sought to prove that the suffragists were

incorrect in their basic assumption that Carroll's sex
excluded her from proper recognition.

Further, because

suffragists demanded recognition for Carroll rather than
accepting the decision of Congress as appropriate, they were

treading where they did not belong.

Tarbell then extended

that reasoning to argue that because the suffragists
demanded voting rights, rather than accepting the decision

of Congress and other institutions as appropriate, they were
doomed never to receive those rights.

Carroll had been

amply rewarded, at least in Tarbell's eyes, and nothing

would ever come of any further demands.

So, too, had women

been amply recompensed for their lack of voting rights by

the special commission, provided by God, of maternity and
the rule over the woman's sphere.

In Tarbell's opinion, the Woman's Rights movement

had overlooked the "one eternal fact" that argument and
agitation would never accomplish their goals.

Too
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aggressive and too bitter, the suffragists had adopted the
"dangerous practice" of espousing causes and supporting

candidates that would benefit their cause and condemning all
who opposed their cause, regardless of individual merit.

Suffragists had failed to consider history, she wrote.
Individual responsibility had always been of the utmost
importance to women, but that responsibility was to be

defined in moral terms.

Most women did not want and would

never demand the individual political responsibility of the
vote as a right.

Tarbell did not see the vote as a right,

but as a privilege, and one which women would seek and

obtain as they had other privileges:

only "when they need

it to accomplish some good for which they feel themselves
g
responsible. "
Tarbell's reactionary view that attempted to

re-establish women in a separate sphere reflected the

growing fight against woman suffrage in the decades prior to
the constitutional amendment enfranchising women.

While she

was perfectly willing to admit that the Civil War, as was
true of all wars, had "by necessity" changed the place of

women in American society, Tarbell was not willing to let
the transformation continue into the field of politics.

Duty in the form of necessity had moved women into the

workplace during the war.

Their actions had been on the

whole collective and properly motivated.

It was wrong to

claim the franchise because of one unusual individual who
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had been discriminated against even though she had acted
with the same motivation.

It was just as wrong to claim it

because women's public roles had expanded and they could no
longer be portrayed as being interested solely in domestic

matters.

Tarbell's argument against Carroll's attempt to

demand recognition for her work outside her appointed

sphere, even if duty had led her there, was an example of
the separate-but-equal repudiation of natural rights which
was common among anti-suffragists.^^

Carroll's story faded gradually from public view.

She was mentioned in a county history as "the most
distinguished and brilliant woman Maryland ever

produced. "11 in 1925, the Baltimore Sun ran an article on

her, comparing her work with the supposed trailblazing
interest in business and politics of the "modern woman."

In

that article, Blackwell's book and Chandler's article were
clearly the sources used.

Lemuel Evans' role in the drama

was de-emphasizad, and Lincoln was said to have gone to
St. Louis to implement Carroll's plan, an invention that
would presumably lend needed credibility to her claim.

An unconsciously patronizing article followed in 1934 by
Dr. Milton Shutes who defended Carroll's trespass on the
"verboten" path of military work "that has always been
j3
jealously reserved for the brilliant male!"
"Somewhere a
little monument is missing!"

argued Shutes, because Carroll

was "a civilian and—a woman!

Shutes thus returned both
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to Carroll ’s argument that the military were too jealous to

let her have her claim and to the suffragists' argument that
held her sex responsible.

In 1940, Anne Carroll's story finally appeared in
the popular press.

Woman's Home Companion, with a

circulation of over three million readers, published a

two-part serialization of Carroll's career as a
strategist. 15 The story of the "unhonored general of the

Civil War" again accepted the validity of Carroll's tale,
again misdated her death, and again argued that her sex was
the reason her work had not been properly rewarded.

The

piece, based on research by Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, added
a twist to the last argument.

Four years after the

publication of the popular Civil War novel, Gone with the

Wind, Greenbie reasoned that had Carroll been a romantic
feminine figure who had defied Southern soldiers at the

door, spied for the union in the dead of night, or bean a

"federal Scarlett O'Hara" she would have been long

remembered and greatly honored.
throughout."

But "hers was a man's role

Because Carroll wrote for the Union, advised

President Lincoln and his cabinet, and designed military

strategy, she did not fit into the acceptable romantic
17
portrayal of women's work during the Civil War.
Her work
was too cerebral, her figure too corpulent, her age too

advanced to permit men to allow her to become a national
heroine.
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Marjorie Greenbie's research for the article went
beyond the repetition of the congressional documents,

Blackwell's biography, and the other suffragists1 writings

that earlier defenders had relied upon.

She had found a

treasure on the Eastern Shore of Maryland in one of Anne

Carroll's nieces, Nellie Calvert Carroll, who remembered her

"Aunt Anne."

In Pikesville, Maryland, she had found

Katherine Cradock, another niece, who had kept her aunt's
papers in her attic .

Greenbie had persuaded her to place

them in the keeping of the Maryland Historical Society.
Shortly after the magazine series was released, Greenbie's

book on Carroll, My Dear Lady, was published.

Although she

had had time to use only a few of the documents she had

discovered in her book, Marjorie Greenbie would be joined by
her husband Sydney twelve years later in a second biography
of Carroll that promised to use all the documents.

The two

Greenbies would form a team determined to put their version

of Carroll's story into the appropriate place in the history
books of America.

IB

The Greenbies were not historians.
doctoral degree in philology from Yale;

Marjorie had a

Sydney was what

might be euphemistically termed a "popular" writer, author
of such books as Furs to Furrows:

An Epic of Rugged

Individualism, a defensive apology of manifest destiny as a

positive good and a non-imperialist method of spreading
American civilization.

He also wrote a whole series of

278

travelogues on South and Central America as the "sister
republics" of the United States.

His works were panned by

historical critics as stylish but insubstantial.

The

writing styles of both Greenbies were similar, not only to

each other, but to Carroll1s work as well.

exclamation points, and paranoia abound.

Hyperbole,

"Could it be,"

Marjorie Greenbie began in My Dear Lady, "that there was a
body of fact about the Civil War, fact intimately

concerning . .

. Lincoln and General Grant, which had been

deliberately concealed?

Could it be that much of the

history of the Civil War is, in effect, untrue . .
on
been allowed to remain so?"

. and has

Greenbie had begun her research in 1937 for her
first book on Carroll, after discovering Blackwell's

biography.

A movie short called Strange Glory whidh

mentioned Carroll she viewed as a sign "that the long
silence about Anne Carroll in written history was bound soon
to be broken."21 Greenbie hurriedly finished her book and

published it in 1940.

My Dear Lady suffered from its quick completion.
is replete with errors:

It

incorrect dates, names (Carroll's

pamphlet Union of the States is mistitled The American
Union), and events.

Even the epigraph taken from Carroll's

The Great American Battle was misquoted.

Greenbie gave

Carroll numerous imaginary beaux, including both Millard
Fillmore and James Buchanan.

Family legend had mentioned
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both, in spite of Carroll's regard for Fillmore as a father

figure.

As for Buchanan, Carroll's political antipathy

toward the Democrats would tend to preclude any romantic
attachment.

22

Carroll was also given an access to Lincoln

undreamed of by any of her previous biographers.

Livermore

had written in My Story of the War that CarrolI saw Lincoln
easily and that he had kept a "special file for her
communications, " but few biographers were willing to suggest
that Carroll could simply walk in and see Lincoln as she

wished.

His papers, in fact, contain an angry letter from

Carroll demanding either an appointment or a reply after she

had been kept waiting to see him for over a month.

Greenbie, in contrast to earlier biographers, portrayed
23
Carroll as obtaining instant access at all times.
Lemuel Evans was married off by Greenbie, though
there is no evidence he ever married.

He became Carroll's

military attaché to prevent any hints of scandal or
impropriety on Carroll's part.^* Greenbie stressed

Carroll's femininity again and again in the text, though it

proved difficult for her to comply with Nellie Calvert's
request that the biography be written in such a way as to

"remove the false sense of strong-mindedness conveyed by her
works."

Carroll was to be feminine, sociable, lady-like.

Any suggestion of Carroll emerging from her proper sphere
without the protective shield of the image of the Southern
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lady was inconceivable to her genteel niece.

Faced with

the contradiction between Calvert’s demands and Carroll's
work and personality, Greenbie began nobly, but soon gave up

trying to assert her subject's femininity in hopes of

convincing the reader of Carroll's overall worth in spite of
her imperious and independent nature.
She succeeded to a degree.

Reviews of My Dear Lady

carefully noted that Carroll's intelligence and hard work
for the Union had not interfered with her femininity.

As

was true in the nineteenth century, however, those who heard

Carroll’s claim had a difficult time accepting it.

They

reviewed the work cautiously, granting its readability but

awaiting more conclusive evidence before accepting the

validity of the claim.

Greenbie had no such hesitation.
Carroll story completely.

She believed the

Hurrying into print with My Dear

Lady, she had not used many of Carroll’s papers she had

retrieved from her niece’s attic.

She wanted more time for

research and promised her public that a closely-documented,
less speculative work would follow that would prove

Carroll’s claim beyond any doubt.

World War II intervened

after 1500 copies of My Dear Lady had been run, and the book
quickly disappeared from print.%? The story, however, did

not disappear.

A radio play based on Greenbie's book was

broadcast in June 1941, starring Agnes Moorhead as Anne
»
20
Carroll. Movie offers came from several studios.
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Greenbie, off in the South Pacific with her husband Sydney

for the duration of the war, left the story behind and
returned to it about 1946.

29

At the same time the Greenbies began their work on a
more substantial biography, newspaper reporter Hollister

Noble was writing a novel based on the life of Anne Carroll.
Entitled Woman with a Sword, it was published by Doubleday

in 1948.3° Coble's novel, which shaved fifteen years and
twenty pounds off Carroll, incorporated the romantic ideas
the Woman's Home Companion article had found lacking in

Carroll's story.

Carroll became a secret agent paid by the

War Department and under the direct supervision of Lincoln,
Stanton, and Benjamin Wade, chairman of the Committee on the

Conduct of the War.

Lemuel Evans became Carroll's fian'oe

whom she would never marry because of what Noble delicately

referred to as her "psychological problem."

Noble's opinion

that Carroll never found a man who could measure up to her

father was a reasonable interpretation of her single state.

He added, however, that career demands also limited

Carroll's freedom of action.

Those demands were not

confined to simple personal fulfillment, but included the

more important demands of duty to God and country.

31

Noble's novel was romantic and dashing and fairly
well-written.

It was also historical fantasy of the

best-selling sort, with just enough sex and violence to make

it interesting without being offensive.

Book reviewers
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praised the portrait of the "petite, lovely and completely
charming lady," whose "ingenious and brilliant mind" had

saved the Union from annihilation.32 Life magazine told

her story, calling Carroll "Lincoln's Lady Strategist" and
33
only briefly mentioning that the work was fiction.
Adaptations of Noble's novel were performed on Cavalcade of
America, and on the Playhouse 25 broadcast of the Armed

Forces Radio Network.34 The more times the story was told,
the greater Carroll became:

a spy, a major-general, a

"secret war tactician."3^ She met with Lincoln and Stanton
often to mastermind the strategical plans of the war.

She deserved the country's thanks, but she had nobly kept

her secret, so as not to denigrate the country's heroes.

She died in penury (with dates as various as April,
February, the 19th, the 18th, the 16th, 1893, 1894), an
unsung heroine foiled by an ungrateful Congress and sexist

historians, and all that had happened to her was important

and destructive and romantic because she was a woman.
The romantic appeal of a lone woman, fighting the

military and political leaders of the time for recognition

and payment for her work, yet managing to retain her
attractive feminity throughout the battle, had enormous
appeal for the public.
thrilled.

Anne Carroll would have been

At last her version of her story had been told.

Granted, some of the biographers' embellishments were
inaccurate (a point which would have concerned her not at
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all), but all accepted unquestioningly the central issue:

Anna Ella Carroll had designed and presented the Tennessee
campaign plan to the United States government during the

Civil War and that plan had been directly responsible for
the winning of the war and the salvation of the Union.
After the first flush of literary excitement at such

a discovery in American history died down, however, critical

reviews and articles began to appear.

F. Lauriston Bullard,

who had reviewed My Dear Lady favorably but reservedly in

1940,37 published a critical analysis of Carroll's
congressional claims.

A contributing editor to the

Lincoln Herald, Bullard argued that claims made by and for
Carroll were so incredible and so excessive that they
demanded dispassionate and scholarly investigation.

Bullard

concentrated on the inconsistencies and changes in text

found in Carroll's congressional documents, the fortuitous

additions, and the credit that Carroll had willingly given
to Scott in 1865, but had tried to belittle in her 1876
memorial to Congress.

In the end Bullard accepted Carroll

as the one who had brought the Tennessee Plan to the
attention of military authorities in Washington, but argued
that Charles M. Scott, "an able and honest man" was its true

author.

39

A few months later, Carroll's Civil War pamphlets

came under scrutiny by lawyer Walter Armstrong.

He found

them to be the "best and most persuasive contemporary
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rationalization of the theory upon which Lincoln acted."

As

for the military plan, while Armstrong did not deny the
validity of Carroll’s claim outright, he pointed out that

Lincoln’s dismissal of Carroll's propaganda proposal made it

clear that he probably would have been unsympathetic to
Carroll's military claims.^®
It was not until 1950 that a scholarly appraisal of

Carroll's military claim was written.

Kenneth P. Williams,

working on a multi-volume history of the war, considered the
claim in both his history and in a journal article.

Carroll's claim, which Williams thought "seemingly settled"

by congressional inaction and her death, had been revived by
Greenbie and Noble to such an extent that Williams was
determined to rule on its veracity once and for all.
interest was not entirely academic:

His

Williams, whom Sydney

Greenbie later referred to as "the bull in General Grant's

pasture," was a great fan of General Grant, and any attack
on the general's abilities and accomplishments was
automatically suspect.
Williams used the official records of the war to

trace the actions in the western theatre to disprove

Greenbie and Noble's versions of Carroll's claim.

Greenbie

had not consulted the military records and had mistakenly

credited Carroil, Thomas A. Scott, and Lincoln with

informing Grant of the plan in February as General Halleck
ordered Grant up the Tennessee.

Noble had explained the
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same event with a secret order from Lincoln to Buell and

Halleck.

In fact, that move upriver was suggested by Grant

and Foote to Halleck.42 The official records did not

support Carroll8s claim, Williams argued.

As for her

defenders, Wade and Scott, both were partisan politicians

and inconsistent in their statements on her behalf.

43

Since ingratitude was certainly uncharacteristic of Lincoln,

Williams wrote, the fact that Lincoln turned down her

propaganda proposal with such vigor further showed that she
could not have been the author of a successful campaign
undertaken such a short time prior to her proposal.44

'

In the end, Williams was not even willing to grant

that Carroll had presented the same November 30 plan to

Scott as had been printed in her congressional claims
45
because the original document had never been found.'
In
the light of his analysis of the inaccuracies of both

Greenbie and Ndble, his caution was reasonable.

He did not,

however, examine Carroll's papers for the plan, merely the
War Department records.

Since Carroll claimed to have read

the paper out loud to Scott, it would not have been in the
register of letters received anyway.

Be that as it may,

there was and is still no proof that the copy of the plan

extant in Carroll's papers today was the one she claimed she

had presented to Scott on November 30.4@
Williams did an excellent job of analyzing Carroll's

claim to prove the errancy of her assumptions regarding the
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effect of her plan.

He also did an excellent job of

provoking Sydney and Marjorie Greenbie, who had been hard at

work on a follow-up biography of Carroll.

Anna Ella Carrol1

and Abraham Lincoln was due to be published in 1952, and a

friend of Williams wrote to the University of Tampa Press

for a pre-publication copy for Williams.

At that time, the

press was run by Sydney Greenbie, and the Carroll biography
was its first publication.

Williams' attack on My Dear Lady

had roused Greenbie's wrath, and the polite request for a
copy of the new biography was met with a childish refusal.

"We don't give a whoot [sic] what Mr.

Williams says or

whether he sees it," Greenbie wrote, angry that Williams had

accused his wife of inaccuracies.

"In due course we will

still take him on and show him a thing or two."*? This was
the first shot in a series of nasty exchanges between
Williams and the Greenbies on the validity of Carroll's
claim and on the scholarly credentials of her biographers.

While the Greenbies' second volume did make use of
Carroll's papers and did benefit from interviews with family

members who remembered her, their extravagant and
unsupported claims detracted from Carroll's reputation as a

legitimate historical figure.

The Greenbies were

convinced that Carroll's help was essential to Lincoln.
They accepted her pamphlets and petitions as prima facie

evidence to assert that their interpretation of Carroll was

correct, that she had been denied recognition solely because
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she was a woman, and that "wicked and malicious historians”
were conspiratorially determined to negate her importance to
the conduct of the war and to history=49

The Greenbies’ book was painfully defensive in tone.
It portrayed a fantastical version of events:

Carroll

supporting Lincoln as early as Lincoln’s Cooper Union speech
in February 1860, which the Greenbies claimed she attended

as a member of the committee that selected lecturers for the
platform; 50 Lincoln, Stanton, Wade, and Carroll meeting

together nightly in the War Department's telegraph office to
plot strategy;51 Carrol1 so close to Lincoln and so much a

part of his Cabinet that the empty chair in Francis
B. Carpenter's painting of the Cabinet at the time of the

Emancipation Proclamation was for her.5% Aside from these
wholly imaginary and unsupported conjectures, the book

contained an inattention to historical detail that was
characteristic of the Greenbies' work and that provided a
field day for reviewers.

Secretary of War Simon Cameron was

Simeon Cameron throughout the text;

Brady was William F. Brady.

photographer Matthew

President Andrew Jackson's

famous toast at the Jefferson Day dinner in 1830 was

misquoted, as was Samuel worse's Biblical telegraph message
that inaugurated the use of his invention.

Not only was

historical detail badly damaged, but even literary nuances
suffered from the Greenbies' inaccuracies as magnolia trees
burst "into waxy bloom" in March in Washington, three months
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prior to their normal blossoming.
Most damaging of all to the Greenbies' text and to

their version of Carroll’s claim was the inventive

terminology within their footnotes.

Practically every

controversial claim the Greenbies made had a footnote.

But

practically every one of those footnotes included the
phrase:

"This scene is synthetic."

Where evidence was

missing, the Greenbies argued, "psychology must step in and,

with sleuth-like determination, re-establish the facts."54

The Greenbies met criticism of their book in the

Journal of Southern History, which was the only major

historical journal that reviewed Anna Ella Carroll and
Abraham Lincoln, with accusations that the reviewer was
exaggerating and distorting the few errors that existed "for
his own ends."55 But Sydney Greenbie saved his most

acidulous replies for the criticism Kenneth Williams

presented in the Lincoln Herald.

For the Greenbies (at

least for Sydney, since Marjorie tended to let her husband

fight her battles), Carroll and her claim had by now become

less a symbol of man’s inhumanity to woman than the failure
of "distinguished egg-heads," "subterreanean" pundits, and

"academia gauleiters" to appreciate the work of outsiders in

the academic provinces.55 As Carroll had been an outsider
in the nineteenth century, striving for recognition and

legitimization by those in power, so the Greenbies fought
for the recognition of their work by legitimate scholars.
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In large part, that recognition was denied.

James

G. Randall mentioned Carroll and the Greenbies* work

favorably;57 Allan Nevins mentioned Carroll1s claim as
well, but pointed out the additional evidence that she was

not the first nor the only one to conceive of the Tennessee

River campaign.58 Roy P. Basler included a letter from
Lincoln to Carroll praising her "address to Maryland" in his
nine-volume edition of Lincoln's papers.59 But by and
large, the academic community found Williams' condemnation

of Carroll's claim convincing and substantially supported by
the Official Records.

Even Williams' additional, somewhat

specious, argument was accepted:

it was unnecessary to give

Carroll credit for the Tennessee Plan because even if she
had thought of it, it was so obvious it had doubtless

occurred to every military mind.58

Resigning themselves momentarily to the lack of

scholarly appreciation, the Greenbies returned their
attention to the popular press, where praise for Noble's

work was still strong.

A Hallmark Hall of Fame television

production, based on Noble's novel and starring Jayne
Meadows, had been broadcast in February 1952.

Noble had

also made a distribution agreement with Sears and Roebuck.
They had sold thousands of copies of Woman with a Sword

through their People's Book Club.5If the Greenbies could
not obtain scholarly regard, they were determined to protect

their story of Anne Carroll from pirates such as Noble who
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were making a fortune.

On July 21, 1954, the Greenbies

filed a copyright infringement suit against Noble, his

publisher Doubleday, Sears and Roebuck, and against those
who had sponsored the shows based on Noble•s book:

Dupont,

the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), Hallmark Cards,

Cavalcade of America;

Batten, Barton, Dunstine & Osborne,

who had produced a 1949 radio show;

and Foote, Cone and

Belding, producers of the Hallmark Hall of Fame version.62

The civil case was before the courts for nearly

three years and produced over 1000 pages of testimony.
Noble committed suicide just prior to the suit's filing, and

eventually only his publisher and Sears and Roebuck remained
as defendants.

The judge ruled against Marjorie Greenbie,

finding that Carroll's story was "derived from common

sources and materials available to all."@3 Since

historical facts contained in government publications were
not subject to copyright, and since Greenbie had failed to
prove that Noble had copied from her book rather than using

the original source material available on Carroll, no

copyright infringement existed.6* Furthermore, since

Greenbie's first book had not been a commercial success and
had been out of print for six years before Noble published
the novel, Greenbie had not been harmed financially, and
could recover no damages.

As for Noble's "parallel

language, incidents, ideas and juxtaposition of words and

events" that Greenbie had exhibited as clear evidence of
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Noble’s plagiarism, the judge ruled that "similarity of

phraseology" did not amount to a copyright infringement.65
"Against this Janus-faced decision" the Greenbies

appealed, but withdrew after a settlement offer, citing the

cost of pursuing an appeal.66 infuriated by the loss,

Sydney Greenbie wrote a book about the writing and the
plagiarizing of the story of Anna Ella Carroll.

The book

was valuable for additional information on Carroll's life as

it recounted the interviews held with her family.

Greenbie

was more interested, however, in revealing that Noble's
"sole original contribution to the life of a very great

person was to falsify her position and her American ideals

by making her and her distinguished associate, Judge Evans,
into communists."6?

Noble's book, ranted Greenbie, was a collaboration
by communists at Doubleday to "propagandize 'old man Marx'"
and to make money.66 Evidence of the second was a given.

Evidence of the first was circumstantial.

Noble had made a

jarring reference to Carroll reading Marx's Civil War

essays, and he had persisted in referring to the Radical
Republicans as the "red Republicans."

He had also

included a scene wherein Evans called for a restructuring of
American capitalist society away from the "feudal strangle"

of Southern planters that had rested on the "exploitation of

man by man" in the form of racial slavery.?6 But such

minor incidents of Marxist philosophy tended to be buried by
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the sweeping romance of Noble’s novelization.

The book was

not, as Greenbie preferred to view it, ”a case of cultural
adultery .... the rape of one of the great stories of

American history by communists for communist ends.”
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Such libelous vituperation kept any publisher from
bringing out Greenbie's manuscript, and in the end he had it
privately printed.

But the Greenbies' championship of

Carroll's causa might have had some effect on the scholarly

world, for even though Williams had pretty well destroyed
their version of her claim, her story did not disappear from

view entirely.

She appeared again, tale intact, in a
72

history of women in the war and in a juvenile biography.

One of her Civil War pamphlets was reprinted in a scholarly

collection of such publications and she was listed in the

biographical directory, Notable American Women.

In the

1970s, as women's history began to achieve momentum and

notice as a legitimate field of historical inquiry, her
entire career was given scholarly attention, free from the

partisanship and literary vindictiveness that had

characterized earlier work.
Charles McCool Snyder discovered approximately fifty

letters between Carroll and Millard Fillmore and, in 1973,
presented his findings about Carroll's career in the 1850s,

characterizing her accurately as a political strategist, but
dismissing her somewhat by calling her a "gadfly."
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Jean

Baker, historian of Maryland politics in the nineteenth

L
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century, analyzed Carroll's writings in two of her texts,
including a quantitative textual analysis of Carroll's The

Great American Battle as a prime example of Know-Nothing

literature.
E. B. Long, research director for Civil War
historian Bruce Catton in the 1950s and 1960s, took on

Carroll's military claim once again, but with a less
condescending and hostile attitude than Kenneth Williams had
evinced.

He fully expected his attempt would "undoubtedly

arouse the same acrimonious controversy that has surrounded
this Maryland lady for over a century," but was willing to
take his chances7^ Long granted that Carroll had written

the Plan in her papers that Williams had dismissed, and that

she had presented the plan to the War Department.

He also

pointed out that those "with political and social axes to

grind" had used Carroll's story for their own purposes.
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Long reasoned, as had Williams, that the design of the plan

was so obvious that giving any one person credit was a bit
absurd.

The validity of her claim aside, Long did not think

Carroll was a "maliciously hidden" figure in history, but
merely a "competent, capable woman," a "minor figure with a
78
fascination all her own, but with slim importance."
This last assessment of Carroll must be

reconsidered, however, in the light of her work outside her
claims of military strategy.

Carroll had used her skill as

a writer to do the work she wanted in a field she loved.

As
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a woman, her options in politics were limited.

So, in the

beginning of her career, Carroll had developed a compromise
methodology to fulfill her goal of participating in
political activity.

Writing was one of the very few

socially acceptable activities outside the home for

upper-class women, particularly Southern women.

Even that

activity was limited by the image of the "Southern lady."

The pervasiveness of that image meant that to achieve social

acceptability for any activities outside the norm, the woman
working had to do so within the cultural framework that

existed.

Carroll accepted the validity of the dominant

assumptions of her culture at first:

the importance of

politics both professional and personal, of ambition and

achievement, and of the idea of the womanly sphere.
writings reflected those assumptions.

Her

And because her work

reflected those assumptions rather than doing battle against
them, Carroll achieved one of her major goals:

work read and taken seriously by politicians.

to have her

79

At the same time, the cultural imperative of the
Southern lady demanded that she present her work in a very
specific manner.

For Carroll, the image's cultural demand

of selflessness would not take the usual and expected form
of voicelessness and listening to those who had something to

say worth listening to (i.e., white male politicians and
preachers).

Carroll's selflessness began as anonymity.

unknown voice could present ideas important to her in a

Her
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designedly non-threatening manner.

80

Carroll’s method as

she began her career did not threaten to challenge the
male-dominant power structure and try to change it.

it threaten her own sense of feminine self.

Nor did

She was very

aware that she was a female operating in a male sphere.

But

with duty as her motivation and anonymity or, later,

self-effacement and apology part of her by-line, she

reassured her readers.

Perhaps Carroll knew claiming a

right to participate fully in politics would raise a

backlash that could shut her out completely.

81

Carroll communicated her ideas through print and
personal contact, through petitioning rather than

confrontation.

These three characteristics of her style are

typical of what historian Linda Kerber has labeled
"prepolitioal" behavior:

the acknowledgment of inferiority

(the apology), the rhetoric of humility (the assurance that

only duty had drawn Carroll into political matters and away

from her more appropriate role), and the individual nature
of the act of petitioning (Carroll wrote alone, even when
gp
the ideas she presented were shared by many).
But for
Carroll, her actions as writer, lobbyist, critic, hostess,

traveller, saleswoman, or strategist, were unquestionably
political acts with political goals in mind, be they

publication, patronage positions, or simple acceptance of
the value of her opinions and intelligence.
When Carroll began writing under her own name with
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no apology, however, and when she filed for her claim and
entered the public arena, her methodology had changed.
Filing her claim and gathering support from suffragists

represented more than a desire for money and for recognition
for something she thought she had done.

They were also acts

that forever broke her link with the role of a proper

Southern lady.

Because she was no longer anonymous, she was

no longer voiceless.

By entering the public sphere. Carroll

confronted the institutions and cultural imperatives that

had proved so unaccepting of her desire for recognition.
To place Carroll into a historical category that is
not a Southern lady is difficult because of the

individualistic nature of her work.

She was not a reformer,

an abolitionist or a proto-feminist of the type identifiable
from 1830 to 1860.

She did not join voluntary associations.

She was not a suffragist, although she did not hesitate to
use their strengths to support her cause.

She was not an

upper or middle-class family-oriented woman preserving the

hearth for a hard-working husband and embracing the cult of
domesticity.

Nor was she an unmarried daughter working

until she was married and thus properly taken care of.

83

If categorized at all, Carroll was a bit of a
Victorian bluestocking, albeit a sociable one, but

enraptured by books and education.

A prescriptive writer,

her works reflected the assumption that universal moral
principles could be conceptualized, understood, and acted
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upon in the same manner as physics or chemistry.

Feeling

free to write on all sorts of subjects, Carroll exemplified

the lettered women and men of the Victorian era in America
who were amateur experts and believed learning and

scholarship were inclusive rather than exclusive, and should
be shared with others, whether as commentary or advice.

84

The fact that Carroll never married was surprising.

She was an attractive and vivacious woman of a distinguished

family.

But she never seemed inclined to give up the

relative freedom a single woman had over a married one in
nineteenth-century America.

Her work as a writer help

support her through mudh of her life and enabled her to care
for her father, a "congenial presence [which] seemed to be

all-sufficient for her."®^ By caring for her father, she
could fulfill the domestic role which society demanded of

her, while retaining her independence.

She was not without

men in her life, but her work was her passion.

Her

surviving letters to politicians and family alike contain
little of the domesticity that was the usual lot and focus
of most women during this period, when the proper sphere of

womanly activity became the cult of domesticity.

Instead,

her letters and those she received were full of political
news and gossip, of reports and opinions, of rumors and
plans, of articles and editorials.

She was treated by the

vast majority of minor politicians who wrote to her as a
woman with a great deal of political and legal acumen and a
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certain amount of influence.

her published work as well;

The former was evidenced in
the latter was a less tangible

and certainly overestimated quality.

Defining Carroll1s historical importance has been

limited to one-sided stands taken in support of or in
opposition to her claim to authorship of the Tennessee

Campaign.

Fortunately, historians in the last twenty years

have become aware that the past is very complex.

Within

that complexity, Carroll begins to assume her place more

clearly.

She becomes, not a simplistic figure of

downtrodden womanhood that historians have either conspired
to consign to oblivion or to save from obscurity, but rather
a woman of active political involvement, laboring for causes

she believed in, using the methods available to her.^^ As
an historical persona. Carroll has become what she called
for in The Great American Battle:

not a Joan of Arc, but a

faithful and true woman, neither heroine nor fool, but an
American woman who could stand in her own shoes.

07

Those

shoes might be a different size than she had planned, a

different style, planted in a different place, but they are
at last her own.
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